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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Miller
Request for Comments: 7520 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Category: Informational May 2015
ISSN: 2070-1721
Examples of Protecting Content Using
JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
Abstract
This document contains a set of examples using JSON Object Signing
and Encryption (JOSE) technology to protect data. These examples
present a representative sampling of JSON Web Key (JWK) objects as
well as various JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) results given similar inputs.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7520.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Miller Informational [Page 1]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................5 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................5 2. Terminology .....................................................6 3. JSON Web Key Examples ...........................................6 3.1. EC Public Key ..............................................6 3.2. EC Private Key .............................................7 3.3. RSA Public Key .............................................8 3.4. RSA Private Key ............................................8 3.5. Symmetric Key (MAC Computation) ...........................10 3.6. Symmetric Key (Encryption) ................................11 4. JSON Web Signature Examples ....................................11 4.1. RSA v1.5 Signature ........................................12 4.1.1. Input Factors ......................................12 4.1.2. Signing Operation ..................................12 4.1.3. Output Results .....................................13 4.2. RSA-PSS Signature .........................................15 4.2.1. Input Factors ......................................15 4.2.2. Signing Operation ..................................16 4.2.3. Output Results .....................................17 4.3. ECDSA Signature ...........................................19 4.3.1. Input Factors ......................................19 4.3.2. Signing Operation ..................................19 4.3.3. Output Results .....................................20 4.4. HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection ............................21 4.4.1. Input Factors ......................................22 4.4.2. Signing Operation ..................................22 4.4.3. Output Results .....................................23 4.5. Signature with Detached Content ...........................24 4.5.1. Input Factors ......................................25 4.5.2. Signing Operation ..................................25 4.5.3. Output Results .....................................26 4.6. Protecting Specific Header Fields .........................27 4.6.1. Input Factors ......................................27 4.6.2. Signing Operation ..................................27 4.6.3. Output Results .....................................28 4.7. Protecting Content Only ...................................29 4.7.1. Input Factors ......................................30 4.7.2. Signing Operation ..................................30 4.7.3. Output Results .....................................31 4.8. Multiple Signatures .......................................32 4.8.1. Input Factors ......................................32 4.8.2. First Signing Operation ............................33 4.8.3. Second Signing Operation ...........................34 4.8.4. Third Signing Operation ............................36 4.8.5. Output Results .....................................37 5. JSON Web Encryption Examples ...................................39 Miller Informational [Page 2]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.1. Key Encryption Using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2 ...........39 5.1.1. Input Factors ......................................39 5.1.2. Generated Factors ..................................41 5.1.3. Encrypting the Key .................................41 5.1.4. Encrypting the Content .............................42 5.1.5. Output Results .....................................43 5.2. Key Encryption Using RSA-OAEP with AES-GCM ................45 5.2.1. Input Factors ......................................46 5.2.2. Generated Factors ..................................47 5.2.3. Encrypting the Key .................................48 5.2.4. Encrypting the Content .............................48 5.2.5. Output Results .....................................49 5.3. Key Wrap Using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ...52 5.3.1. Input Factors ......................................53 5.3.2. Generated Factors ..................................54 5.3.3. Encrypting the Key .................................54 5.3.4. Encrypting the Content .............................55 5.3.5. Output Results .....................................56 5.4. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping Using ECDH-ES and AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM ..................................59 5.4.1. Input Factors ......................................59 5.4.2. Generated Factors ..................................60 5.4.3. Encrypting the Key .................................60 5.4.4. Encrypting the Content .............................61 5.4.5. Output Results .....................................63 5.5. Key Agreement Using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ........65 5.5.1. Input Factors ......................................66 5.5.2. Generated Factors ..................................66 5.5.3. Key Agreement ......................................67 5.5.4. Encrypting the Content .............................67 5.5.5. Output Results .....................................68 5.6. Direct Encryption Using AES-GCM ...........................70 5.6.1. Input Factors ......................................70 5.6.2. Generated Factors ..................................70 5.6.3. Encrypting the Content .............................71 5.6.4. Output Results .....................................72 5.7. Key Wrap Using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 .....73 5.7.1. Input Factors ......................................73 5.7.2. Generated Factors ..................................74 5.7.3. Encrypting the Key .................................74 5.7.4. Encrypting the Content .............................75 5.7.5. Output Results .....................................77 5.8. Key Wrap Using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM ...................79 5.8.1. Input Factors ......................................79 5.8.2. Generated Factors ..................................80 5.8.3. Encrypting the Key .................................80 5.8.4. Encrypting the Content .............................80 5.8.5. Output Results .....................................82 Miller Informational [Page 3]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.9. Compressed Content ........................................84 5.9.1. Input Factors ......................................84 5.9.2. Generated Factors ..................................84 5.9.3. Encrypting the Key .................................85 5.9.4. Encrypting the Content .............................85 5.9.5. Output Results .....................................86 5.10. Including Additional Authenticated Data ..................88 5.10.1. Input Factors .....................................88 5.10.2. Generated Factors .................................89 5.10.3. Encrypting the Key ................................90 5.10.4. Encrypting the Content ............................90 5.10.5. Output Results ....................................91 5.11. Protecting Specific Header Fields ........................93 5.11.1. Input Factors .....................................93 5.11.2. Generated Factors .................................94 5.11.3. Encrypting the Key ................................94 5.11.4. Encrypting the Content ............................94 5.11.5. Output Results ....................................95 5.12. Protecting Content Only ..................................97 5.12.1. Input Factors .....................................97 5.12.2. Generated Factors .................................98 5.12.3. Encrypting the Key ................................98 5.12.4. Encrypting the Content ............................98 5.12.5. Output Results ....................................99 5.13. Encrypting to Multiple Recipients .......................101 5.13.1. Input Factors ....................................101 5.13.2. Generated Factors ................................101 5.13.3. Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient ........102 5.13.4. Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient .......103 5.13.5. Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient ........105 5.13.6. Encrypting the Content ...........................106 5.13.7. Output Results ...................................108 6. Nesting Signatures and Encryption .............................110 6.1. Signing Input Factors ....................................110 6.2. Signing Operation ........................................112 6.3. Signing Output ...........................................112 6.4. Encryption Input Factors .................................113 6.5. Encryption Generated Factors .............................113 6.6. Encrypting the Key .......................................114 6.7. Encrypting the Content ...................................114 6.8. Encryption Output ........................................115 7. Security Considerations .......................................119 8. References ....................................................119 8.1. Normative References .....................................119 8.2. Informative References ...................................120 Acknowledgements .................................................120 Author's Address .................................................120 Miller Informational [Page 4]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 1. Introduction The JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) technologies -- JSON Web Signature [JWS], JSON Web Encryption [JWE], JSON Web Key [JWK], and JSON Web Algorithms [JWA] -- can be used collectively to encrypt and/or sign content using a variety of algorithms. While the full set of permutations is extremely large, and might be daunting to some, it is expected that most applications will only use a small set of algorithms to meet their needs. This document provides a number of examples of signing or encrypting content using JOSE. While not exhaustive, it does compile a representative sampling of JOSE features. As much as possible, the same signature payload or encryption plaintext content is used to illustrate differences in various signing and encryption results. This document also provides a number of example JWK objects. These examples illustrate the distinguishing properties of various key types and emphasize important characteristics. Most of the JWK examples are then used in the signature or encryption examples that follow. All of the examples contained herein are available in a machine- readable format at <https://github.com/ietf-jose/cookbook>. 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document This document separates data that are expected to be input to an implementation of JOSE from data that are expected to be generated by an implementation of JOSE. Each example, wherever possible, provides enough information both to replicate the results of this document and to validate the results by running its inverse operation (e.g., signature results can be validated by performing the JWS verify). However, some algorithms inherently use random data; therefore, computations employing them cannot be exactly replicated. Such cases are explicitly stated in the relevant sections. All instances of binary octet strings are represented using base64url [RFC4648] encoding. Wherever possible and unless otherwise noted, the examples include the JWS or JWE Compact Serialization, general JWS or JWE JSON Serialization, and flattened JWS or JWE JSON Serialization. All of the examples in this document have whitespace added to improve formatting and readability. Except for JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload content, whitespace is not part of the cryptographic operations nor the exchange results. Miller Informational [Page 5]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Unless otherwise noted, the JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload content does include " " (U+0020 SPACE) characters. Line breaks (U+000A LINE FEED) replace some " " (U+0020 SPACE) characters to improve readability but are not present in the JWE Plaintext or JWS Payload. 2. Terminology This document inherits terminology regarding JSON Web Signature (JWS) technology from [JWS], terminology regarding JSON Web Encryption (JWE) technology from [JWE], terminology regarding JSON Web Key (JWK) technology from [JWK], and terminology regarding algorithms from [JWA]. 3. JSON Web Key Examples The following sections demonstrate how to represent various JWK and JWK Set objects. 3.1. EC Public Key This example illustrates an Elliptic Curve (EC) public key. This example is the public key corresponding to the private key in Figure 2. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. { "kty": "EC", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "use": "sig", "crv": "P-521", "x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9 A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt", "y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVy SsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1" } Figure 1: Elliptic Curve P-521 Public Key The field "kty" value of "EC" identifies this as an Elliptic Curve key. The field "crv" identifies the curve, which is curve P-521 for this example. The values of the fields "x" and "y" are the base64url-encoded X and Y coordinates (respectively). Miller Informational [Page 6]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The values of the fields "x" and "y" decoded are the octets necessary to represent each full coordinate to the order of the curve. For a key over curve P-521, the values of the fields "x" and "y" are exactly 66 octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero (0x00) octets to reach the expected length. 3.2. EC Private Key This example illustrates an Elliptic Curve private key. This example is the private key corresponding to the public key in Figure 1. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. { "kty": "EC", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "use": "sig", "crv": "P-521", "x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9 A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt", "y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVy SsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1", "d": "AAhRON2r9cqXX1hg-RoI6R1tX5p2rUAYdmpHZoC1XNM56KtscrX6zb KipQrCW9CGZH3T4ubpnoTKLDYJ_fF3_rJt" } Figure 2: Elliptic Curve P-521 Private Key The field "kty" value of "EC" identifies this as an Elliptic Curve key. The field "crv" identifies the curve, which is curve P-521 (also known as SECG curve secp521r1) for this example. The values of the fields "x" and "y" are the base64url-encoded X and Y coordinates (respectively). The field "d" value is the base64url-encoded private key. The values of the fields "d", "x", and "y" decoded are the octets necessary to represent the private key or each full coordinate (respectively) to the order of the curve. For a key over curve P-521, the values of the "d", "x", and "y" fields are each exactly 66 octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero (0x00) octets to reach the expected length. Miller Informational [Page 7]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 3.3. RSA Public Key This example illustrates an RSA public key. This example is the public key corresponding to the private key in Figure 4. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "use": "sig", "n": "n4EPtAOCc9AlkeQHPzHStgAbgs7bTZLwUBZdR8_KuKPEHLd4rHVTeT -O-XV2jRojdNhxJWTDvNd7nqQ0VEiZQHz_AJmSCpMaJMRBSFKrKb2wqV wGU_NsYOYL-QtiWN2lbzcEe6XC0dApr5ydQLrHqkHHig3RBordaZ6Aj- oBHqFEHYpPe7Tpe-OfVfHd1E6cS6M1FZcD1NNLYD5lFHpPI9bTwJlsde 3uhGqC0ZCuEHg8lhzwOHrtIQbS0FVbb9k3-tVTU4fg_3L_vniUFAKwuC LqKnS2BYwdq_mzSnbLY7h_qixoR7jig3__kRhuaxwUkRz5iaiQkqgc5g HdrNP5zw", "e": "AQAB" } Figure 3: RSA 2048-Bit Public Key The field "kty" value of "RSA" identifies this as an RSA key. The fields "n" and "e" values are the modulus and (public) exponent (respectively) using the minimum octets necessary. For a 2048-bit key, the field "n" value is 256 octets in length when decoded. 3.4. RSA Private Key This example illustrates an RSA private key. This example is the private key corresponding to the public key in Figure 3. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 8]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "use": "sig", "n": "n4EPtAOCc9AlkeQHPzHStgAbgs7bTZLwUBZdR8_KuKPEHLd4rHVTeT -O-XV2jRojdNhxJWTDvNd7nqQ0VEiZQHz_AJmSCpMaJMRBSFKrKb2wqV wGU_NsYOYL-QtiWN2lbzcEe6XC0dApr5ydQLrHqkHHig3RBordaZ6Aj- oBHqFEHYpPe7Tpe-OfVfHd1E6cS6M1FZcD1NNLYD5lFHpPI9bTwJlsde 3uhGqC0ZCuEHg8lhzwOHrtIQbS0FVbb9k3-tVTU4fg_3L_vniUFAKwuC LqKnS2BYwdq_mzSnbLY7h_qixoR7jig3__kRhuaxwUkRz5iaiQkqgc5g HdrNP5zw", "e": "AQAB", "d": "bWUC9B-EFRIo8kpGfh0ZuyGPvMNKvYWNtB_ikiH9k20eT-O1q_I78e iZkpXxXQ0UTEs2LsNRS-8uJbvQ-A1irkwMSMkK1J3XTGgdrhCku9gRld Y7sNA_AKZGh-Q661_42rINLRCe8W-nZ34ui_qOfkLnK9QWDDqpaIsA-b MwWWSDFu2MUBYwkHTMEzLYGqOe04noqeq1hExBTHBOBdkMXiuFhUq1BU 6l-DqEiWxqg82sXt2h-LMnT3046AOYJoRioz75tSUQfGCshWTBnP5uDj d18kKhyv07lhfSJdrPdM5Plyl21hsFf4L_mHCuoFau7gdsPfHPxxjVOc OpBrQzwQ", "p": "3Slxg_DwTXJcb6095RoXygQCAZ5RnAvZlno1yhHtnUex_fp7AZ_9nR aO7HX_-SFfGQeutao2TDjDAWU4Vupk8rw9JR0AzZ0N2fvuIAmr_WCsmG peNqQnev1T7IyEsnh8UMt-n5CafhkikzhEsrmndH6LxOrvRJlsPp6Zv8 bUq0k", "q": "uKE2dh-cTf6ERF4k4e_jy78GfPYUIaUyoSSJuBzp3Cubk3OCqs6grT 8bR_cu0Dm1MZwWmtdqDyI95HrUeq3MP15vMMON8lHTeZu2lmKvwqW7an V5UzhM1iZ7z4yMkuUwFWoBvyY898EXvRD-hdqRxHlSqAZ192zB3pVFJ0 s7pFc", "dp": "B8PVvXkvJrj2L-GYQ7v3y9r6Kw5g9SahXBwsWUzp19TVlgI-YV85q 1NIb1rxQtD-IsXXR3-TanevuRPRt5OBOdiMGQp8pbt26gljYfKU_E9xn -RULHz0-ed9E9gXLKD4VGngpz-PfQ_q29pk5xWHoJp009Qf1HvChixRX 59ehik", "dq": "CLDmDGduhylc9o7r84rEUVn7pzQ6PF83Y-iBZx5NT-TpnOZKF1pEr AMVeKzFEl41DlHHqqBLSM0W1sOFbwTxYWZDm6sI6og5iTbwQGIC3gnJK bi_7k_vJgGHwHxgPaX2PnvP-zyEkDERuf-ry4c_Z11Cq9AqC2yeL6kdK T1cYF8", "qi": "3PiqvXQN0zwMeE-sBvZgi289XP9XCQF3VWqPzMKnIgQp7_Tugo6-N ZBKCQsMf3HaEGBjTVJs_jcK8-TRXvaKe-7ZMaQj8VfBdYkssbu0NKDDh jJ-GtiseaDVWt7dcH0cfwxgFUHpQh7FoCrjFJ6h6ZEpMF6xmujs4qMpP z8aaI4" } Figure 4: RSA 2048-Bit Private Key Miller Informational [Page 9]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The field "kty" value of "RSA" identifies this as an RSA key. The fields "n" and "e" values are the base64url-encoded modulus and (public) exponent (respectively) using the minimum number of octets necessary. The field "d" value is the base64url-encoded private exponent using the minimum number of octets necessary. The fields "p", "q", "dp", "dq", and "qi" are the base64url-encoded additional private information using the minimum number of octets necessary. For a 2048-bit key, the field "n" is 256 octets in length when decoded, and the field "d" is not longer than 256 octets in length when decoded. 3.5. Symmetric Key (MAC Computation) This example illustrates a symmetric key used for computing Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. { "kty": "oct", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037", "use": "sig", "alg": "HS256", "k": "hJtXIZ2uSN5kbQfbtTNWbpdmhkV8FJG-Onbc6mxCcYg" } Figure 5: HMAC SHA-256 Symmetric Key The field "kty" value of "oct" identifies this as a symmetric key. The field "k" value is the symmetric key. When used for the signing algorithm "HS256" (HMAC-SHA256), the field "k" value is 32 octets (or more) in length when decoded, padded with leading zero (0x00) octets to reach the minimum expected length. Miller Informational [Page 10]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 3.6. Symmetric Key (Encryption) This example illustrates a symmetric key used for encryption. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. { "kty": "oct", "kid": "1e571774-2e08-40da-8308-e8d68773842d", "use": "enc", "alg": "A256GCM", "k": "AAPapAv4LbFbiVawEjagUBluYqN5rhna-8nuldDvOx8" } Figure 6: AES 256-Bit Symmetric Encryption Key The field "kty" value of "oct" identifies this as a symmetric key. The field "k" value is the symmetric key. For the content encryption algorithm "A256GCM", the field "k" value is exactly 32 octets in length when decoded, padded with leading zero (0x00) octets to reach the expected length. 4. JSON Web Signature Examples The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWS objects. All of the signature examples use the following payload content (an abridged quote from "The Fellowship of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP]), serialized as UTF-8. The payload is presented here as a series of quoted strings that are concatenated to produce the JWS Payload. The sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" is substituted for (U+2019 RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK), and quotation marks (U+0022 QUOTATION MARK) are added for readability but are not present in the JWS Payload. "It\xe2\x80\x99s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your " "door. You step onto the road, and if you don't keep your feet, " "there\xe2\x80\x99s no knowing where you might be swept off " "to." Figure 7: Payload Content Plaintext Miller Informational [Page 11]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The payload -- with the sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" replaced with (U+2019 RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK) and quotations marks (U+0022 QUOTATION MARK) are removed -- is encoded as UTF-8 and then as base64url [RFC4648]: SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 8: Payload Content, base64url-encoded 4.1. RSA v1.5 Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "RS256" (RSASSA- PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256) algorithm. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 4.1.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 4. o "alg" parameter of "RS256". 4.1.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 9, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 10. { "alg": "RS256", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 9: JWS Protected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 12]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 Figure 10: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded The JWS Protected Header (Figure 10) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in Section 5.1 of [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 11). eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 11: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 11) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 12). MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmK ZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4J IwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8w W1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluP xUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_f cIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg Figure 12: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 4.1.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 9) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 12) Miller Informational [Page 13]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 . MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmK ZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4J IwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8w W1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluP xUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_f cIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg Figure 13: JWS Compact Serialization The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2 dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHo xnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmKZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII 7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4JIwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0Rnlt uYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8wW1Kt9eRo4QPo cSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluPxU Ahb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJush Z41Axf_fcIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg" } ] } Figure 14: General JWS JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 14]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbn NAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2 e5CZ5NlKtainoFmKZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84w nB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4JIwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_q HRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8wW1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9U zpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluPxUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0 KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_fcIe8u9ipH84ogore e7vjbU5y18kDquDg" } Figure 15: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.2. RSA-PSS Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "PS384" (RSASSA- PSS with SHA-384) algorithm. Note that RSASSA-PSS uses random data to generate the signature; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 4.2.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 4. o "alg" parameter of "PS384". Miller Informational [Page 15]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.2.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 16, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 17. { "alg": "PS384", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 16: JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 Figure 17: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded The JWS Protected Header (Figure 17) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 18). eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 18: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 18) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 19). cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT 0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a 6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw Figure 19: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 16]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.2.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 17) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 19) The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 . cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT 0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a 6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw Figure 20: JWS Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 17]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2 dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy 42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2IpN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5 dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXUvdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz2 8zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRXe8P_ijQ7p8Vd z0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT0q I0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uT OcbH510a6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw" } ] } Figure 21: General JWS JSON Serialization The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbn NAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42mi Ah2qyBzk1xEsnk2IpN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllV o6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXUvdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf 8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRXe8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9s hnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQT lqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD 4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw" } Figure 22: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 18]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.3. ECDSA Signature This example illustrates signing content using the "ES512" (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-521 and SHA- 512) algorithm. Note that ECDSA uses random data to generate the signature; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 4.3.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o EC private key on the curve P-521; this example uses the key from Figure 2. o "alg" parameter of "ES512". 4.3.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before beginning the signature process: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 23, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 24. { "alg": "ES512", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 23: JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 Figure 24: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 19]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The JWS Protected Header (Figure 24) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 25). eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 25: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 25) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 26). AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2 Figure 26: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 4.3.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 24) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 26) The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX hhbXBsZSJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 . AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2 Figure 27: JWS Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 20]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2 dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNl aAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvbu9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mt PBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kvAD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBp HABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2" } ] } Figure 28: General JWS JSON Serialization The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbn NAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9", "signature": "AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP 2kqaluUIIUnC9qvbu9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sD DyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kvAD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sF Y8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2" } Figure 29: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.4. HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection This example illustrates integrity protecting content using the "HS256" (HMAC-SHA-256) algorithm. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 21]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.4.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o HMAC symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 5. o "alg" parameter of "HS256". 4.4.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 30, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 31. { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" } Figure 30: JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 Figure 31: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded The JWS Protected Header (Figure 31) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 32). eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 32: JWS Signing Input Miller Informational [Page 22]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 32) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 33). s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0 Figure 33: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 4.4.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 31) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 33) The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 . s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0 Figure 34: JWS Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 23]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p 0" } ] } Figure 35: General JWS JSON Serialization The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0" } Figure 36: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.5. Signature with Detached Content This example illustrates a signature with detached content. This example is identical to other examples in Section 4, except the resulting JWS objects do not include the JWS Payload field. Instead, the application is expected to locate it elsewhere. For example, the signature might be in a metadata section, with the payload being the content. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 24]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.5.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from Figure 5. o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256". 4.5.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 37, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 38. { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" } Figure 37: JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 Figure 38: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded The JWS Protected Header (Figure 38) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 39). eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 39: JWS Signing Input Miller Informational [Page 25]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 39) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 40). s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0 Figure 40: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 4.5.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 38) o Signature (Figure 40) The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 . . s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0 Figure 41: General JWS JSON Serialization The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p 0" } ] } Figure 42: General JWS JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 26]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0" } Figure 43: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.6. Protecting Specific Header Fields This example illustrates a signature where only certain Header Parameters are protected. Since this example contains both unprotected and protected Header Parameters, only the general JWS JSON Serialization and flattened JWS JSON Serialization are possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 4.6.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from Figure 5. o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256". 4.6.2. Signing Operation The following are generated before completing the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 44, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 45. o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 46. { "alg": "HS256" } Figure 44: JWS Protected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 27]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 Figure 45: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded { "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" } Figure 46: JWS Unprotected Header JSON The JWS Protected Header (Figure 45) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 47). eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 47: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 47) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 48). bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr20 Figure 48: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 4.6.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 45) o JWS Unprotected Header (Figure 46) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 48) The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case. Miller Informational [Page 28]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9", "header": { "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" }, "signature": "bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr2 0" } ] } Figure 49: General JWS JSON Serialization The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9", "header": { "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" }, "signature": "bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr20" } Figure 50: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.7. Protecting Content Only This example illustrates a signature where none of the Header Parameters are protected. Since this example contains only unprotected Header Parameters, only the general JWS JSON Serialization and flattened JWS JSON Serialization are possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 29]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.7.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from Figure 5. o Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256". 4.7.2. Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the signing operation: o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 51. { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" } Figure 51: JWS Unprotected Header JSON The empty string (as there is no JWS Protected Header) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 52). . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 52: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 52) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 53). xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZuk Figure 53: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 30]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.7.3. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Unprotected Header (Figure 51) o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature (Figure 53) The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case. The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "header": { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" }, "signature": "xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZu k" } ] } Figure 54: General JWS JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 31]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the flattened JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "header": { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" }, "signature": "xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZuk" } Figure 55: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization 4.8. Multiple Signatures This example illustrates multiple signatures applied to the same payload. Since this example contains more than one signature, only the JSON General Serialization is possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 4.8.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 7, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 8. o Signing keys; this example uses the following: * RSA private key from Figure 4 for the first signature * EC private key from Figure 2 for the second signature * AES symmetric key from Figure 5 for the third signature o Signing algorithms; this example uses the following: * "RS256" for the first signature * "ES512" for the second signature * "HS256" for the third signature Miller Informational [Page 32]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.8.2. First Signing Operation The following are generated before completing the first signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 56, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 57. o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 58. { "alg": "RS256" } Figure 56: Signature #1 JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 Figure 57: Signature #1 JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded { "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 58: Signature #1 JWS Unprotected Header JSON The JWS Protected Header (Figure 57) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 59). eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 59: JWS Signing Input Miller Informational [Page 33]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 59) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 60). MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53uoimic1tcMdSg-qpt rzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkSw129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTC glNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUYyXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjy tKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuCHtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqB BCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGoOSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPt QHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-083B745_AfYOnlC9w Figure 60: JWS Signature #1, base64url-encoded The following is the assembled first signature serialized as JSON: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9", "header": { "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" }, "signature": "MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53u oimic1tcMdSg-qptrzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkS w129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTCglNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUY yXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjytKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuC HtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqBBCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGo OSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPtQHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-0 83B745_AfYOnlC9w" } Figure 61: Signature #1 JSON 4.8.3. Second Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the second signing operation: o JWS Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 62. { "alg": "ES512", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 62: Signature #2 JWS Unprotected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 34]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The empty string (as there is no JWS Protected Header) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 63). . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 63: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 63) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 64). ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhcdCoFZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Yb dlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8ObLfTvNCrqcI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7 xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8bAWz4vIfj5pCMYxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD Figure 64: JWS Signature #2, base64url-encoded The following is the assembled second signature serialized as JSON: { "header": { "alg": "ES512", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" }, "signature": "ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhcdCoF ZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Ybdlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8ObLfTvNCrq cI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8bAWz4vIfj5pCM Yxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD" } Figure 65: Signature #2 JSON Miller Informational [Page 35]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 4.8.4. Third Signing Operation The following is generated before completing the third signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 66, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 67. { "alg": "HS256", "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037" } Figure 66: Signature #3 JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 Figure 67: Signature #3 JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded The JWS Protected Header (Figure 67) and JWS Payload (Figure 8) are combined as described in [JWS] to produce the JWS Signing Input (Figure 68). eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9 . SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4 Figure 68: JWS Signing Input Performing the signature operation over the JWS Signing Input (Figure 68) produces the JWS Signature (Figure 69). s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0 Figure 69: JWS Signature #3, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 36]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The following is the assembled third signature serialized as JSON: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0" } Figure 70: Signature #3 JSON 4.8.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWS object: o Payload content (Figure 8) o Signature #1 JSON (Figure 61) o Signature #2 JSON (Figure 65) o Signature #3 JSON (Figure 70) The JWS Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case; the flattened JWS JSON Serialization is not presented because there is more than one signature. Miller Informational [Page 37]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the general JWS JSON Serialization: { "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m ZiB0by4", "signatures": [ { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9", "header": { "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" }, "signature": "MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5Nvy G53uoimic1tcMdSg-qptrzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFc ryNFiHkSw129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTCglNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc -1RlpO2HibUYyXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjytKSeAMbhMBdM ma622_BG5t4sdbuCHtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqBBC XbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGoOSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK6 4jU6_TPtQHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-083B745_AfYOnlC9w" }, { "header": { "alg": "ES512", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example" }, "signature": "ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhc dCoFZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Ybdlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8Ob LfTvNCrqcI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8b AWz4vIfj5pCMYxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD" }, { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9", "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p 0" } ] } Figure 71: General JWS JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 38]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5. JSON Web Encryption Examples The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWE objects. All of the encryption examples (unless otherwise noted) use the following Plaintext content (an abridged quote from "The Fellowship of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP]), serialized as UTF-8. The Plaintext is presented here as a series of quoted strings that are concatenated to produce the JWE Plaintext. The sequence "\xe2\x80\x93" is substituted for (U+2013 EN DASH), and quotation marks (U+0022 QUOTATION MARK) are added for readability but are not present in the JWE Plaintext. "You can trust us to stick with you through thick and " "thin\xe2\x80\x93to the bitter end. And you can trust us to " "keep any secret of yours\xe2\x80\x93closer than you keep it " "yourself. But you cannot trust us to let you face trouble " "alone, and go off without a word. We are your friends, Frodo." Figure 72: Plaintext Content 5.1. Key Encryption Using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA1_5" (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) key encryption algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm. Note that RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that only the RSA public key is necessary to perform the encryption. However, the example includes the RSA private key to allow readers to validate the output. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.1.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 73. Miller Informational [Page 39]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 o "alg" parameter of "RSA1_5". o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256". { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "use": "enc", "n": "maxhbsmBtdQ3CNrKvprUE6n9lYcregDMLYNeTAWcLj8NnPU9XIYegT HVHQjxKDSHP2l-F5jS7sppG1wgdAqZyhnWvXhYNvcM7RfgKxqNx_xAHx 6f3yy7s-M9PSNCwPC2lh6UAkR4I00EhV9lrypM9Pi4lBUop9t5fS9W5U NwaAllhrd-osQGPjIeI1deHTwx-ZTHu3C60Pu_LJIl6hKn9wbwaUmA4c R5Bd2pgbaY7ASgsjCUbtYJaNIHSoHXprUdJZKUMAzV0WOKPfA6OPI4oy pBadjvMZ4ZAj3BnXaSYsEZhaueTXvZB4eZOAjIyh2e_VOIKVMsnDrJYA VotGlvMQ", "e": "AQAB", "d": "Kn9tgoHfiTVi8uPu5b9TnwyHwG5dK6RE0uFdlpCGnJN7ZEi963R7wy bQ1PLAHmpIbNTztfrheoAniRV1NCIqXaW_qS461xiDTp4ntEPnqcKsyO 5jMAji7-CL8vhpYYowNFvIesgMoVaPRYMYT9TW63hNM0aWs7USZ_hLg6 Oe1mY0vHTI3FucjSM86Nff4oIENt43r2fspgEPGRrdE6fpLc9Oaq-qeP 1GFULimrRdndm-P8q8kvN3KHlNAtEgrQAgTTgz80S-3VD0FgWfgnb1PN miuPUxO8OpI9KDIfu_acc6fg14nsNaJqXe6RESvhGPH2afjHqSy_Fd2v pzj85bQQ", "p": "2DwQmZ43FoTnQ8IkUj3BmKRf5Eh2mizZA5xEJ2MinUE3sdTYKSLtaE oekX9vbBZuWxHdVhM6UnKCJ_2iNk8Z0ayLYHL0_G21aXf9-unynEpUsH 7HHTklLpYAzOOx1ZgVljoxAdWNn3hiEFrjZLZGS7lOH-a3QQlDDQoJOJ 2VFmU", "q": "te8LY4-W7IyaqH1ExujjMqkTAlTeRbv0VLQnfLY2xINnrWdwiQ93_V F099aP1ESeLja2nw-6iKIe-qT7mtCPozKfVtUYfz5HrJ_XY2kfexJINb 9lhZHMv5p1skZpeIS-GPHCC6gRlKo1q-idn_qxyusfWv7WAxlSVfQfk8 d6Et0", "dp": "UfYKcL_or492vVc0PzwLSplbg4L3-Z5wL48mwiswbpzOyIgd2xHTH QmjJpFAIZ8q-zf9RmgJXkDrFs9rkdxPtAsL1WYdeCT5c125Fkdg317JV RDo1inX7x2Kdh8ERCreW8_4zXItuTl_KiXZNU5lvMQjWbIw2eTx1lpsf lo0rYU", "dq": "iEgcO-QfpepdH8FWd7mUFyrXdnOkXJBCogChY6YKuIHGc_p8Le9Mb pFKESzEaLlN1Ehf3B6oGBl5Iz_ayUlZj2IoQZ82znoUrpa9fVYNot87A CfzIG7q9Mv7RiPAderZi03tkVXAdaBau_9vs5rS-7HMtxkVrxSUvJY14 TkXlHE", "qi": "kC-lzZOqoFaZCr5l0tOVtREKoVqaAYhQiqIRGL-MzS4sCmRkxm5vZ lXYx6RtE1n_AagjqajlkjieGlxTTThHD8Iga6foGBMaAr5uR1hGQpSc7 Gl7CF1DZkBJMTQN6EshYzZfxW08mIO8M6Rzuh0beL6fG9mkDcIyPrBXx 2bQ_mM" } Figure 73: RSA 2048-Bit Key, in JWK Format Miller Informational [Page 40]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 (NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption operation.) 5.1.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 74. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 75. 3qyTVhIWt5juqZUCpfRqpvauwB956MEJL2Rt-8qXKSo Figure 74: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA Figure 75: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.1.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 74) with the RSA key (Figure 73) results in the following Encrypted Key: laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw Figure 76: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 41]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.1.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 77, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 78. { "alg": "RSA1_5", "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example", "enc": "A128CBC-HS256" } Figure 77: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 Figure 78: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 72) using the following: o CEK (Figure 74); o Initialization Vector (Figure 75); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 77) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 79. o Authentication Tag from Figure 80. 0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0 zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2 O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW i7lzA6BP430m Figure 79: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg Figure 80: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 42]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.1.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 78) o Encrypted Key (Figure 76) o Initialization Vector (Figure 75) o Ciphertext (Figure 79) o Authentication Tag (Figure 80) The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 . laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw . bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA . 0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0 zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2 O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW i7lzA6BP430m . kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg Figure 81: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 43]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzf TihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePFvG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai_ _3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2GXfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WX C2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcGTSLUeeCt 36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8 VlzNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx 1BpyIfgvfjOhMBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW 5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In 0", "iv": "bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA", "ciphertext": "0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62 JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_raa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wn I3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8OWzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc 2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZVyeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtm RdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0y KVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2O6_7uInMGhFeX4c tHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VWi7lzA6BP4 30m", "tag": "kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg" } Figure 82: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 44]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW 5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In 0", "encrypted_key": "laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJ Buuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePFvG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON39 5H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2GXfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ 1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcGTSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQX oZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8VlzNmoxaGMny3YnGir5W f6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOhMBs9M8XL223F g47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw", "iv": "bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA", "ciphertext": "0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62 JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_raa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wn I3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8OWzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc 2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZVyeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtm RdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0y KVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2O6_7uInMGhFeX4c tHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VWi7lzA6BP4 30m", "tag": "kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg" } Figure 83: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.2. Key Encryption Using RSA-OAEP with AES-GCM This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA-OAEP" (RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A256GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption algorithm. Note that RSAES-OAEP uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that only the RSA public key is necessary to perform the encryption. However, the example includes the RSA private key to allow readers to validate the output. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 45]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.2.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 72. o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 84. o "alg" parameter of "RSA-OAEP". o "enc" parameter of "A256GCM". { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example", "use": "enc", "n": "wbdxI55VaanZXPY29Lg5hdmv2XhvqAhoxUkanfzf2-5zVUxa6prHRr I4pP1AhoqJRlZfYtWWd5mmHRG2pAHIlh0ySJ9wi0BioZBl1XP2e-C-Fy XJGcTy0HdKQWlrfhTm42EW7Vv04r4gfao6uxjLGwfpGrZLarohiWCPnk Nrg71S2CuNZSQBIPGjXfkmIy2tl_VWgGnL22GplyXj5YlBLdxXp3XeSt sqo571utNfoUTU8E4qdzJ3U1DItoVkPGsMwlmmnJiwA7sXRItBCivR4M 5qnZtdw-7v4WuR4779ubDuJ5nalMv2S66-RPcnFAzWSKxtBDnFJJDGIU e7Tzizjg1nms0Xq_yPub_UOlWn0ec85FCft1hACpWG8schrOBeNqHBOD FskYpUc2LC5JA2TaPF2dA67dg1TTsC_FupfQ2kNGcE1LgprxKHcVWYQb 86B-HozjHZcqtauBzFNV5tbTuB-TpkcvJfNcFLlH3b8mb-H_ox35FjqB SAjLKyoeqfKTpVjvXhd09knwgJf6VKq6UC418_TOljMVfFTWXUxlnfhO OnzW6HSSzD1c9WrCuVzsUMv54szidQ9wf1cYWf3g5qFDxDQKis99gcDa iCAwM3yEBIzuNeeCa5dartHDb1xEB_HcHSeYbghbMjGfasvKn0aZRsnT yC0xhWBlsolZE", "e": "AQAB", "alg": "RSA-OAEP", "d": "n7fzJc3_WG59VEOBTkayzuSMM780OJQuZjN_KbH8lOZG25ZoA7T4Bx cc0xQn5oZE5uSCIwg91oCt0JvxPcpmqzaJZg1nirjcWZ-oBtVk7gCAWq -B3qhfF3izlbkosrzjHajIcY33HBhsy4_WerrXg4MDNE4HYojy68TcxT 2LYQRxUOCf5TtJXvM8olexlSGtVnQnDRutxEUCwiewfmmrfveEogLx9E A-KMgAjTiISXxqIXQhWUQX1G7v_mV_Hr2YuImYcNcHkRvp9E7ook0876 DhkO8v4UOZLwA1OlUX98mkoqwc58A_Y2lBYbVx1_s5lpPsEqbbH-nqIj h1fL0gdNfihLxnclWtW7pCztLnImZAyeCWAG7ZIfv-Rn9fLIv9jZ6r7r -MSH9sqbuziHN2grGjD_jfRluMHa0l84fFKl6bcqN1JWxPVhzNZo01yD F-1LiQnqUYSepPf6X3a2SOdkqBRiquE6EvLuSYIDpJq3jDIsgoL8Mo1L oomgiJxUwL_GWEOGu28gplyzm-9Q0U0nyhEf1uhSR8aJAQWAiFImWH5W _IQT9I7-yrindr_2fWQ_i1UgMsGzA7aOGzZfPljRy6z-tY_KuBG00-28 S_aWvjyUc-Alp8AUyKjBZ-7CWH32fGWK48j1t-zomrwjL_mnhsPbGs0c 9WsWgRzI-K8gE", "p": "7_2v3OQZzlPFcHyYfLABQ3XP85Es4hCdwCkbDeltaUXgVy9l9etKgh vM4hRkOvbb01kYVuLFmxIkCDtpi-zLCYAdXKrAK3PtSbtzld_XZ9nlsY a_QZWpXB_IrtFjVfdKUdMz94pHUhFGFj7nr6NNxfpiHSHWFE1zD_AC3m Y46J961Y2LRnreVwAGNw53p07Db8yD_92pDa97vqcZOdgtybH9q6uma- Miller Informational [Page 46]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 RFNhO1AoiJhYZj69hjmMRXx-x56HO9cnXNbmzNSCFCKnQmn4GQLmRj9s fbZRqL94bbtE4_e0Zrpo8RNo8vxRLqQNwIy85fc6BRgBJomt8QdQvIgP gWCv5HoQ", "q": "zqOHk1P6WN_rHuM7ZF1cXH0x6RuOHq67WuHiSknqQeefGBA9PWs6Zy KQCO-O6mKXtcgE8_Q_hA2kMRcKOcvHil1hqMCNSXlflM7WPRPZu2qCDc qssd_uMbP-DqYthH_EzwL9KnYoH7JQFxxmcv5An8oXUtTwk4knKjkIYG RuUwfQTus0w1NfjFAyxOOiAQ37ussIcE6C6ZSsM3n41UlbJ7TCqewzVJ aPJN5cxjySPZPD3Vp01a9YgAD6a3IIaKJdIxJS1ImnfPevSJQBE79-EX e2kSwVgOzvt-gsmM29QQ8veHy4uAqca5dZzMs7hkkHtw1z0jHV90epQJ JlXXnH8Q", "dp": "19oDkBh1AXelMIxQFm2zZTqUhAzCIr4xNIGEPNoDt1jK83_FJA-xn x5kA7-1erdHdms_Ef67HsONNv5A60JaR7w8LHnDiBGnjdaUmmuO8XAxQ J_ia5mxjxNjS6E2yD44USo2JmHvzeeNczq25elqbTPLhUpGo1IZuG72F ZQ5gTjXoTXC2-xtCDEUZfaUNh4IeAipfLugbpe0JAFlFfrTDAMUFpC3i XjxqzbEanflwPvj6V9iDSgjj8SozSM0dLtxvu0LIeIQAeEgT_yXcrKGm pKdSO08kLBx8VUjkbv_3Pn20Gyu2YEuwpFlM_H1NikuxJNKFGmnAq9Lc nwwT0jvoQ", "dq": "S6p59KrlmzGzaQYQM3o0XfHCGvfqHLYjCO557HYQf72O9kLMCfd_1 VBEqeD-1jjwELKDjck8kOBl5UvohK1oDfSP1DleAy-cnmL29DqWmhgwM 1ip0CCNmkmsmDSlqkUXDi6sAaZuntyukyflI-qSQ3C_BafPyFaKrt1fg dyEwYa08pESKwwWisy7KnmoUvaJ3SaHmohFS78TJ25cfc10wZ9hQNOrI ChZlkiOdFCtxDqdmCqNacnhgE3bZQjGp3n83ODSz9zwJcSUvODlXBPc2 AycH6Ci5yjbxt4Ppox_5pjm6xnQkiPgj01GpsUssMmBN7iHVsrE7N2iz nBNCeOUIQ", "qi": "FZhClBMywVVjnuUud-05qd5CYU0dK79akAgy9oX6RX6I3IIIPckCc iRrokxglZn-omAY5CnCe4KdrnjFOT5YUZE7G_Pg44XgCXaarLQf4hl80 oPEf6-jJ5Iy6wPRx7G2e8qLxnh9cOdf-kRqgOS3F48Ucvw3ma5V6KGMw QqWFeV31XtZ8l5cVI-I3NzBS7qltpUVgz2Ju021eyc7IlqgzR98qKONl 27DuEES0aK0WE97jnsyO27Yp88Wa2RiBrEocM89QZI1seJiGDizHRUP4 UZxw9zsXww46wy0P6f9grnYp7t8LkyDDk8eoI4KX6SNMNVcyVS9IWjlq 8EzqZEKIA" } Figure 84: RSA 4096-Bit Key (NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption operation.) 5.2.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 85. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 86. Miller Informational [Page 47]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 mYMfsggkTAm0TbvtlFh2hyoXnbEzJQjMxmgLN3d8xXA Figure 85: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded -nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9 Figure 86: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.2.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 85) with the RSA key (Figure 84) produces the following Encrypted Key: rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQi beYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyu cvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58 -Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8Bpx KdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pK IIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7 pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe3 8UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU 06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5 Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDR s Figure 87: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.2.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 88, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 89. { "alg": "RSA-OAEP", "kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example", "enc": "A256GCM" } Figure 88: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG 9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0 Figure 89: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 48]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 72) with the following: o CEK (Figure 85); o Initialization Vector (Figure 86); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 89) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 90. o Authentication Tag from Figure 91. o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgR L-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYxrXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEw P7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lhhNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8 iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML 7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7aCflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSV maPpOslY2n525DxDfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw Figure 90: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA Figure 91: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.2.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 89) o Encrypted Key (Figure 87) o Initialization Vector (Figure 86) o Ciphertext (Figure 90) o Authentication Tag (Figure 91) Miller Informational [Page 49]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG 9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0 . rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQi beYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyu cvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58 -Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8Bpx KdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pK IIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7 pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe3 8UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU 06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5 Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDR s . -nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9 . o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgR L-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYxrXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEw P7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lhhNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8 iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML 7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7aCflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSV maPpOslY2n525DxDfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw . UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA Figure 92: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 50]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNu h7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQibeYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-Bb tsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyucvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4 v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58-Aad3FzM uo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8B pxKdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1 asnuHtVMt2pKIIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq 5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz 4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQfOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKh jYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe38UjQb0lvXn 1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU 06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8a KaOnx6ASE5Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xD EdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDRs" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2 FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0", "iv": "-nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9", "ciphertext": "o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6 UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgRL-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYx rXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEwP7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lh hNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz 6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7a CflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSVmaPpOslY2n525Dx DfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw", "tag": "UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA" } Figure 93: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 51]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2 FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0", "encrypted_key": "rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lC iud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQibeYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2U sPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyucvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89 mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58-Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakL XYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8BpxKdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJE Bz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pKIIfux5BC6huI vmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7pZfPYD SXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO 2AWBe38UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G 7S2rscw5lQQU06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDP Tr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ 69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDRs", "iv": "-nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9", "ciphertext": "o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6 UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgRL-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYx rXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEwP7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lh hNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz 6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7a CflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSVmaPpOslY2n525Dx DfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw", "tag": "UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA" } Figure 94: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.3. Key Wrap Using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 The example illustrates encrypting content using the "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" (PBES2 Password-based Encryption using HMAC- SHA-512 and AES-256-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm. A common use of password-based encryption is the import/export of keys. Therefore, this example uses a JWK Set for the Plaintext content instead of the Plaintext from Figure 72. Miller Informational [Page 52]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Note that if password-based encryption is used for multiple recipients, it is expected that each recipient use different values for the PBES2 parameters "p2s" and "p2c". Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.3.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 95 (NOTE: All whitespace was added for readability). o Password; this example uses the password from Figure 96 -- with the sequence "\xe2\x80\x93" replaced with (U+2013 EN DASH). o "alg" parameter of "PBES2-HS512+A256KW". o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256". { "keys": [ { "kty": "oct", "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a", "use": "enc", "alg": "A128GCM", "k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A" }, { "kty": "oct", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "use": "enc", "alg": "A128KW", "k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ" }, { "kty": "oct", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "use": "enc", "alg": "A256GCMKW", "k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8" } ] } Figure 95: Plaintext Content Miller Informational [Page 53]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 entrap_o\xe2\x80\x93peter_long\xe2\x80\x93credit_tun Figure 96: Password 5.3.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 97. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 98. uwsjJXaBK407Qaf0_zpcpmr1Cs0CC50hIUEyGNEt3m0 Figure 97: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ Figure 98: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.3.3. Encrypting the Key The following are generated before encrypting the CEK: o Salt input; this example uses the salt input from Figure 99. o Iteration count; this example uses the iteration count 8192. 8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA Figure 99: Salt Input, base64url-encoded Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 97) with the following: o Password (Figure 96); o Salt input (Figure 99), encoded as an octet string; and o Iteration count (8192) produces the following Encrypted Key: d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlUtFPWdgtURtmeDV1g Figure 100: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 54]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.3.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 101, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 102. { "alg": "PBES2-HS512+A256KW", "p2s": "8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA", "p2c": 8192, "cty": "jwk-set+json", "enc": "A128CBC-HS256" } Figure 101: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOiI4UTFTemluYXNSM3 hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOiJqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJl bmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 Figure 102: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 95) with the following: o CEK (Figure 97); o Initialization Vector (Figure 98); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 102) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 103. o Authentication Tag from Figure 104. Miller Informational [Page 55]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IR sfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpDjEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6l TF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb 6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz424givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL _SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKd PQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrok AKYPqmXUeRdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N- zl5tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdTw8V 3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p Figure 103: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded 0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg Figure 104: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.3.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 102) o Encrypted Key (Figure 100) o Initialization Vector (Figure 98) o Ciphertext (Figure 103) o Authentication Tag (Figure 104) Miller Informational [Page 56]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOiI4UTFTemluYXNSM3 hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOiJqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJl bmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 . d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlUtFPWdgtURtmeDV1g . VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ . 23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IR sfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpDjEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6l TF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb 6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz424givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL _SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKd PQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrok AKYPqmXUeRdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N- zl5tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdTw8V 3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p . 0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg Figure 105: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 57]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlU tFPWdgtURtmeDV1g" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOi I4UTFTemluYXNSM3hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOi Jqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0", "iv": "VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ", "ciphertext": "23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2 nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IRsfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpD jEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6lTF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_ hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz42 4givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL_SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ 7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKdPQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru 5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrokAKYPqmXUe RdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-zl5 tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdT w8V3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p", "tag": "0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg" } Figure 106: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 58]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzUxMitBMjU2S1ciLCJwMnMiOi I4UTFTemluYXNSM3hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOi Jqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0", "encrypted_key": "d3qNhUWfqheyPp4H8sjOWsDYajoej4c5Je6rlUtFPW dgtURtmeDV1g", "iv": "VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ", "ciphertext": "23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2 nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IRsfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpD jEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6lTF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_ hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz42 4givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL_SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ 7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKdPQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru 5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrokAKYPqmXUe RdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-zl5 tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdT w8V3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p", "tag": "0HlwodAhOCILG5SQ2LQ9dg" } Figure 107: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.4. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping Using ECDH-ES and AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH- ES+A128KW" (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static with AES- 128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption algorithm. Note that only the EC public key is necessary to perform the key agreement. However, the example includes the EC private key to allow readers to validate the output. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.4.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 108. Miller Informational [Page 59]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 o "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES+A128KW". o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM". { "kty": "EC", "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example", "use": "enc", "crv": "P-384", "x": "YU4rRUzdmVqmRtWOs2OpDE_T5fsNIodcG8G5FWPrTPMyxpzsSOGaQL pe2FpxBmu2", "y": "A8-yxCHxkfBz3hKZfI1jUYMjUhsEveZ9THuwFjH2sCNdtksRJU7D5- SkgaFL1ETP", "d": "iTx2pk7wW-GqJkHcEkFQb2EFyYcO7RugmaW3mRrQVAOUiPommT0Idn YK2xDlZh-j" } Figure 108: Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK Format (NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the encryption operation.) 5.4.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 109. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 110. Nou2ueKlP70ZXDbq9UrRwg Figure 109: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_ Figure 110: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.4.3. Encrypting the Key To encrypt the Content Encryption Key, the following is generated: o Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key; this example uses the private key from Figure 111. Miller Informational [Page 60]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6iuE DsQ6wNdNg3", "y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQTA- JdaY8tb7E0", "d": "D5H4Y_5PSKZvhfVFbcCYJOtcGZygRgfZkpsBr59Icmmhe9sW6nkZ8W fwhinUfWJg" } Figure 111: Ephemeral Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK Format Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 109) with the following: o The static Elliptic Curve public key (Figure 108); and o The ephemeral Elliptic Curve private key (Figure 111) produces the following JWE Encrypted Key: 0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2 Figure 112: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.4.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 113, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 114. { "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example", "epk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6i uEDsQ6wNdNg3", "y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQT A-JdaY8tb7E0" }, "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 113: JWE Protected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 61]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcmVncmluLnRvb2tAdH Vja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAt Mzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bDB4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NH hBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUTZ3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMy ZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWT h0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 Figure 114: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 72) using the following: o CEK (Figure 109); o Initialization Vector (Figure 110); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 114) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 115. o Authentication Tag from Figure 116. tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cP WJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzsXaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0 IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkc Y9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93YcdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w0 3XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkUZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu 07WNhjzJEPc4jVntRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ Figure 115: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg Figure 116: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 62]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.4.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 114) o Encrypted Key (Figure 112) o Initialization Vector (Figure 110) o Ciphertext (Figure 115) o Authentication Tag (Figure 116) The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcmVncmluLnRvb2tAdH Vja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAt Mzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bDB4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NH hBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUTZ3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMy ZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWT h0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 . 0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2 . mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_ . tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cP WJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzsXaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0 IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkc Y9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93YcdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w0 3XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkUZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu 07WNhjzJEPc4jVntRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ . WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg Figure 117: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 63]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcm VncmluLnRvb2tAdHVja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdH kiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bD B4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NHhBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUT Z3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMyZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3 BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWTh0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbm MiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", "iv": "mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_", "ciphertext": "tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz 5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cPWJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzs XaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05 jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkcY9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93Y cdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w03XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkU ZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu07WNhjzJEPc4jVn tRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ", "tag": "WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg" } Figure 118: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 64]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcm VncmluLnRvb2tAdHVja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdH kiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bD B4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NHhBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUT Z3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMyZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3 BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWTh0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbm MiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", "encrypted_key": "0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2", "iv": "mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_", "ciphertext": "tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz 5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cPWJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzs XaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05 jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkcY9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93Y cdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w03XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkU ZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu07WNhjzJEPc4jVn tRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ", "tag": "WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg" } Figure 119: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.5. Key Agreement Using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH-ES" (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static) key agreement algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm. Note that only the EC public key is necessary to perform the key agreement. However, the example includes the EC private key to allow readers to validate the output. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. Miller Informational [Page 65]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.5.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 120. o "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES". o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256". { "kty": "EC", "kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example", "use": "enc", "crv": "P-256", "x": "Ze2loSV3wrroKUN_4zhwGhCqo3Xhu1td4QjeQ5wIVR0", "y": "HlLtdXARY_f55A3fnzQbPcm6hgr34Mp8p-nuzQCE0Zw", "d": "r_kHyZ-a06rmxM3yESK84r1otSg-aQcVStkRhA-iCM8" } Figure 120: Elliptic Curve P-256 Key (NOTE: While the key includes the private parameters, only the public parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the encryption operation.) 5.5.2. Generated Factors The following is generated before encrypting: o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 121. yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg Figure 121: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded NOTE: The Content Encryption Key (CEK) is not randomly generated; instead, it is determined using ECDH-ES key agreement. Miller Informational [Page 66]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.5.3. Key Agreement The following is generated to agree on a CEK: o Ephemeral private key; this example uses the private key from Figure 122. { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA", "y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs", "d": "AtH35vJsQ9SGjYfOsjUxYXQKrPH3FjZHmEtSKoSN8cM" } Figure 122: Ephemeral Private Key, in JWK Format Performing the ECDH operation using the static EC public key (Figure 120) over the ephemeral private key (Figure 122) produces the following CEK: hzHdlfQIAEehb8Hrd_mFRhKsKLEzPfshfXs9l6areCc Figure 123: Agreed-to Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded 5.5.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 124, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 125. { "alg": "ECDH-ES", "kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example", "epk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA", "y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs" }, "enc": "A128CBC-HS256" } Figure 124: JWE Protected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 67]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYnJhbmR5YnVja0BidW NrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYi LCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqanFWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZF lvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUzQ2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0 RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ Figure 125: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 72) using the following: o CEK (Figure 123); o Initialization Vector (Figure 121); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 125) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 126. o Authentication Tag from Figure 127. BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4OPKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9 IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEsDIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_e vAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolqZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7- IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl24j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI -sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIAfsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7 MsFfI_K767G9C9Azp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ61 95_JGG2m9Csg Figure 126: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg Figure 127: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.5.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 114) o Initialization Vector (Figure 110) o Ciphertext (Figure 115) o Authentication Tag (Figure 116) Miller Informational [Page 68]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Only the general JWE JSON Serialization is presented because the flattened JWE JSON Serialization is identical. The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYnJhbmR5YnVja0BidW NrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYi LCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqanFWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZF lvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUzQ2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0 RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ . . yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg . BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4OPKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9 IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEsDIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_e vAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolqZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7- IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl24j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI -sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIAfsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7 MsFfI_K767G9C9Azp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ61 95_JGG2m9Csg . WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg Figure 128: JWE Compact Serialization The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYn JhbmR5YnVja0BidWNrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik VDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqan FWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZFlvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUz Q2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6Ik ExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ", "iv": "yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg", "ciphertext": "BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4O PKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEs DIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_evAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolq ZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl2 4j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI-sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIA fsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7MsFfI_K767G9C9A zp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ6195_JGG2m9 Csg", "tag": "WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg" } Figure 129: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 69]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.6. Direct Encryption Using AES-GCM This example illustrates encrypting content using a previously exchanged key directly and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption algorithm. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.6.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 130. o "alg" parameter of "dir". o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM". { "kty": "oct", "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a", "use": "enc", "alg": "A128GCM", "k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A" } Figure 130: AES 128-Bit Key, in JWK Format 5.6.2. Generated Factors The following is generated before encrypting: o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 131. refa467QzzKx6QAB Figure 131: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 70]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.6.3. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 132, encoded as base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 133. { "alg": "dir", "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a", "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 132: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 Figure 133: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 72) using the following: o CEK (Figure 130); o Initialization Vector (Figure 131); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 133) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 134. o Authentication Tag from Figure 135. JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_ BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5 g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp Figure 134: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ Figure 135: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 71]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.6.4. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 133) o Initialization Vector (Figure 131) o Ciphertext (Figure 134) o Authentication Tag (Figure 135) Only the general JWE JSON Serialization is presented because the flattened JWE JSON Serialization is identical. The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 . . refa467QzzKx6QAB . JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_ BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5 g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp . vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ Figure 136: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 72]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLT Q1Y2YtODY3Mi02MTdiNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", "iv": "refa467QzzKx6QAB", "ciphertext": "JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJ oBcW29rHP8yZOZG7YhLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9 HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zMDB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdc qMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8 ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb1 5wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSInZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_ aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp", "tag": "vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ" } Figure 137: General JWE JSON Serialization 5.7. Key Wrap Using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 This example illustrates encrypting content using the "A256GCMKW" (AES-256-GCM-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the "A128CBC- HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.7.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 138. o "alg" parameter of "A256GCMKW". o "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256". Miller Informational [Page 73]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "kty": "oct", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "use": "enc", "alg": "A256GCMKW", "k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8" } Figure 138: AES 256-Bit Key 5.7.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 139. o Initialization Vector for content encryption; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 140. UWxARpat23nL9ReIj4WG3D1ee9I4r-Mv5QLuFXdy_rE Figure 139: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ Figure 140: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.7.3. Encrypting the Key The following is generated before encrypting the CEK: o Initialization Vector for key wrapping; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 141. KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_ Figure 141: Initialization Vector for Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 74]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 139) with the following: o AES symmetric key (Figure 138); o Initialization Vector (Figure 141); and o The empty string as authenticated data produces the following: o Encrypted Key from Figure 142. o Authentication Tag from Figure 143. lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok Figure 142: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw Figure 143: Authentication Tag from Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded 5.7.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 144, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 145. { "alg": "A256GCMKW", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "tag": "kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw", "iv": "KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_", "enc": "A128CBC-HS256" } Figure 144: JWE Protected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 75]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYj IwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3 IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1Ni J9 Figure 145: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 72) with the following: o CEK (Figure 139); o Initialization Vector (Figure 140); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 145) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 146. o Authentication Tag from Figure 147. Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8EqoDZHyFKFBupS8iaE eVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyWtZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCz LjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQHLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFq hpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfDgymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hde b6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0Jtj xAj4UPI61oONK7zzFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR 1B-gxpNk3xWU Figure 146: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g Figure 147: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 76]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.7.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 145) o Encrypted Key (Figure 142) o Initialization Vector (Figure 140) o Ciphertext (Figure 146) o Authentication Tag (Figure 147) The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYj IwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3 IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1Ni J9 . lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok . gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ . Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8EqoDZHyFKFBupS8iaE eVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyWtZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCz LjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQHLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFq hpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfDgymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hde b6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0Jtj xAj4UPI61oONK7zzFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR 1B-gxpNk3xWU . DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g Figure 148: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 77]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElL vYNok" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS 1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYjIwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdV ZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIi wiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1NiJ9", "iv": "gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ", "ciphertext": "Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8E qoDZHyFKFBupS8iaEeVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyW tZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCzLjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQ HLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFqhpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfD gymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hdeb6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec 4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0JtjxAj4UPI61oONK7z zFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR1B-gxpNk3 xWU", "tag": "DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g" } Figure 149: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 78]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJpdiI6IktrWVQwR1hfMm pIbGZxTl8iLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYjIwNS0yYj RkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3Ii wiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1NiJ9", "encrypted_key": "lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNo k", "iv": "gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ", "ciphertext": "Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8E qoDZHyFKFBupS8iaEeVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyW tZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCzLjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQ HLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFqhpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfD gymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hdeb6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec 4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0JtjxAj4UPI61oONK7z zFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR1B-gxpNk3 xWU", "tag": "NvBveHr_vonkvflfnUrmBQ" } Figure 150: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.8. Key Wrap Using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM The following example illustrates content encryption using the "A128KW" (AES-128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-128-GCM) content encryption algorithm. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.8.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 151. o "alg" parameter of "A128KW". o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM". Miller Informational [Page 79]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "kty": "oct", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "use": "enc", "alg": "A128KW", "k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ" } Figure 151: AES 128-Bit Key 5.8.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example uses the key from Figure 152. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 153. aY5_Ghmk9KxWPBLu_glx1w Figure 152: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo Figure 153: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.8.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 152) with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following Encrypted Key: CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx Figure 154: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.8.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 155, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 156. Miller Informational [Page 80]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 155: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC 04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 Figure 156: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption over the Plaintext (Figure 72) with the following: o CEK (Figure 152); o Initialization Vector (Figure 153); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 156) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 157. o Authentication Tag from Figure 158. AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1bTdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD6 1A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGkd3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfe F0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiYSoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8RE wOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-p uQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvETUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRa a8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMvEmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF Figure 157: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw Figure 158: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 81]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.8.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 156) o Encrypted Key (Figure 154) o Initialization Vector (Figure 153) o Ciphertext (Figure 157) o Authentication Tag (Figure 158) The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC 04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 . CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx . Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo . AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1bTdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD6 1A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGkd3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfe F0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiYSoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8RE wOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-p uQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvETUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRa a8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMvEmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF . ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw Figure 159: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 82]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn 0", "iv": "Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo", "ciphertext": "AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1b TdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD61A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGk d3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfeF0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiY SoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8REwOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7 PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-puQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvE TUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRaa8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMv EmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF", "tag": "ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw" } Figure 160: General JWE JSON Serialization The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn 0", "encrypted_key": "CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx", "iv": "Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo", "ciphertext": "AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1b TdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD61A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGk d3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfeF0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiY SoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8REwOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7 PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-puQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvE TUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRaa8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMv EmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF", "tag": "ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw" } Figure 161: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 83]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.9. Compressed Content This example illustrates encrypting content that is first compressed. It reuses the AES symmetric key, key encryption algorithm, and content encryption algorithm from Section 5.8. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.9.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from Figure 151. o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW". o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM". o "zip" parameter of "DEF". 5.9.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o Compressed Plaintext from the original Plaintext content; compressing Figure 72 using the DEFLATE [RFC1951] algorithm produces the compressed Plaintext from Figure 162. o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 163. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 164. bY_BDcIwDEVX-QNU3QEOrIA4pqlDokYxchxVvbEDGzIJbioOSJwc-f___HPjBu 8KVFpVtAplVE1-wZo0YjNZo3C7R5v72pV5f5X382VWjYQpqZKAyjziZOr2B7kQ PSy6oZIXUnDYbVKN4jNXi2u0yB7t1qSHTjmMODf9QgvrDzfTIQXnyQRuUya4zI WG3vTOdir0v7BRHFYWq3k1k1A_gSDJqtcBF-GZxw8 Figure 162: Compressed Plaintext, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 84]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 hC-MpLZSuwWv8sexS6ydfw Figure 163: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl Figure 164: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.9.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 163) with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following Encrypted Key: 5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi Figure 165: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.9.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 166, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 167. { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM", "zip": "DEF" } Figure 166: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC 04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwiemlwIjoiREVGIn0 Figure 167: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 85]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the content encryption operation over the compressed Plaintext (Figure 162, encoded as an octet string) with the following: o CEK (Figure 163); o Initialization Vector (Figure 164); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 167) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 168. o Authentication Tag from Figure 169. HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6VB8hry57tDZ61jXyez SPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWGml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0 m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDHj0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBK hpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxExCpG3mK420TjOw Figure 168: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA Figure 169: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.9.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 167) o Encrypted Key (Figure 165) o Initialization Vector (Figure 164) o Ciphertext (Figure 168) o Authentication Tag (Figure 169) Miller Informational [Page 86]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC 04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwiemlwIjoiREVGIn0 . 5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi . p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl . HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6VB8hry57tDZ61jXyez SPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWGml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0 m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDHj0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBK hpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxExCpG3mK420TjOw . VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA Figure 170: JWE Compact Serialization The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIi wiemlwIjoiREVGIn0", "iv": "p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl", "ciphertext": "HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6V B8hry57tDZ61jXyezSPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWG ml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDH j0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBKhpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxE xCpG3mK420TjOw", "tag": "VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA" } Figure 171: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 87]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIi wiemlwIjoiREVGIn0", "encrypted_key": "5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi", "iv": "p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl", "ciphertext": "HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6V B8hry57tDZ61jXyezSPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWG ml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDH j0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBKhpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxE xCpG3mK420TjOw", "tag": "VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA" } Figure 172: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.10. Including Additional Authenticated Data This example illustrates encrypting content that includes additional authenticated data. As this example includes an additional top-level property not present in the JWE Compact Serialization, only the flattened JWE JSON Serialization and general JWE JSON Serialization are possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.10.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from Figure 151. o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW". o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM". o Additional Authenticated Data; this example uses a vCard [RFC7095] from Figure 173, serialized to UTF-8. Miller Informational [Page 88]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 [ "vcard", [ [ "version", {}, "text", "4.0" ], [ "fn", {}, "text", "Meriadoc Brandybuck" ], [ "n", {}, "text", [ "Brandybuck", "Meriadoc", "Mr.", "" ] ], [ "bday", {}, "text", "TA 2982" ], [ "gender", {}, "text", "M" ] ] ] Figure 173: Additional Authenticated Data, in JSON Format NOTE: Whitespace between JSON values was added for readability. 5.10.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 174. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 175. o Encoded Additional Authenticated Data (AAD); this example uses the Additional Authenticated Data from Figure 173, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 176. 75m1ALsYv10pZTKPWrsqdg Figure 174: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded veCx9ece2orS7c_N Figure 175: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxbImZuIix7fS widGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4iLHt9LCJ0ZXh0Iixb IkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIsIiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LC J0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVyIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d Figure 176: Additional Authenticated Data, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 89]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.10.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 174) with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following Encrypted Key: 4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X Figure 177: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.10.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 178, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 179. { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 178: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC 04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 Figure 179: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with the following: o CEK (Figure 174); o Initialization Vector (Figure 175); and o Concatenation of the JWE Protected Header (Figure 179), ".", and the base64url [RFC4648] encoding of Figure 173 as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 180. o Authentication Tag from Figure 181. Miller Informational [Page 90]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1 oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK 8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fzOI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft 9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrsLNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4a q3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHr RDQeHyMRoBljoV3X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV Figure 180: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA Figure 181: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.10.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 179) o Encrypted Key (Figure 177) o Initialization Vector (Figure 175) o Additional Authenticated Data (Figure 176) o Ciphertext (Figure 180) o Authentication Tag (Figure 181) The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case. Miller Informational [Page 91]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn 0", "iv": "veCx9ece2orS7c_N", "aad": "WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxb ImZuIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4i LHt9LCJ0ZXh0IixbIkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIs IiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LCJ0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVy Iix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d", "ciphertext": "Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0 Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14 T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fz OI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrs LNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4aq3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy 2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHrRDQeHyMRoBljoV3 X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV", "tag": "vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA" } Figure 182: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 92]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn 0", "encrypted_key": "4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X", "aad": "WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxb ImZuIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4i LHt9LCJ0ZXh0IixbIkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIs IiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LCJ0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVy Iix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d", "iv": "veCx9ece2orS7c_N", "ciphertext": "Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0 Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14 T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fz OI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrs LNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4aq3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy 2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHrRDQeHyMRoBljoV3 X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV", "tag": "vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA" } Figure 183: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.11. Protecting Specific Header Fields This example illustrates encrypting content where only certain JOSE Header Parameters are protected. As this example includes parameters in the JWE Shared Unprotected Header, only the general JWE JSON Serialization and flattened JWE JSON Serialization are possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.11.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from Figure 151. o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW". o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM". Miller Informational [Page 93]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.11.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 184. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 185. WDgEptBmQs9ouUvArz6x6g Figure 184: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR Figure 185: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.11.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 184) with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following Encrypted Key: jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H Figure 186: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.11.4. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 187, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 188. { "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 187: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0 Figure 188: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 94]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with the following: o CEK (Figure 184); o Initialization Vector (Figure 185); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 188) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 189. o Authentication Tag from Figure 190. lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2DM3swKkjOwQyZtWsFL YMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9OCCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8 fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyF XPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nO WL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWL Hs1NqBbre0dEwK3HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf Figure 189: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ Figure 190: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.11.5. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Shared Unprotected Header (Figure 191) o JWE Protected Header (Figure 188) o Encrypted Key (Figure 186) o Initialization Vector (Figure 185) o Ciphertext (Figure 189) o Authentication Tag (Figure 190) The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case. Miller Informational [Page 95]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The following JWE Shared Unprotected Header is generated before assembling the output results: { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8" } Figure 191: JWE Shared Unprotected Header JSON The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H" } ], "unprotected": { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8" }, "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", "iv": "WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR", "ciphertext": "lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2D M3swKkjOwQyZtWsFLYMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9O CCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6 uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyFXPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5 g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nOWL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU 4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWLHs1NqBbre0dEwK3 HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf", "tag": "fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ" } Figure 192: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 96]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", "unprotected": { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8" }, "encrypted_key": "jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H", "iv": "WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR", "ciphertext": "lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2D M3swKkjOwQyZtWsFLYMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9O CCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6 uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyFXPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5 g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nOWL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU 4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWLHs1NqBbre0dEwK3 HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf", "tag": "fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ" } Figure 193: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization 5.12. Protecting Content Only This example illustrates encrypting content where none of the JOSE header parameters are protected. As this example includes parameters only in the JWE Shared Unprotected Header, only the flattened JWE JSON Serialization and general JWE JSON Serialization are possible. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.12.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 72. o Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from Figure 151. o Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW". o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM". Miller Informational [Page 97]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.12.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example the key from Figure 194. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 195. KBooAFl30QPV3vkcZlXnzQ Figure 194: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD Figure 195: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.12.3. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 194) with the AES symmetric key (Figure 151) produces the following Encrypted Key: 244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv Figure 196: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 5.12.4. Encrypting the Content Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 72) using the following: o CEK (Figure 194); o Initialization Vector (Figure 195); and o Empty string as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 197. o Authentication Tag from Figure 198. Miller Informational [Page 98]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq-arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS 6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHFSP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3 svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDsRPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNI QURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISO a6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDfrb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z 4KX9lfz1cne31N4-8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF Figure 197: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg Figure 198: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 5.12.5. Output Results The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case. The following JWE Shared Unprotected Header is generated before assembling the output results: { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 199: JWE Shared Unprotected Header JSON The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Shared Unprotected Header (Figure 199) o Encrypted Key (Figure 196) o Initialization Vector (Figure 195) o Ciphertext (Figure 197) o Authentication Tag (Figure 198) Miller Informational [Page 99]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv" } ], "unprotected": { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM" }, "iv": "YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD", "ciphertext": "qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq- arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHF SP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDs RPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNIQURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8 ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISOa6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDf rb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z4KX9lfz1cne31N4 -8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF", "tag": "e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg" } Figure 200: General JWE JSON Serialization The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "unprotected": { "alg": "A128KW", "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8", "enc": "A128GCM" }, "encrypted_key": "244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv", "iv": "YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD", "ciphertext": "qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq- arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHF SP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDs RPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNIQURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8 ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISOa6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDf rb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z4KX9lfz1cne31N4 -8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF", "tag": "e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg" } Figure 201: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 100]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 5.13. Encrypting to Multiple Recipients This example illustrates encryption content for multiple recipients. As this example has multiple recipients, only the general JWE JSON Serialization is possible. Note that RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 5.13.1. Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the Plaintext from Figure 72. o Recipient keys; this example uses the following: * The RSA public key from Figure 73 for the first recipient. * The EC public key from Figure 108 for the second recipient. * The AES symmetric key from Figure 138 for the third recipient. o Key encryption algorithms; this example uses the following: * "RSA1_5" for the first recipient. * "ECDH-ES+A256KW" for the second recipient. * "A256GCMKW" for the third recipient. o Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128CBC-HS256". 5.13.2. Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 202. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 203. Miller Informational [Page 101]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 zXayeJ4gvm8NJr3IUInyokTUO-LbQNKEhe_zWlYbdpQ Figure 202: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g Figure 203: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded 5.13.3. Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient Performing the "RSA1_5" key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 202) with the first recipient's RSA key (Figure 73) produces the following Encrypted Key: dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUA OcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4bWrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIa KMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_tSiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-w qjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYS rRicJK5xodvWgkpIdkMHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-d bHcGlihqc_wGgho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ Figure 204: Recipient #1 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded The following is generated after encrypting the CEK for the first recipient: o Recipient JWE Unprotected Header from Figure 205. { "alg": "RSA1_5", "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } Figure 205: Recipient #1 JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 102]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The following is the assembled first recipient JSON: { "encrypted_key": "dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w 6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUAOcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4b WrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIaKMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_t SiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-wqjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7 Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYSrRicJK5xodvWgkpIdk MHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-dbHcGlihqc_wG gho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ", "header": { "alg": "RSA1_5", "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } } Figure 206: Recipient #1 JSON 5.13.4. Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient The following is generated before encrypting the CEK for the second recipient: o Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key; this example uses the private key from Figure 207. { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xAn2Dt MRb25Ma2CX", "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pOMbw9 1fzZ84pbfm", "d": "1DKHfTv-PiifVw2VBHM_ZiVcwOMxkOyANS_lQHJcrDxVY3jhVCvZPw MxJKIE793C" } Figure 207: Ephemeral Private Key for Recipient #2, in JWK Format Miller Informational [Page 103]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the "ECDH-ES+A256KW" key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 202) with the following: o Static Elliptic Curve public key (Figure 108). o Ephemeral Elliptic Curve private key (Figure 207). produces the following Encrypted Key: ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHixJuw_elY4gSSId_w Figure 208: Recipient #2 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded The following is generated after encrypting the CEK for the second recipient: o Recipient JWE Unprotected Header from Figure 209. { "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW", "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example", "epk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xAn2 DtMRb25Ma2CX", "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pOMb w91fzZ84pbfm" } } Figure 209: Recipient #2 JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header JSON Miller Informational [Page 104]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The following is the assembled second recipient JSON: { "encrypted_key": "ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHixJuw _elY4gSSId_w", "header": { "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW", "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example", "epk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xA n2DtMRb25Ma2CX", "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pO Mbw91fzZ84pbfm" } } } Figure 210: Recipient #2 JSON 5.13.5. Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient The following is generated before encrypting the CEK for the third recipient: o Initialization Vector for key wrapping; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 211. AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn Figure 211: Recipient #2 Initialization Vector for Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded Performing the "A256GCMKW" key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 202) with the following: o AES symmetric key (Figure 138); and o Initialization Vector (Figure 211) produces the following: o Encrypted Key from Figure 212. o Authentication Tag from Figure 213. Miller Informational [Page 105]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1E Figure 212: Recipient #3 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw Figure 213: Recipient #3 Authentication Tag from Key Wrapping, base64url-encoded The following is generated after encrypting the CEK for the third recipient: o Recipient JWE Unprotected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 214. { "alg": "A256GCMKW", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw", "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn" } Figure 214: Recipient #3 JWE Per-Recipient Unprotected Header JSON The following is the assembled third recipient JSON: { "encrypted_key": "a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1 E", "header": { "alg": "A256GCMKW", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw", "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn" } } Figure 215: Recipient #3 JSON 5.13.6. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the content: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 216, encoded to base64url [RFC4648] as Figure 217. Miller Informational [Page 106]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 { "enc": "A128CBC-HS256" } Figure 216: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0 Figure 217: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 72) with the following: o CEK (Figure 202), o Initialization Vector (Figure 203), and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 217) as the authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 218. o Authentication Tag from Figure 219. ajm2Q-OpPXCr7-MHXicknb1lsxLdXxK_yLds0KuhJzfWK04SjdxQeSw2L9mu3a _k1C55kCQ_3xlkcVKC5yr__Is48VOoK0k63_QRM9tBURMFqLByJ8vOYQX0oJW4 VUHJLmGhF-tVQWB7Kz8mr8zeE7txF0MSaP6ga7-siYxStR7_G07Thd1jh-zGT0 wxM5g-VRORtq0K6AXpLlwEqRp7pkt2zRM0ZAXqSpe1O6FJ7FHLDyEFnD-zDIZu kLpCbzhzMDLLw2-8I14FQrgi-iEuzHgIJFIJn2wh9Tj0cg_kOZy9BqMRZbmYXM Y9YQjorZ_P_JYG3ARAIF3OjDNqpdYe-K_5Q5crGJSDNyij_ygEiItR5jssQVH2 ofDQdLChtazE Figure 218: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded BESYyFN7T09KY7i8zKs5_g Figure 219: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 107]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The following is generated after encrypting the Plaintext: o JWE Shared Unprotected Header parameters; this example uses the header from Figure 220. { "cty": "text/plain" } Figure 220: JWE Shared Unprotected Header JSON 5.13.7. Output Results The following compose the resulting JWE object: o Recipient #1 JSON (Figure 206) o Recipient #2 JSON (Figure 210) o Recipient #3 JSON (Figure 215) o Initialization Vector (Figure 203) o Ciphertext (Figure 218) o Authentication Tag (Figure 219) The JWE Compact Serialization is not presented because it does not support this use case; the flattened JWE JSON Serialization is not presented because there is more than one recipient. Miller Informational [Page 108]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zj wj4w6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUAOcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa- vhW6me4bWrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIaKMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076 DFthg2_AV0_tSiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-wqjw0-b-S 1laS11QVbuP78dQ7Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbe YSrRicJK5xodvWgkpIdkMHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n 5trGuExtp_-dbHcGlihqc_wGgho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ", "header": { "alg": "RSA1_5", "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example" } }, { "encrypted_key": "ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHi xJuw_elY4gSSId_w", "header": { "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW", "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example", "epk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-384", "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhs E2xAn2DtMRb25Ma2CX", "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEj I1pOMbw91fzZ84pbfm" } } }, { "encrypted_key": "a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-Wy TpS1E", "header": { "alg": "A256GCMKW", "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d", "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw", "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn" } } ], "unprotected": { "cty": "text/plain" }, "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0", Miller Informational [Page 109]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 "iv": "VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g", "ciphertext": "ajm2Q-OpPXCr7-MHXicknb1lsxLdXxK_yLds0KuhJzfWK 04SjdxQeSw2L9mu3a_k1C55kCQ_3xlkcVKC5yr__Is48VOoK0k63_QRM 9tBURMFqLByJ8vOYQX0oJW4VUHJLmGhF-tVQWB7Kz8mr8zeE7txF0MSa P6ga7-siYxStR7_G07Thd1jh-zGT0wxM5g-VRORtq0K6AXpLlwEqRp7p kt2zRM0ZAXqSpe1O6FJ7FHLDyEFnD-zDIZukLpCbzhzMDLLw2-8I14FQ rgi-iEuzHgIJFIJn2wh9Tj0cg_kOZy9BqMRZbmYXMY9YQjorZ_P_JYG3 ARAIF3OjDNqpdYe-K_5Q5crGJSDNyij_ygEiItR5jssQVH2ofDQdLCht azE", "tag": "BESYyFN7T09KY7i8zKs5_g" } Figure 221: General JWE JSON Serialization 6. Nesting Signatures and Encryption This example illustrates nesting a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure within a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure. The signature uses the "PS256" (RSASSA-PSS) algorithm; the encryption uses the "RSA-OAEP" (RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption algorithm. Note that RSASSA-PSS uses random data to generate the signature, and RSAES-OAEP uses random data to generate the ciphertext; it might not be possible to exactly replicate the results in this section. Note that whitespace is added for readability as described in Section 1.1. 6.1. Signing Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation: o Payload content; this example uses the JSON Web Token [JWT] content from Figure 222, encoded as base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 223. o RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 224. o "alg" parameter of "PS256". { "iss": "hobbiton.example", "exp": 1300819380, "http://example.com/is_root": true } Figure 222: Payload Content, in JSON Format Miller Informational [Page 110]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 eyJpc3MiOiJob2JiaXRvbi5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXhwIjoxMzAwODE5MzgwLCJodH RwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNfcm9vdCI6dHJ1ZX0 Figure 223: Payload Content, base64url-encoded { "kty": "RSA", "kid": "hobbiton.example", "use": "sig", "n": "kNrPIBDXMU6fcyv5i-QHQAQ-K8gsC3HJb7FYhYaw8hXbNJa-t8q0lD KwLZgQXYV-ffWxXJv5GGrlZE4GU52lfMEegTDzYTrRQ3tepgKFjMGg6I y6fkl1ZNsx2gEonsnlShfzA9GJwRTmtKPbk1s-hwx1IU5AT-AIelNqBg cF2vE5W25_SGGBoaROVdUYxqETDggM1z5cKV4ZjDZ8-lh4oVB07bkac6 LQdHpJUUySH_Er20DXx30Kyi97PciXKTS-QKXnmm8ivyRCmux22ZoPUi nd2BKC5OiG4MwALhaL2Z2k8CsRdfy-7dg7z41Rp6D0ZeEvtaUp4bX4aK raL4rTfw", "e": "AQAB", "d": "ZLe_TIxpE9-W_n2VBa-HWvuYPtjvxwVXClJFOpJsdea8g9RMx34qEO EtnoYc2un3CZ3LtJi-mju5RAT8YSc76YJds3ZVw0UiO8mMBeG6-iOnvg obobNx7K57-xjTJZU72EjOr9kB7z6ZKwDDq7HFyCDhUEcYcHFVc7iL_6 TibVhAhOFONWlqlJgEgwVYd0rybNGKifdnpEbwyHoMwY6HM1qvnEFgP7 iZ0YzHUT535x6jj4VKcdA7ZduFkhUauysySEW7mxZM6fj1vdjJIy9LD1 fIz30Xv4ckoqhKF5GONU6tNmMmNgAD6gIViyEle1PrIxl1tBhCI14bRW -zrpHgAQ", "p": "yKWYoNIAqwMRQlgIBOdT1NIcbDNUUs2Rh-pBaxD_mIkweMt4Mg-0-B 2iSYvMrs8horhonV7vxCQagcBAATGW-hAafUehWjxWSH-3KccRM8toL4 e0q7M-idRDOBXSoe7Z2-CV2x_ZCY3RP8qp642R13WgXqGDIM4MbUkZSj cY9-c", "q": "uND4o15V30KDzf8vFJw589p1vlQVQ3NEilrinRUPHkkxaAzDzccGgr WMWpGxGFFnNL3w5CqPLeU76-5IVYQq0HwYVl0hVXQHr7sgaGu-483Ad3 ENcL23FrOnF45m7_2ooAstJDe49MeLTTQKrSIBl_SKvqpYvfSPTczPcZ kh9Kk", "dp": "jmTnEoq2qqa8ouaymjhJSCnsveUXnMQC2gAneQJRQkFqQu-zV2PKP KNbPvKVyiF5b2-L3tM3OW2d2iNDyRUWXlT7V5l0KwPTABSTOnTqAmYCh Gi8kXXdlhcrtSvXldBakC6saxwI_TzGGY2MVXzc2ZnCvCXHV4qjSxOrf P3pHFU", "dq": "R9FUvU88OVzEkTkXl3-5-WusE4DjHmndeZIlu3rifBdfLpq_P-iWP BbGaq9wzQ1c-J7SzCdJqkEJDv5yd2C7rnZ6kpzwBh_nmL8zscAk1qsun nt9CJGAYz7-sGWy1JGShFazfP52ThB4rlCJ0YuEaQMrIzpY77_oLAhpm DA0hLk", "qi": "S8tC7ZknW6hPITkjcwttQOPLVmRfwirRlFAViuDb8NW9CrV_7F2Oq UZCqmzHTYAumwGFHI1WVRep7anleWaJjxC_1b3fq_al4qH3Pe-EKiHg6 IMazuRtZLUROcThrExDbF5dYbsciDnfRUWLErZ4N1Be0bnxYuPqxwKd9 QZwMo0" } Figure 224: RSA 2048-Bit Private Key, in JWK Format Miller Informational [Page 111]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 6.2. Signing Operation The following is generated to complete the signing operation: o JWS Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 225, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 226. { "alg": "PS256", "typ": "JWT" } Figure 225: JWS Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 Figure 226: JWS Protected Header, base64url-encoded Performing the signature operation over the combined JWS Protected Header (Figure 226) and payload content (Figure 222) produces the following signature: dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5 _W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5 AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA Figure 227: JWS Signature, base64url-encoded 6.3. Signing Output The following compose the resulting JWS object: o JWS Protected Header (Figure 226) o Payload content (Figure 223) o Signature (Figure 227) Miller Informational [Page 112]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWS object using the JWS Compact Serialization (which is the plaintext input to the following encryption operation): eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 . eyJpc3MiOiJob2JiaXRvbi5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXhwIjoxMzAwODE5MzgwLCJodH RwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNfcm9vdCI6dHJ1ZX0 . dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5 _W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5 AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA Figure 228: JWS Compact Serialization 6.4. Encryption Input Factors The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process: o Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 228. o RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 84. o "alg" parameter of "RSA-OAEP". o "enc" parameter of "A128GCM". 6.5. Encryption Generated Factors The following are generated before encrypting: o AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this example uses the key from Figure 229. o Initialization Vector; this example uses the Initialization Vector from Figure 230. 0RHSNYwN-6-2QBGsYTZLSQ Figure 229: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA Figure 230: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 113]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 6.6. Encrypting the Key Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 229) with the RSA key (Figure 84) produces the following Encrypted Key: a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4 E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4g zMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21 O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5I R7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDU F_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-I apSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAa mBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_x pkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO 0 Figure 231: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded 6.7. Encrypting the Content The following is generated before encrypting the Plaintext: o JWE Protected Header; this example uses the header from Figure 232, encoded using base64url [RFC4648] to produce Figure 233. { "alg": "RSA-OAEP", "cty": "JWT", "enc": "A128GCM" } Figure 232: JWE Protected Header JSON eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ Figure 233: JWE Protected Header, base64url-encoded Miller Informational [Page 114]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext (Figure 228) with the following: o CEK (Figure 229); o Initialization Vector (Figure 230); and o JWE Protected Header (Figure 233) as authenticated data produces the following: o Ciphertext from Figure 234. o Authentication Tag from Figure 235. SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBNgCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2Q kxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAvVLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLX qZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7HsQePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZ TNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fuzvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9C hMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJwr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEa ulV18l4Fg9tLejdkAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2 zI3Q_1sYjKUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUr lx4gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gYjLf hn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5XmnwZMyNc 9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMxtlMizR88NKU1WkB siXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM Figure 234: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw Figure 235: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded 6.8. Encryption Output The following compose the resulting JWE object: o JWE Protected Header (Figure 233) o Encrypted Key (Figure 231) o Initialization Vector (Figure 230) o Ciphertext (Figure 234) o Authentication Tag (Figure 235) Miller Informational [Page 115]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the JWE Compact Serialization: eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ . a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4 E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4g zMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21 O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5I R7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDU F_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-I apSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAa mBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_x pkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO 0 . GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA . SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBNgCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2Q kxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAvVLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLX qZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7HsQePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZ TNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fuzvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9C hMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJwr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEa ulV18l4Fg9tLejdkAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2 zI3Q_1sYjKUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUr lx4gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gYjLf hn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5XmnwZMyNc 9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMxtlMizR88NKU1WkB siXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM . KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw Figure 236: JWE Compact Serialization Miller Informational [Page 116]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the general JWE JSON Serialization: { "recipients": [ { "encrypted_key": "a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVh jurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVO GrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4gzMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV 7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21O0ul4YxS HV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e 5IR7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5 o6yV64x6yzDUF_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBq XxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-IapSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXM uinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZa38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jl tmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAamBKOYwfk7J hLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDh i1smxS_X_xpkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_ GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO0" } ], "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYy I6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ", "iv": "GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA", "ciphertext": "SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBN gCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2QkxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAv VLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLXqZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7Hs QePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZTNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fu zvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9ChMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJ wr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEaulV18l4Fg9tLejd kAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2zI3Q_1sYj KUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUrlx4 gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gY jLfhn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5 XmnwZMyNc9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMx tlMizR88NKU1WkBsiXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM", "tag": "KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw" } Figure 237: General JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 117]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 The resulting JWE object using the flattened JWE JSON Serialization: { "encrypted_key": "a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurC yrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13 mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4gzMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJ WrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_f uYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5IR7nany-25_UmC2uros NkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDUF_5JCIdl-Qv6 H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-IapSjVF nMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3 kJusAamBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15q JIEXNJtqnblpymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TX uPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_xpkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX 2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO0", "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYy I6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ", "iv": "GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA", "ciphertext": "SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBN gCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2QkxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAv VLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLXqZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7Hs QePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZTNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fu zvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9ChMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJ wr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEaulV18l4Fg9tLejd kAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2zI3Q_1sYj KUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUrlx4 gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gY jLfhn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5 XmnwZMyNc9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMx tlMizR88NKU1WkBsiXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM", "tag": "KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw" } Figure 238: Flattened JWE JSON Serialization Miller Informational [Page 118]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 7. Security Considerations This document is designed to provide examples for developers to use in checking their implementations. As such, it does not follow some of the security considerations and recommendations in the core documents (i.e., [JWS], [JWE], [JWK], and [JWA]). For instance: o it does not always generate a new CEK value for every encrypted example; o it does not always generate a new Initialization Vector (IV) value for every encrypted example; and o it does not always generate a new ephemeral key for every ephemeral key example. For each example, data that is expected to be generated for each signing or encryption operation is isolated to sections titled "Generated Factors". 8. References 8.1. Normative References [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. Miller Informational [Page 119]
RFC 7520 JOSE Cookbook May 2015 8.2. Informative References [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP] Tolkien, J., "The Fellowship of the Ring", HarperCollins Publishers, ePub Edition, ISBN 9780061952838, March 2009. [RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification version 1.3", RFC 1951, DOI 10.17487/RFC1951, May 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1951>. [RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095, DOI 10.17487/RFC7095, January 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7095>. Acknowledgements Most of the examples herein use quotes and character names found in the novel "The Fellowship of the Ring" [LOTR-FELLOWSHIP], written by J. R. R. Tolkien. Thanks to Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Mike Jones, and Jim Schaad for their input and review of the text. Thanks to Brian Campbell for verifying the Compact Serialization examples. Author's Address Matthew Miller Cisco Systems, Inc. EMail: mamille2@cisco.com Miller Informational [Page 120]