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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Jennings Request for Comments: 6216 Cisco Systems Category: Informational K. Ono ISSN: 2070-1721 Columbia University R. Sparks B. Hibbard, Ed. Tekelec April 2011 Example Call Flows Using Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Security Mechanisms Abstract This document shows example call flows demonstrating the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). It also provides information that helps implementers build interoperable SIP software. To help facilitate interoperability testing, it includes certificates used in the example call flows and processes to create certificates for testing. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6216. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Host Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3. User Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Call Flow with Message Over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1. TLS with Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2. MESSAGE Transaction Over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Call Flow with S/MIME-Secured Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1. MESSAGE Request with Signed Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted Body . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted and Signed Body . . . . . . 22 5. Observed Interoperability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Additional Test Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix A. Making Test Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A.1. makeCA script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.2. makeCert script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Appendix B. Certificates for Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 B.1. Certificates Using EKU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 B.2. Certificates NOT Using EKU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 B.3. Certificate Chaining with a Non-Root CA . . . . . . . . . 58 Appendix C. Message Dumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 1. Introduction This document is informational and is not normative on any aspect of SIP. SIP with TLS ([RFC5246]) implementations are becoming very common. Several implementations of the S/MIME ([RFC5751]) portion of SIP ([RFC3261]) are also becoming available. After several interoperability events, it is clear that it is difficult to write these systems without any test vectors or examples of "known good" messages to test against. Furthermore, testing at the events is often hindered due to the lack of a commonly trusted certification authority to sign the certificates used in the events. This document addresses both of these issues by providing messages that give detailed examples that implementers can use for comparison and that can also be used for testing. In addition, this document provides a common certificate and private key that can be used to set up a mock Certification Authority (CA) that can be used during the SIP interoperability events. Certificate requests from the users will be signed by the private key of the mock CA. The document also provides some hints and clarifications for implementers. A simple SIP call flow using SIPS URIs and TLS is shown in Section 3. The certificates for the hosts used are shown in Section 2.2, and the CA certificates used to sign these are shown in Section 2.1. The text from Section 4.1 through Section 4.3 shows some simple SIP call flows using S/MIME to sign and encrypt the body of the message. The user certificates used in these examples are shown in Section 2.3. These host certificates are signed with the same mock CA private key. Section 5 presents a partial list of items that implementers should consider in order to implement systems that will interoperate. Scripts and instructions to make certificates that can be used for interoperability testing are presented in Appendix A, along with methods for converting these to various formats. The certificates used while creating the examples and test messages in this document are made available in Appendix B. Binary copies of various messages in this document that can be used for testing appear in Appendix C. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 2. Certificates 2.1. CA Certificates The certificate used by the CA to sign the other certificates is shown below. This is an X.509v3 ([X.509]) certificate. Note that the X.509v3 Basic Constraints in the certificate allows it to be used as a CA, certification authority. This certificate is not used directly in the TLS call flow; it is used only to verify user and host certificates. Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4c Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Jan 27 18:36:05 2011 GMT Not After : Jan 3 18:36:05 2111 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:ab:1f:91:61:f1:1c:c5:cd:a6:7b:16:9b:b7:14: 79:e4:30:9e:98:d0:ec:07:b7:bd:77:d7:d1:f5:5b: 2c:e2:ee:e6:b1:b0:f0:85:fa:a5:bc:cb:cc:cf:69: 2c:4f:fc:50:ef:9d:31:2b:c0:59:ea:fb:64:6f:1f: 55:a7:3d:fd:70:d2:56:db:14:99:17:92:70:ac:26: f8:34:41:70:d9:c0:03:91:6a:ba:d1:11:8f:ac:12: 31:de:b9:19:70:8d:5d:a7:7d:8b:19:cc:40:3f:ae: ff:de:1f:db:94:b3:46:77:6c:ae:ae:ff:3e:d6:84: 5b:c2:de:0b:26:65:d0:91:c7:70:4b:c7:0a:4a:bf: c7:97:04:dd:ba:58:47:cb:e0:2b:23:76:87:65:c5: 55:34:10:ab:27:1f:1c:f8:30:3d:b0:9b:ca:a2:81: 72:4c:bd:60:fe:f7:21:fe:0b:db:0b:db:e9:5b:01: 36:d4:28:15:6b:79:eb:d0:91:1b:21:59:b8:0e:aa: bf:d5:b1:6c:70:37:a3:3f:a5:7d:0e:95:46:f6:f6: 58:67:83:75:42:37:18:0b:a4:41:39:b2:2f:6c:80: 2c:78:ec:a5:0f:be:9c:10:f8:c0:0b:0d:73:99:9e: 0d:d7:97:50:cb:cc:45:34:23:49:41:85:22:24:ad: 29:c3 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27 Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27 X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:TRUE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 06:5f:9e:ae:a0:9a:bc:b5:b9:5b:7e:97:33:cc:df:63:98:98: 94:cb:0d:66:a9:83:e8:aa:58:2a:59:a1:9e:47:31:a6:af:5c: 3f:a2:25:86:f8:df:05:92:b7:db:69:a1:69:72:87:66:c5:ab: 35:89:01:37:19:c9:74:eb:09:d1:3f:88:7b:24:13:42:ca:2d: fb:45:e6:cc:4b:f8:21:78:f3:f5:97:ec:09:92:24:a2:f0:e6: 94:8d:97:4a:00:94:00:bd:25:b8:17:2c:52:53:5d:cc:5c:48: a4:a1:1d:2d:f6:50:55:13:a4:d3:b2:a2:f4:f1:b9:6d:48:5e: 5c:f3:de:e0:fc:59:09:a1:d9:14:61:65:bf:d8:3f:b9:ba:2e: 7c:ed:5c:24:9b:6b:ca:aa:5f:f1:c1:1e:b0:a8:da:82:0f:fb: 4c:71:3b:4d:7b:38:c8:e3:8a:2a:19:34:44:26:0b:ea:f0:47: 38:46:28:65:04:e2:01:52:dd:ec:3d:e5:f5:53:74:77:74:75: 6d:c6:d9:c2:0a:ac:3b:b8:98:5c:55:53:34:74:52:a8:26:b1: 2f:30:22:d0:8b:b7:f3:a0:dd:68:07:33:d5:ae:b7:81:b2:94: 58:72:4e:7c:c6:72:2f:bd:6c:69:fb:b5:17:a8:2a:8d:d7:2c: 91:06:c8:0c The certificate content shown above and throughout this document was rendered by the OpenSSL "x509" tool. These dumps are included only as informative examples. Output may vary among future revisions of the tool. At the time of this document's publication, there were some irregularities in the presentation of Distinguished Names (DNs). In particular, note that in the "Issuer" and "Subject" fields, it appears the intent is to present DNs in Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) format. If this was intended, the spaces should have been omitted after the delimiting commas, and the elements should have been presented in order of most-specific to least-specific. Please refer to Appendix A of [RFC4514]. Using the "Issuer" DN from above as an example and following guidelines in [RFC4514], it should have instead appeared as: Issuer: OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority,O=sipit,L=San Jose, ST=California,C=US The ASN.1 ([X.683]) parse of the CA certificate is shown below. 0:l= 949 cons: SEQUENCE 4:l= 669 cons: SEQUENCE 8:l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ] 10:l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02 13:l= 9 prim: INTEGER :96A384174EEF8A4C 24:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 26:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha1WithRSAEncryption 37:l= 0 prim: NULL 39:l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE 41:l= 11 cons: SET 43:l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE 45:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName 50:l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :US 54:l= 19 cons: SET 56:l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE 58:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :stateOrProvinceName 63:l= 10 prim: UTF8STRING 43 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e-69 61 California 75:l= 17 cons: SET 77:l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE 79:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :localityName 84:l= 8 prim: UTF8STRING 53 61 6e 20 4a 6f 73 65- San Jose 94:l= 14 cons: SET 96:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE 98:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationName 103:l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING 73 69 70 69 74 sipit 110:l= 41 cons: SET 112:l= 39 cons: SEQUENCE 114:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationalUnitName 119:l= 32 prim: UTF8STRING 53 69 70 69 74 20 54 65-73 74 20 43 65 72 74 69 Sipit Test Certi 66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41-75 74 68 6f 72 69 74 79 ficate Authority 153:l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE 155:l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :110127183605Z 170:l= 15 prim: GENERALIZEDTIME :21110103183605Z 187:l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE 189:l= 11 cons: SET 191:l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE 193:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName 198:l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :US 202:l= 19 cons: SET 204:l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE 206:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :stateOrProvinceName 211:l= 10 prim: UTF8STRING 43 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e-69 61 California 223:l= 17 cons: SET 225:l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE 227:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :localityName 232:l= 8 prim: UTF8STRING 53 61 6e 20 4a 6f 73 65- San Jose 242:l= 14 cons: SET 244:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 246:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationName 251:l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING 73 69 70 69 74 sipit 258:l= 41 cons: SET 260:l= 39 cons: SEQUENCE 262:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationalUnitName 267:l= 32 prim: UTF8STRING 53 69 70 69 74 20 54 65-73 74 20 43 65 72 74 69 Sipit Test Certi 66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41-75 74 68 6f 72 69 74 79 ficate Authority 301:l= 290 cons: SEQUENCE 305:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE 307:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsaEncryption 318:l= 0 prim: NULL 320:l= 271 prim: BIT STRING 00 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01-01 00 ab 1f 91 61 f1 1c .0...........a.. c5 cd a6 7b 16 9b b7 14-79 e4 30 9e 98 d0 ec 07 ...{....y.0..... b7 bd 77 d7 d1 f5 5b 2c-e2 ee e6 b1 b0 f0 85 fa ..w...[,........ a5 bc cb cc cf 69 2c 4f-fc 50 ef 9d 31 2b c0 59 .....i,O.P..1+.Y ea fb 64 6f 1f 55 a7 3d-fd 70 d2 56 db 14 99 17 ..do.U.=.p.V.... 92 70 ac 26 f8 34 41 70-d9 c0 03 91 6a ba d1 11 .p.&.4Ap....j... 8f ac 12 31 de b9 19 70-8d 5d a7 7d 8b 19 cc 40 ...1...p.].}...@ 3f ae ff de 1f db 94 b3-46 77 6c ae ae ff 3e d6 ?.......Fwl...>. 84 5b c2 de 0b 26 65 d0-91 c7 70 4b c7 0a 4a bf .[...&e...pK..J. c7 97 04 dd ba 58 47 cb-e0 2b 23 76 87 65 c5 55 .....XG..+#v.e.U 34 10 ab 27 1f 1c f8 30-3d b0 9b ca a2 81 72 4c 4..'...0=.....rL bd 60 fe f7 21 fe 0b db-0b db e9 5b 01 36 d4 28 .`..!......[.6.( 15 6b 79 eb d0 91 1b 21-59 b8 0e aa bf d5 b1 6c .ky....!Y......l 70 37 a3 3f a5 7d 0e 95-46 f6 f6 58 67 83 75 42 p7.?.}..F..Xg.uB 37 18 0b a4 41 39 b2 2f-6c 80 2c 78 ec a5 0f be 7...A9./l.,x.... 9c 10 f8 c0 0b 0d 73 99-9e 0d d7 97 50 cb cc 45 ......s.....P..E 34 23 49 41 85 22 24 ad-29 c3 02 03 01 00 01 4#IA."$.)...... 595:l= 80 cons: cont [ 3 ] 597:l= 78 cons: SEQUENCE 599:l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE 601:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Subject Key Identifier 606:l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING 04 14 95 45 7e 5f 2b ea-65 98 12 91 04 f3 63 c7 ...E~_+.e.....c. 68 9a 58 16 77 27 h.X.w' 630:l= 31 cons: SEQUENCE 632:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Authority Key Identifier 637:l= 24 prim: OCTET STRING 30 16 80 14 95 45 7e 5f-2b ea 65 98 12 91 04 f3 0....E~_+.e..... 63 c7 68 9a 58 16 77 27- c.h.X.w' 663:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE 665:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic Constraints 670:l= 5 prim: OCTET STRING 30 03 01 01 ff 0.... 677:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 679:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha1WithRSAEncryption 690:l= 0 prim: NULL 692:l= 257 prim: BIT STRING 00 06 5f 9e ae a0 9a bc-b5 b9 5b 7e 97 33 cc df .._.......[~.3.. 63 98 98 94 cb 0d 66 a9-83 e8 aa 58 2a 59 a1 9e c.....f....X*Y.. 47 31 a6 af 5c 3f a2 25-86 f8 df 05 92 b7 db 69 G1..\?.%.......i a1 69 72 87 66 c5 ab 35-89 01 37 19 c9 74 eb 09 .ir.f..5..7..t.. d1 3f 88 7b 24 13 42 ca-2d fb 45 e6 cc 4b f8 21 .?.{$.B.-.E..K.! 78 f3 f5 97 ec 09 92 24-a2 f0 e6 94 8d 97 4a 00 x......$......J. 94 00 bd 25 b8 17 2c 52-53 5d cc 5c 48 a4 a1 1d ...%..,RS].\H... 2d f6 50 55 13 a4 d3 b2-a2 f4 f1 b9 6d 48 5e 5c -.PU........mH^\ f3 de e0 fc 59 09 a1 d9-14 61 65 bf d8 3f b9 ba ....Y....ae..?.. 2e 7c ed 5c 24 9b 6b ca-aa 5f f1 c1 1e b0 a8 da .|.\$.k.._...... 82 0f fb 4c 71 3b 4d 7b-38 c8 e3 8a 2a 19 34 44 ...Lq;M{8...*.4D 26 0b ea f0 47 38 46 28-65 04 e2 01 52 dd ec 3d &...G8F(e...R..= e5 f5 53 74 77 74 75 6d-c6 d9 c2 0a ac 3b b8 98 ..Stwtum.....;.. 5c 55 53 34 74 52 a8 26-b1 2f 30 22 d0 8b b7 f3 \US4tR.&./0".... a0 dd 68 07 33 d5 ae b7-81 b2 94 58 72 4e 7c c6 ..h.3......XrN|. 72 2f bd 6c 69 fb b5 17-a8 2a 8d d7 2c 91 06 c8 r/.li....*..,... 0c . 2.2. Host Certificates The certificate for the host example.com is shown below. Note that the Subject Alternative Name is set to example.com and is a DNS type. The certificates for the other hosts are shown in Appendix B. Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4f Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Feb 7 19:32:17 2011 GMT Not After : Jan 14 19:32:17 2111 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, CN=example.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:dd:74:06:02:10:c2:e7:04:1f:bc:8c:b6:24:e7: 9b:94:a3:48:37:85:9e:6d:83:12:84:50:1a:8e:48: b1:fa:86:8c:a7:80:b9:be:52:ec:a6:ca:63:47:84: ad:f6:74:85:82:16:7e:4e:36:40:0a:74:2c:20:a9: 6a:0e:6a:7f:35:cf:70:71:63:7d:e9:43:67:81:4c: ea:b5:1e:b7:4c:a3:35:08:7b:21:0d:2a:73:07:63: 9d:8d:75:bf:1f:d4:8e:e6:67:60:75:f7:ea:0a:7a: Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 6c:90:af:92:45:e0:62:05:9a:8a:10:98:dc:7c:54: 8b:e4:61:95:3b:04:fc:10:50:ef:80:45:ba:5e:84: 97:76:c1:20:25:c1:92:1d:89:0a:f7:55:62:64:fa: e8:69:a2:62:4c:67:d3:08:d9:61:b5:3d:16:54:b6: b7:44:8d:59:2b:90:d4:e9:fb:c7:7d:87:58:c3:12: ac:33:78:00:50:ba:07:05:b3:b9:01:1a:63:55:6c: e1:7a:ec:a3:07:ae:3b:02:83:a1:69:e0:c3:dc:2d: 61:e9:b2:e3:b3:71:c8:a6:cf:da:fb:3e:99:c7:e5: 71:b9:c9:17:d4:ed:bc:a0:47:54:09:8c:6e:6d:53: 9a:2c:c9:68:c6:6f:f1:3d:91:1a:24:43:77:7d:91: 69:4b Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:example.com, URI:sip:example.com X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: CC:06:59:5B:8B:5E:D6:0D:F2:05:4D:1B:68:54:1E:FC:F9:43:19:17 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 6a:9a:d1:db:00:4b:90:86:b0:53:ea:6f:30:31:89:1e:9b:09: 14:bd:6f:b9:02:aa:6f:58:ee:30:03:b8:a1:fd:b3:41:72:ff: b3:0d:cb:76:a7:17:c6:57:38:06:13:e5:f3:e4:30:17:4d:f7: 97:b5:f3:74:e9:81:f8:f4:55:a3:0d:f5:82:38:c3:98:43:52: 1f:84:cd:1a:b4:a3:45:9f:3d:e2:31:fd:cb:a2:ad:ed:60:7d: fa:d2:aa:49:2f:41:a9:80:01:bb:ed:b6:75:c9:97:69:7f:0c: 91:60:f1:c4:5a:36:e8:5c:ac:e1:a8:e7:9a:55:e5:e0:cd:01: f4:de:93:f4:38:6c:c1:71:d2:fd:cd:1b:5d:25:eb:90:7b:31: 41:e7:37:0e:e5:c0:01:48:91:f7:34:dd:c6:1f:74:e6:34:34: e6:cd:93:0f:3f:ce:94:ad:91:d9:e2:72:b1:9f:1d:d3:a5:7d: 5e:e2:a4:56:c5:b1:71:4d:10:0a:5d:a6:56:e6:57:1f:48:a5: 5c:75:67:ea:ab:35:3e:f6:b6:fa:c1:f3:8a:c1:80:71:32:18: 6c:33:b5:fa:16:5a:16:e1:a1:6c:19:67:f5:45:68:64:6f:b2: 31:dc:e3:5a:1a:b2:d4:87:89:96:fd:87:ba:38:4e:0a:19:07: 03:4b:9b:b1 The example host certificate above, as well as all the others presented in this document, are signed directly by a root CA. These certificate chains have a length equal to two: the root CA and the host certificate. Non-root CAs exist and may also sign certificates. The certificate chains presented by hosts with certificates signed by Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 non-root CAs will have a length greater than two. For more details on how certificate chains are validated, see Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of [RFC5280]. 2.3. User Certificates User certificates are used by many applications to establish user identity. The user certificate for fluffy@example.com is shown below. Note that the Subject Alternative Name has a list of names with different URL types such as a sip, im, or pres URL. This is necessary for interoperating with a Common Profile for Instant Messaging (CPIM) gateway. In this example, example.com is the domain for fluffy. The message could be coming from any host in *.example.com, and the address-of-record (AOR) in the user certificate would still be the same. The others are shown in Appendix B.1. These certificates make use of the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension discussed in [RFC5924]. Note that the X509v3 Extended Key Usage attribute refers to the SIP OID introduced in [RFC5924], which is 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20. Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4d Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Feb 7 19:32:17 2011 GMT Not After : Jan 14 19:32:17 2111 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, CN=fluffy Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:a3:2c:59:0c:e9:bc:e4:ec:d3:9e:fb:99:02:ec: b1:36:3a:b7:d3:1d:4d:c3:3a:b6:ae:50:bd:5f:55: 08:77:8c:7e:a4:e9:f0:68:31:28:8f:23:32:56:19: c3:22:97:a7:6d:fd:a7:22:2a:01:b5:af:61:bd:5f: 7e:c1:14:e5:98:29:b4:34:4e:38:8a:26:ee:0d:da: db:27:b9:78:d6:ac:ac:04:78:32:98:c2:75:e7:6a: b7:2d:b3:3c:e3:eb:97:a5:ef:8b:59:42:50:17:7b: fe:a7:81:af:37:a7:e7:e3:1f:b0:8d:d0:72:2f:6c: 14:42:c6:01:68:e1:8f:fd:56:4d:7d:cf:16:dc:aa: 05:61:0b:0a:ca:ca:ec:51:ec:53:6e:3d:2b:00:80: fe:35:1b:06:0a:61:13:88:0b:44:f3:cc:fd:2b:0e: b4:a2:0b:a0:97:84:14:2e:ee:2b:e3:2f:c1:1a:9e: 86:9a:78:6a:a2:4c:57:93:e7:01:26:d3:56:0d:bd: Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 b0:2f:f8:da:c7:3c:01:dc:cb:2d:31:8c:6c:c6:5c: b4:63:e8:b2:a2:40:11:bf:ad:f8:6d:12:01:97:1d: 47:f8:6a:15:8b:fb:27:96:73:44:46:34:d7:24:1c: cf:56:8d:d4:be:d6:94:5b:f0:a6:67:e3:dd:cf:b4: f2:d5 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: URI:sip:fluffy@example.com, URI:im:fluffy@example.com, URI:pres:fluffy@example.com X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 85:97:09:B8:D3:55:37:24:8A:DC:DE:E3:91:72:E4:22:CF:98:87:52 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: E-mail Protection, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption a8:a9:8f:d8:8a:0b:88:ed:ff:4f:bf:e5:cd:8f:9e:7b:b8:e6: f2:2c:aa:e3:23:5b:9a:71:5e:fd:20:a3:dd:d9:d3:c1:f2:e8: f0:be:77:db:33:cc:8a:7b:4f:91:2b:8d:d6:f7:14:c3:8d:e0: 60:d3:34:50:bc:be:67:22:cd:f5:74:7b:f4:9a:68:a2:52:2b: 81:2f:46:d3:09:9f:25:c3:20:e8:10:d5:ef:38:7b:d1:17:d4: f1:d7:54:67:56:f1:13:cf:2f:fc:8b:83:fc:14:e7:01:82:59: 83:cc:b1:8d:f0:c7:da:4e:b1:dc:cc:54:cf:6c:3b:47:47:59: 87:d9:16:ec:af:af:e1:12:13:23:1e:0a:db:f5:b5:ff:5d:ab: 15:0e:e3:25:91:00:0e:90:db:d8:07:11:90:81:01:3a:48:a8: aa:9e:b0:62:d3:36:f0:0c:b7:2f:a7:17:92:52:36:29:14:0a: d6:65:86:67:73:74:6e:aa:3c:ee:47:38:1e:c8:6e:06:81:85: 1c:2e:f0:b6:04:7d:6c:38:db:81:9c:b8:07:e3:07:be:f5:2f: 09:68:63:04:6b:87:0e:36:b9:a1:a3:fb:c8:30:0c:a0:63:8d: 6d:ab:0a:f8:44:b0:78:19:1a:38:7e:fa:6a:a1:d4:4b:4b:75: 75:bf:6f:09 Versions of these certificates that do not make use of EKU are also included in Appendix B.2 Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 3. Call Flow with Message Over TLS 3.1. TLS with Server Authentication The flow below shows the edited SSLDump output of the host example.com forming a TLS [RFC5246] connection to example.net. In this example, mutual authentication is not used. Note that the client proposed three protocol suites including TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA defined in [RFC5246]. The certificate returned by the server contains a Subject Alternative Name that is set to example.net. A detailed discussion of TLS can be found in SSL and TLS [EKR-TLS]. For more details on the SSLDump tool, see the SSLDump Manual [ssldump-manpage]. This example does not use the Server Extended Hello (see [RFC5246]). New TCP connection #1: example.com(50738) <-> example.net(5061) 1 1 0.0004 (0.0004) C>SV3.1(101) Handshake ClientHello Version 3.1 random[32]= 4c 09 5b a7 66 77 eb 43 52 30 dd 98 4d 09 23 d3 ff 81 74 ab 04 69 bb 79 8c dc 59 cd c2 1f b7 ec cipher suites TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DSS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 compression methods NULL 1 2 0.0012 (0.0007) S>CV3.1(48) Handshake ServerHello Version 3.1 random[32]= 4c 09 5b a7 30 87 74 c7 16 98 24 d5 af 35 17 a7 ef c3 78 0c 94 d4 94 d2 7b a6 3f 40 04 25 f6 e0 session_id[0]= cipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA compressionMethod NULL 1 3 0.0012 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(1858) Handshake Certificate 1 4 0.0012 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(14) Handshake CertificateRequest certificate_types rsa_sign certificate_types dss_sign certificate_types unknown value ServerHelloDone 1 5 0.0043 (0.0031) C>SV3.1(7) Handshake Certificate 1 6 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(262) Handshake ClientKeyExchange 1 7 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(1) ChangeCipherSpec 1 8 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(48) Handshake 1 9 0.0129 (0.0085) S>CV3.1(170) Handshake 1 10 0.0129 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(1) ChangeCipherSpec 1 11 0.0129 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(48) Handshake 1 12 0.0134 (0.0005) C>SV3.1(32) application_data 1 13 0.0134 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(496) application_data 1 14 0.2150 (0.2016) S>CV3.1(32) application_data 1 15 0.2150 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(336) application_data 1 16 12.2304 (12.0154) S>CV3.1(32) Alert 1 12.2310 (0.0005) S>C TCP FIN 1 17 12.2321 (0.0011) C>SV3.1(32) Alert 3.2. MESSAGE Transaction Over TLS Once the TLS session is set up, the following MESSAGE request (as defined in [RFC3428] is sent from fluffy@example.com to kumiko@example.net. Note that the URI has a SIPS URL and that the VIA indicates that TLS was used. In order to format this document, the <allOneLine> convention from [RFC4475] is used to break long lines. The actual message does not contain the line breaks contained within those tags. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 MESSAGE sips:kumiko@example.net:5061 SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TLS 192.0.2.2:15001; branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c785a077a9a8451b-1---d8754z-; rport=50738 </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 To: <sips:kumiko@example.net:5061> From: <sips:fluffy@example.com:15001>;tag=1a93430b Call-ID: OTZmMDE2OWNlYTVjNDkzYzBhMWRlMDU4NDExZmU4ZTQ. CSeq: 4308 MESSAGE <allOneLine> Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime, application/sdp, multipart/alternative </allOneLine> Content-Type: text/plain Content-Length: 6 Hello! When a User Agent (UA) goes to send a message to example.com, the UA can see if it already has a TLS connection to example.com and if it does, it may send the message over this connection. A UA should have some scheme for reusing connections as opening a new TLS connection for every message results in awful performance. Implementers are encouraged to read [RFC5923] and [RFC3263]. The response is sent from example.net to example.com over the same TLS connection. It is shown below. SIP/2.0 200 OK <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TLS 192.0.2.2:15001; branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c785a077a9a8451b-1---d8754z-; rport=50738 </allOneLine> To: <sips:kumiko@example.net:5061>;tag=0d075510 From: <sips:fluffy@example.com:15001>;tag=1a93430b Call-ID: OTZmMDE2OWNlYTVjNDkzYzBhMWRlMDU4NDExZmU4ZTQ. CSeq: 4308 MESSAGE Content-Length: 0 Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 4. Call Flow with S/MIME-Secured Message 4.1. MESSAGE Request with Signed Body Below is an example of a signed message. The values on the Content- Type line (multipart/signed) and on the Content-Disposition line have been broken across lines to fit on the page, but they are not broken across lines in actual implementations. MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001; branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-3a922b6dc0f0ff37-1---d8754z-; rport=50739 </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 To: <sip:kumiko@example.net> From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=ef6bad5e Call-ID: N2NiZjI0NjRjNDQ0MTY1NDRjNWNmMGU1MDA2MDRhYmI. CSeq: 8473 MESSAGE <allOneLine> Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime, application/sdp, multipart/alternative </allOneLine> <allOneLine> Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=3b515e121b43a911; micalg=sha1;protocol="application/pkcs7-signature" </allOneLine> Content-Length: 774 --3b515e121b43a911 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Hello! --3b515e121b43a911 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature;name=smime.p7s <allOneLine> Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required; filename=smime.p7s </allOneLine> Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary ***************** * BINARY BLOB 1 * ***************** --3b515e121b43a911-- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 It is important to note that the signature ("BINARY BLOB 1") is computed over the MIME headers and body, but excludes the multipart boundary lines. The value on the Message-body line ends with CRLF. The CRLF is included in the boundary and is not part of the signature computation. To be clear, the signature is computed over data starting with the "C" in the "Content-Type" and ending with the "!" in the "Hello!". Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Hello! Following is the ASN.1 parsing of encrypted contents referred to above as "BINARY BLOB 1". Note that at address 30, the hash for the signature is specified as SHA-1. Also note that the sender's certificate is not attached as it is optional in [RFC5652]. 0 472: SEQUENCE { 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2) 15 457: [0] { 19 453: SEQUENCE { 23 1: INTEGER 1 26 11: SET { 28 9: SEQUENCE { 30 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) 37 0: NULL : } : } 39 11: SEQUENCE { 41 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1) : } 52 420: SET { 56 416: SEQUENCE { 60 1: INTEGER 1 63 125: SEQUENCE { 65 112: SEQUENCE { 67 11: SET { 69 9: SEQUENCE { 71 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 76 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 80 19: SET { 82 17: SEQUENCE { 84 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8) 89 10: UTF8String 'California' Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 : } : } 101 17: SET { 103 15: SEQUENCE { 105 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7) 110 8: UTF8String 'San Jose' : } : } 120 14: SET { 122 12: SEQUENCE { 124 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationName (2 5 4 10) 129 5: UTF8String 'sipit' : } : } 136 41: SET { 138 39: SEQUENCE { 140 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) 145 32: UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate Authority' : } : } : } 179 9: INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4D : } 190 9: SEQUENCE { 192 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) 199 0: NULL : } 201 13: SEQUENCE { 203 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 214 0: NULL : } 216 256: OCTET STRING : 74 4D 21 39 D6 E2 E2 2C 30 5A AA BC 4E 60 8D 69 : A7 E5 79 50 1A B1 7D 4A D3 C1 03 9F 19 7D A2 76 : 97 B3 CE 30 CD 62 4B 96 20 35 DB C1 64 D9 33 92 : 96 CD 28 03 98 6E 2C 0C F6 8D 93 40 F2 88 DA 29 : AD 0B C2 0E F9 D3 6A 95 2C 79 6E C2 3D 62 E6 54 : A9 1B AC 66 DB 16 B7 44 6C 03 1B 71 9C EE C9 EC : 4D 93 B1 CF F5 17 79 C5 C8 BA 2F A7 6C 4B DC CF : 62 A3 F3 1A 1B 24 E4 40 66 3C 4F 87 86 BF 09 6A : 7A 43 60 2B FC D8 3D 2B 57 17 CB 81 03 2A 56 69 : 81 82 FA 78 DE D2 3A 2F FA A3 C5 EA 8B E8 0C 36 : 1B BC DC FD 1B 8C 2E 0F 01 AF D9 E1 04 0E 4E 50 : 94 75 7C BD D9 0B DD AA FA 36 E3 EC E4 A5 35 46 Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 : BE A2 97 1D AD BA 44 54 3A ED 94 DA 76 4A 51 BA : A4 7D 7A 62 BF 2A 2F F2 5C 5A FE CA E6 B9 DC 5D : EA 26 F2 35 17 19 20 CE 97 96 4E 72 9C 72 FD 1F : 68 C1 6A 5C 86 42 F2 ED F2 70 65 4C C7 44 C5 7C : } : } : } : } : } SHA-1 parameters may be omitted entirely, instead of being set to NULL, as mentioned in [RFC3370]. The above dump of Blob 1 has SHA-1 parameters set to NULL. Below are the same contents signed with the same key, but omitting the NULL according to [RFC3370]. This is the preferred encoding. This is covered in greater detail in Section 5. 0 468: SEQUENCE { 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2) 15 453: [0] { 19 449: SEQUENCE { 23 1: INTEGER 1 26 9: SET { 28 7: SEQUENCE { 30 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) : } : } 37 11: SEQUENCE { 39 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1) : } 50 418: SET { 54 414: SEQUENCE { 58 1: INTEGER 1 61 125: SEQUENCE { 63 112: SEQUENCE { 65 11: SET { 67 9: SEQUENCE { 69 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 74 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 78 19: SET { 80 17: SEQUENCE { 82 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8) 87 10: UTF8String 'California' : } : } 99 17: SET { Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 18]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 101 15: SEQUENCE { 103 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7) 108 8: UTF8String 'San Jose' : } : } 118 14: SET { 120 12: SEQUENCE { 122 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationName (2 5 4 10) 127 5: UTF8String 'sipit' : } : } 134 41: SET { 136 39: SEQUENCE { 138 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) 143 32: UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate Authority' : } : } : } 177 9: INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4D : } 188 7: SEQUENCE { 190 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) : } 197 13: SEQUENCE { 199 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 210 0: NULL : } 212 256: OCTET STRING : 74 4D 21 39 D6 E2 E2 2C 30 5A AA BC 4E 60 8D 69 : A7 E5 79 50 1A B1 7D 4A D3 C1 03 9F 19 7D A2 76 : 97 B3 CE 30 CD 62 4B 96 20 35 DB C1 64 D9 33 92 : 96 CD 28 03 98 6E 2C 0C F6 8D 93 40 F2 88 DA 29 : AD 0B C2 0E F9 D3 6A 95 2C 79 6E C2 3D 62 E6 54 : A9 1B AC 66 DB 16 B7 44 6C 03 1B 71 9C EE C9 EC : 4D 93 B1 CF F5 17 79 C5 C8 BA 2F A7 6C 4B DC CF : 62 A3 F3 1A 1B 24 E4 40 66 3C 4F 87 86 BF 09 6A : 7A 43 60 2B FC D8 3D 2B 57 17 CB 81 03 2A 56 69 : 81 82 FA 78 DE D2 3A 2F FA A3 C5 EA 8B E8 0C 36 : 1B BC DC FD 1B 8C 2E 0F 01 AF D9 E1 04 0E 4E 50 : 94 75 7C BD D9 0B DD AA FA 36 E3 EC E4 A5 35 46 : BE A2 97 1D AD BA 44 54 3A ED 94 DA 76 4A 51 BA : A4 7D 7A 62 BF 2A 2F F2 5C 5A FE CA E6 B9 DC 5D : EA 26 F2 35 17 19 20 CE 97 96 4E 72 9C 72 FD 1F : 68 C1 6A 5C 86 42 F2 ED F2 70 65 4C C7 44 C5 7C Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 19]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 : } : } : } : } : } 4.2. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted Body Below is an example of an encrypted text/plain message that says "Hello!". The binary encrypted contents have been replaced with the block "BINARY BLOB 2". MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001; branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c276232b541dd527-1---d8754z-; rport=50741 </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 To: <sip:kumiko@example.net> From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=7a2e3025 Call-ID: MDYyMDhhODA3NWE2ZjEyYzAwOTZlMjExNWI2ZWQwZGM. CSeq: 3260 MESSAGE <allOneLine> Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime, application/sdp, multipart/alternative </allOneLine> <allOneLine> Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required; filename=smime.p7 </allOneLine> Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary <allOneLine> Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m </allOneLine> Content-Length: 565 ***************** * BINARY BLOB 2 * ***************** Following is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 2". Note that at address 454, the encryption is set to aes128-CBC. 0 561: SEQUENCE { 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER envelopedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 3) 15 546: [0] { Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 20]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 19 542: SEQUENCE { 23 1: INTEGER 0 26 409: SET { 30 405: SEQUENCE { 34 1: INTEGER 0 37 125: SEQUENCE { 39 112: SEQUENCE { 41 11: SET { 43 9: SEQUENCE { 45 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 50 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 54 19: SET { 56 17: SEQUENCE { 58 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8) 63 10: UTF8String 'California' : } : } 75 17: SET { 77 15: SEQUENCE { 79 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7) 84 8: UTF8String 'San Jose' : } : } 94 14: SET { 96 12: SEQUENCE { 98 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationName (2 5 4 10) 103 5: UTF8String 'sipit' : } : } 110 41: SET { 112 39: SEQUENCE { 114 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) 119 32: UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate Authority' : } : } : } 153 9: INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4E : } 164 13: SEQUENCE { 166 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 177 0: NULL Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 21]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 : } 179 256: OCTET STRING : B9 12 8F 32 AB 4A E2 38 C1 E0 53 69 88 D6 25 E7 : 40 03 B1 DE 79 21 A3 E8 23 5A 1B CB FB 58 F4 97 : 48 A7 C8 F0 3D DF 41 A3 5A 90 32 70 82 FA B0 DE : D8 94 7C 6C 2E 01 FE 33 BD 62 CB 07 4F 58 DE 6F : EA 3F EF B4 FB 46 72 58 9A 88 A0 85 BC 23 D7 C8 : 09 0B 90 8D 4A 5F 3F 96 7C AC D4 E2 19 E8 02 B6 : 0E F3 0D F2 91 4A 67 A9 EE 51 6A 97 D7 86 6D EC : 78 6E C6 E0 83 7C E1 00 1F 5A 40 59 60 0C D7 EB : A3 FB 04 B3 C9 A5 EB 79 ED B3 56 F8 F6 51 B2 5E : 58 E2 D8 17 28 33 A6 B8 35 8C 0E 14 7F 90 D0 7B : 03 00 6C 3D 81 29 F5 D7 E5 AC 75 5E E0 F0 DD E3 : 3E B2 06 97 D6 49 A9 CB 38 08 F1 84 05 F5 C0 BC : 55 A6 D4 C9 D8 FD A4 AC 40 9F 9D 51 5B F7 3A C3 : C3 CD 3A E7 6D 21 05 D0 50 75 4F 14 D8 77 76 C6 : 13 A6 48 12 7B 25 CC 22 5D 73 BD 40 E4 15 02 A2 : 39 4A CB D9 55 08 A4 EE 4E 8A 5E BA C4 4A 46 9C : } : } 439 124: SEQUENCE { 441 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1) 452 29: SEQUENCE { 454 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : aes128-CBC (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2) 465 16: OCTET STRING : CA 35 CA BD 1E 78 83 D9 20 6C 47 B9 9F DC 91 88 : } 483 80: [0] : 1B AE 12 C4 0E 55 96 AB 99 CC 1C 7F B5 98 A4 BF : D2 D8 7F 94 BB B5 38 05 59 F2 38 A1 CD 29 75 17 : 1D 63 1B 0B B0 2D 88 06 7F 78 80 F3 5A 3E DC 35 : BF 22 1E 03 32 59 98 DA FD 81 5F D9 41 63 3A 18 : FD B5 84 14 01 46 0B 40 EB 56 29 86 47 8B D1 EE : } : } : } : } 4.3. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted and Signed Body In the example below, some of the header values have been split across multiple lines. Where the lines have been broken, the <allOneLine> convention has been used. This was only done to make it fit in the RFC format. Specifically, the application/pkcs7-mime Content-Type line is one line with no whitespace between the "mime;" and the "smime-type". The values are split across lines for formatting, but are not split in the real message. The binary Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 22]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 encrypted content has been replaced with "BINARY BLOB 3", and the binary signed content has been replaced with "BINARY BLOB 4". MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001; branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-97a26e59b7262b34-1---d8754z-; rport=50742 </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 To: <sip:kumiko@example.net> From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=379f5b27 Call-ID: MjYwMzdjYTY3YWRkYzgzMjU0MGI4Mzc2Njk1YzJlNzE. CSeq: 5449 MESSAGE <allOneLine> Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime, application/sdp, multipart/alternative </allOneLine> <allOneLine> Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=e8df6e1ce5d1e864; micalg=sha1;protocol="application/pkcs7-signature" </allOneLine> Content-Length: 1455 --e8df6e1ce5d1e864 <allOneLine> Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m </allOneLine> <allOneLine> Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required; filename=smime.p7 </allOneLine> Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary ***************** * BINARY BLOB 3 * ***************** --e8df6e1ce5d1e864 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature;name=smime.p7s <allOneLine> Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required; filename=smime.p7s </allOneLine> Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary ***************** * BINARY BLOB 4 * Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 23]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 ***************** --e8df6e1ce5d1e864-- Below is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 3". 0 561: SEQUENCE { 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER envelopedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 3) 15 546: [0] { 19 542: SEQUENCE { 23 1: INTEGER 0 26 409: SET { 30 405: SEQUENCE { 34 1: INTEGER 0 37 125: SEQUENCE { 39 112: SEQUENCE { 41 11: SET { 43 9: SEQUENCE { 45 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 50 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 54 19: SET { 56 17: SEQUENCE { 58 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8) 63 10: UTF8String 'California' : } : } 75 17: SET { 77 15: SEQUENCE { 79 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7) 84 8: UTF8String 'San Jose' : } : } 94 14: SET { 96 12: SEQUENCE { 98 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationName (2 5 4 10) 103 5: UTF8String 'sipit' : } : } 110 41: SET { 112 39: SEQUENCE { 114 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) 119 32: UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate Authority' : } Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 24]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 : } : } 153 9: INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4E : } 164 13: SEQUENCE { 166 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 177 0: NULL : } 179 256: OCTET STRING : 49 11 0B 11 52 A9 9D E3 AA FB 86 CB EB 12 CC 8E : 96 9D 85 3E 80 D2 7C C4 9B B7 81 4B B5 FA 13 80 : 6A 6A B2 34 72 D8 C0 82 60 DA B3 43 F8 51 8C 32 : 8B DD D0 76 6D 9C 46 73 C1 44 A0 10 FF 16 A4 83 : 74 85 21 74 7D E0 FD 42 C0 97 00 82 A2 80 81 22 : 9C A2 82 0A 85 F0 68 EF 9A D7 6D 1D 24 2B A9 5E : B3 9A A0 3E A7 D9 1D 1C D7 42 CB 6F A5 81 66 23 : 28 00 7C 99 6A B6 03 3F 7E F6 48 EA 91 49 35 F1 : FD 40 54 5D AC F7 84 EA 3F 27 43 FD DE E2 10 DD : 63 C4 35 4A 13 63 0B 6D 0D 9A D5 AB 72 39 69 8C : 65 4C 44 C4 A3 31 60 79 B9 A8 A3 A1 03 FD 41 25 : 12 E5 F3 F8 47 CE 8C 42 D9 26 77 A5 57 AF 1A 95 : BF 05 A5 E9 47 F2 D1 AE DC 13 7E 1B 83 5C 8C C4 : 1F 31 BC 59 E6 FD 6E 9A B0 91 EC 71 A6 7F 28 3E : 23 1B 40 E2 C0 60 CF 5E 5B 86 08 06 82 B4 B7 DB : 00 DD AC 3A 39 27 E2 7C 96 AD 8A E9 C3 B8 06 5E : } : } 439 124: SEQUENCE { 441 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1) 452 29: SEQUENCE { 454 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : aes128-CBC (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2) 465 16: OCTET STRING : 88 9B 13 75 A7 66 14 C3 CF CD C6 FF D2 91 5D A0 : } 483 80: [0] : 80 0B A3 B7 57 89 B4 F4 70 AE 1D 14 A9 35 DD F9 : 1D 66 29 46 52 40 13 E1 3B 4A 23 E5 EC AB F9 35 : A6 B6 A4 BE C0 02 31 06 19 C4 39 22 7D 10 4C 0D : F4 96 04 78 11 85 4E 7E E3 C3 BC B2 DF 55 17 79 : 5F F2 4E E5 25 42 37 45 39 5D F6 DA 57 9A 4E 0B : } : } : } : } Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 25]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Below is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 4". 0 472: SEQUENCE { 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2) 15 457: [0] { 19 453: SEQUENCE { 23 1: INTEGER 1 26 11: SET { 28 9: SEQUENCE { 30 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) 37 0: NULL : } : } 39 11: SEQUENCE { 41 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1) : } 52 420: SET { 56 416: SEQUENCE { 60 1: INTEGER 1 63 125: SEQUENCE { 65 112: SEQUENCE { 67 11: SET { 69 9: SEQUENCE { 71 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 76 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 80 19: SET { 82 17: SEQUENCE { 84 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8) 89 10: UTF8String 'California' : } : } 101 17: SET { 103 15: SEQUENCE { 105 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7) 110 8: UTF8String 'San Jose' : } : } 120 14: SET { 122 12: SEQUENCE { 124 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationName (2 5 4 10) 129 5: UTF8String 'sipit' : } : } 136 41: SET { Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 26]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 138 39: SEQUENCE { 140 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) 145 32: UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate Authority' : } : } : } 179 9: INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4D : } 190 9: SEQUENCE { 192 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) 199 0: NULL : } 201 13: SEQUENCE { 203 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 214 0: NULL : } 216 256: OCTET STRING : 6E 51 AC 24 2E BA 7C A1 EE 80 A8 55 BC D4 64 5D : E5 29 09 5F B2 AF AA 6F 91 D2 97 79 32 5B AF CA : FE A1 73 FC E5 57 4E C6 3B 67 35 AA E4 78 1E 59 : 93 EE 67 63 77 1E 7A 82 BC 1E 26 0F 39 75 0C A6 : 26 92 01 6A B7 5D F0 C0 2C 51 46 FB A7 36 44 E3 : 64 C6 11 CB 0B 6B FD F3 6D 7C FD 3E AE 2E 91 BB : 78 9E F4 1B A1 20 68 B9 DE D3 E3 0C FC F7 14 9A : 2C 64 AB 27 52 BD 52 EC 27 88 14 BD DB C3 54 C7 : EA 48 DB 07 E9 9B 2E C8 BE 62 A2 76 83 53 37 E8 : 02 4B D1 86 E9 DF 2E BD 93 39 EC 2F 01 53 A0 7F : 1A B9 A6 31 FC E7 91 1C DB 22 4A 67 83 94 B2 4E : 28 A9 CD DE 4A 04 6A E0 86 90 7B 58 5F DB 7A 96 : 96 A0 25 61 C2 58 A2 28 E5 B3 B2 F1 6D 51 06 9C : 78 61 0D D8 3A A7 9F A3 B5 87 0B 80 11 C2 A9 1A : E5 17 1C EB 82 55 AB CD 04 E7 D9 5B 11 E8 B7 47 : FE FD CC B7 DB 47 6F 77 85 9E 24 D8 11 E1 E4 7D : } : } : } : } : } 5. Observed Interoperability Issues This section describes some common interoperability problems. These were observed by the authors at SIPit interoperability events. Implementers should be careful to verify that their systems do not introduce these common problems, and, when possible, make their Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 27]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 clients forgiving in what they receive. Implementations should take extra care to produce reasonable error messages when interacting with software that has these problems. Some SIP clients incorrectly only do SSLv3 and do not support TLS. See Section 26.2.1 of [RFC3261]. Many SIP clients were found to accept expired certificates with no warning or error. See Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280]. When used with SIP, TLS and S/MIME provide the identity of the peer that a client is communicating with in the Subject Alternative Name in the certificate. The software checks that this name corresponds to the identity the server is trying to contact. Normative text describing path validation can be found in Section 7 of [RFC5922] and Section 6 of [RFC5280]. If a client is trying to set up a TLS connection to good.example.com and it gets a TLS connection set up with a server that presents a valid certificate but with the name evil.example.com, it will typically generate an error or warning of some type. Similarly with S/MIME, if a user is trying to communicate with sip:fluffy@example.com, one of the items in the Subject Alternate Name set in the certificate will need to match according to the certificate validation rules in Section 23 of [RFC3261] and Section 6 of [RFC5280]. Some implementations used binary MIME encodings while others used base64. It is advisable that implementations send only binary and are prepared to receive either. See Section 3.2 of [RFC5621]. In several places in this document, the messages contain the encoding for the SHA-1 digest algorithm identifier. The preferred form for encoding as set out in Section 2 of [RFC3370] is the form in which the optional AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field is omitted. However, [RFC3370] also says the recipients need to be able to receive the form in which the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field is present and set to NULL. Examples of the form using NULL can be found in Section 4.2 of [RFC4134]. Receivers really do need to be able to receive the form that includes the NULL because the NULL form, while not preferred, is what was observed as being generated by most implementations. Implementers should also note that if the algorithm is MD5 instead of SHA-1, then the form that omits the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field is not allowed and the sender has to use the form where the NULL is included. The preferred encryption algorithm for S/MIME in SIP is AES as defined in [RFC3853]. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 28]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Observed S/MIME interoperability has been better when UAs did not attach the senders' certificates. Attaching the certificates significantly increases the size of the messages, which should be considered when sending over UDP. Furthermore, the receiver cannot rely on the sender to always send the certificate, so it does not turn out to be useful in most situations. Please note that the certificate path validation algorithm described in Section 6 of [RFC5280] is a complex algorithm for which all of the details matter. There are numerous ways in which failing to precisely implement the algorithm as specified in Section 6 of [RFC5280] can create a security flaw, a simple example of which is the failure to check the expiration date that is already mentioned above. It is important for developers to ensure that this validation is performed and that the results are verified by their applications or any libraries that they use. 6. Additional Test Scenarios This section provides a non-exhaustive list of tests that implementations should perform while developing systems that use S/MIME and TLS for SIP. Much of the required behavior for inspecting certificates when using S/MIME and TLS with SIP is currently underspecified. The non- normative recommendations in this document capture the current folklore around that required behavior, guided by both related normative works such as [RFC4474] (particularly, Section 13.4 Domain Names and Subordination) and informative works such as [RFC2818], Section 3.1. To summarize, test plans should: o For S/MIME secured bodies, ensure that the peer's URI (address-of- record, as per [RFC3261], Section 23.3) appears in the subjectAltName of the peer's certificate as a uniformResourceIdentifier field. o For TLS, ensure that the peer's hostname appears as described in [RFC5922]. Also: * ensure an exact match in a dNSName entry in the subjectAltName if there are any dNSNames in the subjectAltName. Wildcard matching is not allowed against these dNSName entries. See Section 7.1 of [RFC5922]. * ensure that the most specific CommonName in the Subject field matches if there are no dNSName entries in the subjectAltName at all (which is not the same as there being no matching Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 29]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 dNSName entries). This match can be either exact, or against an entry that uses the wildcard matching character '*'. The peer's hostname is discovered from the initial DNS query in the server location process [RFC3263]. o IP addresses can appear in subjectAltName ([RFC5280]) of the peer's certificate, e.g., "IP:192.168.0.1". Note that if IP addresses are used in subjectAltName, there are important ramifications regarding the use of Record-Route headers that also need to be considered. See Section 7.5 of [RFC5922]. Use of IP addresses instead of domain names is inadvisable. For each of these tests, an implementation will proceed past the verification point only if the certificate is "good". S/MIME protected requests presenting bad certificate data will be rejected. S/MIME protected responses presenting bad certificate information will be ignored. TLS connections involving bad certificate data will not be completed. 1. S/MIME : Good peer certificate 2. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (peer URI does not appear in subjectAltName) 3. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (valid authority chain does not end at a trusted CA) 4. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (incomplete authority chain) 5. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (the current time does not fall within the period of validity) 6. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (certificate, or certificate in authority chain, has been revoked) 7. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate ("Digital Signature" is not specified as an X509v3 Key Usage) 8. TLS : Good peer certificate (hostname appears in dNSName in subjectAltName) 9. TLS : Good peer certificate (no dNSNames in subjectAltName, hostname appears in Common Name (CN) of Subject) Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 30]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 10. TLS : Good peer certificate (CN of Subject empty, and subjectAltName extension contains an iPAddress stored in the octet string in network byte order form as specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791]) 11. TLS : Bad peer certificate (no match in dNSNames or in the Subject CN) 12. TLS : Bad peer certificate (valid authority chain does not end at a trusted CA) 13. TLS : Bad peer certificate (incomplete authority chain) 14. TLS : Bad peer certificate (the current time does not fall within the period of validity) 15. TLS : Bad peer certificate (certificate, or certificate in authority chain, has been revoked) 16. TLS : Bad peer certificate ("TLS Web Server Authentication" is not specified as an X509v3 Key Usage) 17. TLS : Bad peer certificate (Neither "SIP Domain" nor "Any Extended Key Usage" specified as an X509v3 Extended Key Usage, and X509v3 Extended Key Usage is present) 7. Acknowledgments Many thanks to the developers of all the open source software used to create these call flows. This includes the underlying crypto and TLS software used from openssl.org, the SIP stack from www.resiprocate.org, and the SIP for Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extensions (SIMPLE) Instant Messaging and Presence Protocol (IMPP) agent from www.sipimp.org. The TLS flow dumps were done with SSLDump from http://www.rtfm.com/ssldump. The book "SSL and TLS" [EKR-TLS] was a huge help in developing the code for these flows. It's sad there is no second edition. Thanks to Jim Schaad, Russ Housley, Eric Rescorla, Dan Wing, Tat Chan, and Lyndsay Campbell, who all helped find and correct mistakes in this document. Vijay Gurbani and Alan Jeffrey contributed much of the additional test scenario content. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 31]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 8. Security Considerations Implementers must never use any of the certificates provided in this document in anything but a test environment. Installing the CA root certificates used in this document as a trusted root in operational software would completely destroy the security of the system while giving the user the impression that the system was operating securely. This document recommends some things that implementers might test or verify to improve the security of their implementations. It is impossible to make a comprehensive list of these, and this document only suggests some of the most common mistakes that have been seen at the SIPit interoperability events. Just because an implementation does everything this document recommends does not make it secure. This document does not show any messages to check certificate revocation status (see Sections 3.3 and 6.3 of [RFC5280]) as that is not part of the SIP call flow. The expectation is that revocation status is checked regularly to protect against the possibility of certificate compromise or repudiation. For more information on how certificate revocation status can be checked, see [RFC2560] (Online Certificate Status Protocol) and [RFC5055] (Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol). 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981. [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. [RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, June 2002. [RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 32]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 [RFC3428] Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C., and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December 2002. [RFC3853] Peterson, J., "S/MIME Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Requirement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3853, July 2004. [RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006. [RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007. [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. [RFC5621] Camarillo, G., "Message Body Handling in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5621, September 2009. [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, September 2009. [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010. [RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5922, June 2010. [RFC5923] Gurbani, V., Mahy, R., and B. Tate, "Connection Reuse in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5923, June 2010. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 33]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 [RFC5924] Lawrence, S. and V. Gurbani, "Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) X.509 Certificates", RFC 5924, June 2010. [X.509] International Telecommunications Union, "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005), ISO/ IEC 9594-8:2005. [X.683] International Telecommunications Union, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications", ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002), ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002. 9.2. Informative References [EKR-TLS] Rescorla, E., "SSL and TLS - Designing and Building Secure Systems", Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-61598-3, 2001. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC4134] Hoffman, P., "Examples of S/MIME Messages", RFC 4134, July 2005. [RFC4475] Sparks, R., Hawrylyshen, A., Johnston, A., Rosenberg, J., and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Torture Test Messages", RFC 4475, May 2006. [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 4514, June 2006. [ssldump-manpage] Rescorla, E., "SSLDump manpage", <http://www.rtfm.com/ssldump/Ssldump.html>. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 34]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Appendix A. Making Test Certificates These scripts allow you to make certificates for test purposes. The certificates will all share a common CA root so that everyone running these scripts can have interoperable certificates. WARNING - these certificates are totally insecure and are for test purposes only. All the CAs created by this script share the same private key to facilitate interoperability testing, but this totally breaks the security since the private key of the CA is well known. The instructions assume a Unix-like environment with openssl installed, but openssl does work in Windows too. OpenSSL version 0.9.8j was used to generate the certificates used in this document. Make sure you have openssl installed by trying to run "openssl". Run the makeCA script found in Appendix A.1; this creates a subdirectory called demoCA. If the makeCA script cannot find where your openssl is installed you will have to set an environment variable called OPENSSLDIR to whatever directory contains the file openssl.cnf. You can find this with a "locate openssl.cnf". You are now ready to make certificates. To create certificates for use with TLS, run the makeCert script found in Appendix A.2 with the fully qualified domain name of the proxy you are making the certificate for, e.g., "makeCert host.example.net domain eku". This will generate a private key and a certificate. The private key will be left in a file named domain_key_example.net.pem in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format. The certificate will be in domain_cert_example.net.pem. Some programs expect both the certificate and private key combined together in a Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #12 format file. This is created by the script and left in a file named example.net.p12. Some programs expect this file to have a .pfx extension instead of .p12 -- just rename the file if needed. A file with a certificate signing request, called example.net.csr, is also created and can be used to get the certificate signed by another CA. A second argument indicating the number of days for which the certificate should be valid can be passed to the makeCert script. It is possible to make an expired certificate using the command "makeCert host.example.net 0". Anywhere that a password is used to protect a certificate, the password is set to the string "password". The root certificate for the CA is in the file root_cert_fluffyCA.pem. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 35]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 For things that need DER format certificates, a certificate can be converted from PEM to DER with "openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER". Some programs expect certificates in PKCS #7 format (with a file extension of .p7c). You can convert these from PEM format to PKCS #7 with "openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile cert.pem -certfile demoCA/ cacert.pem -outform DER -out cert.p7c". IE (version 8), Outlook Express (version 6), and Firefox (version 3.5) can import and export .p12 files and .p7c files. You can convert a PKCS #7 certificate to PEM format with "openssl pkcs7 -in cert.p7c -inform DER -outform PEM -out cert.pem". The private key can be converted to PKCS #8 format with "openssl pkcs8 -in a_key.pem -topk8 -outform DER -out a_key.p8c". In general, a TLS client will just need the root certificate of the CA. A TLS server will need its private key and its certificate. These could be in two PEM files, a single file with both certificate and private key PEM sections, or a single .p12 file. An S/MIME program will need its private key and certificate, the root certificate of the CA, and the certificate for every other user it communicates with. A.1. makeCA script #!/bin/sh set -x rm -rf demoCA mkdir demoCA mkdir demoCA/certs mkdir demoCA/crl mkdir demoCA/newcerts mkdir demoCA/private # This is done to generate the exact serial number used for the RFC echo "4902110184015C" > demoCA/serial touch demoCA/index.txt # You may need to modify this for where your default file is # you can find where yours in by typing "openssl ca" for D in /etc/ssl /usr/local/ssl /sw/etc/ssl /sw/share/ssl; do CONF=${OPENSSLDIR:=$D}/openssl.cnf [ -f ${CONF} ] && break done Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 36]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 CONF=${OPENSSLDIR}/openssl.cnf if [ ! -f $CONF ]; then echo "Can not find file $CONF - set your OPENSSLDIR variable" exit fi cp $CONF openssl.cnf cat >> openssl.cnf <<EOF [ sipdomain_cert ] subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20 [ sipdomain_req ] basicConstraints = CA:FALSE subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} subjectKeyIdentifier=hash [ sipuser_cert ] subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20 [ sipuser_req ] basicConstraints = CA:FALSE subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} subjectKeyIdentifier=hash [ sipdomain_noeku_cert ] subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment [ sipdomain_noeku_req ] basicConstraints = CA:FALSE subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} subjectKeyIdentifier=hash Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 37]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 [ sipuser_noeku_cert ] subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment [ sipuser_noeku_req ] basicConstraints = CA:FALSE subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME} subjectKeyIdentifier=hash EOF cat > demoCA/private/cakey.pem <<EOF -----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- MIIFDjBABgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wMzAbBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwDgQIlwtc771DlNUCAggA MBQGCCqGSIb3DQMHBAhRD3Z1i2TavwSCBMgXoXo0H/dTplHwnqfW7Uh1dr776z7B lsNxlenMA6lYmALF/4E1tqOE2/aEbr8W3wTVjNpew9r5TBsbA1I9/FMMe+USc1ra 5pIdDLx7ynzHvxcUWJ1xbWGeLcEmXGOvzkwW/oOg49Yq1ce1GtlLSV2L7Wi93TUQ Q8i5l0X0xjx7cB7kaHTOTyaN0sxUE3qlQ2sXTbbHWUfIaNpEZUI5ITrDUflfMnxb RogQGv+5owsM7zwzfyGz3QocM9WaZwKFOEOqBvEfGaaZ9ml+cn1Rz/1Id7tSBlRH 3ucN2mGdEVIUvzSACZ9LPuIO7WBGM56enDRsqZji4WfqDHdXa4gkJKqPEJeBnLVA jxCmLJSyikM25kHDm8LWuOckO/Rk+7999h13Qv1Ynm7yCincorqdlTrAdmq1Z8Tj QPgXioTlx6++6yxiDCV7Mwkydox31K9y/Tf2cZ//dWuf/lfMaaq8HfpSNl4RKqsz ufL41K5sCzPRIugUdooUQSGPC0JgcskPcifT6zvrI62KLPFVrwG5HT9PdevQvC6O VgglxbEGJ7I4vllzmY62/0LtQKIA6bh8pszvvmHjGo9s+f+p7KJVYygEHNEmRTm+ 8M2owk67033sV6IClDOAdRL8siTHmcmM+r1x9VVIppsDrzjqQqYVGYBbjEJW8eQp t7kAjuN48tDD1mS8E6DstPv/6S0AjzAqCbjkuPJ0WU5fD1cY+iTpo9vcunohcj+i KVXsM34wOsBpMBjFQ+Aww5bsIkEV1liOYLav1F7/BvP2s0gc3puM5W35y1cbKLu2 ThJV7mIWoV770aQYpJba0UAk9OzBVEvPNahrDI1NucbEkFrhN2pfnOs7k4UvrjiK uknKrm3gocDOdstyMZX81Beyj06NhpcJH+bOSvROk/d68aAsapy6qS9hLijNNbcd itQ/fo+1o9MDujT/huj7ZFqdzNM3KA6vxf0kmmVM+GJbYke+cjXk6WB80lF9lYcB 0pWPd+fgwFL252FUoFcjvUWFXkvbR1+IMkv6sNdKcXHHazAE6nl6yPl9bVwCaS1I WNqEfHntblNZbeW+3qH8ov1ZXVCqEmaHkajSAhFJKXCgpSXaIx2FSntzpVFbRpnw Yd9eml9xwgE3l9aRuvR6p61fd051LzCh7KjvorV1CemPUT6YRBamFNCBoT7cqjhE kqMQfowKkMEY0p2dzMnGzsSPKk10nI53RgPyD/8FT5dPuq073SyjxTKhAbvl+kVl lrfZ6b7P/UKwLBCT3bLG6uU/Es84euWN+U2JXIADPoCcVeWrUqkf4j368c2Z8Zdd A27X4ZJ+q+YfsFNiOA7vshHi3Am3gBzQhEEGsRdzgkf8qmtlRGhq/823GEexoUfu 8SiOOjoU08HGAkTtPWjV5+0C6Q6RW9SmNMwz7msZHoKTQ8kz2LKXUwb6DBwWcw6/ UTUgzVXqhA8HmjsnVe9ftDKL66v9zlp4RVRdDzm4TYUybYh5uigFbjJFLlnJnJho TcnusHO80Cxgs64khLRzM46Oi+JSEPv7o7zHcfWNOVtNW908EKCubtEDZtnQn9VC 0Sky9R/WzunaLlG3LZ3BRUhWpyyvdNxlNq3ie4tcRMlXIEe14UZN0sPCKZY//NEn BEc= -----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- EOF Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 38]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 cat > demoCA/cacert.pem <<EOF -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDtTCCAp2gAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pMMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDEyNzE4MzYwNVoYDzIxMTEwMTAzMTgzNjA1WjBwMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBwwIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoMBXNpcGl0MSkwJwYDVQQLDCBTaXBpdCBUZXN0IENlcnRpZmlj YXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKsf kWHxHMXNpnsWm7cUeeQwnpjQ7Ae3vXfX0fVbLOLu5rGw8IX6pbzLzM9pLE/8UO+d MSvAWer7ZG8fVac9/XDSVtsUmReScKwm+DRBcNnAA5FqutERj6wSMd65GXCNXad9 ixnMQD+u/94f25SzRndsrq7/PtaEW8LeCyZl0JHHcEvHCkq/x5cE3bpYR8vgKyN2 h2XFVTQQqycfHPgwPbCbyqKBcky9YP73If4L2wvb6VsBNtQoFWt569CRGyFZuA6q v9WxbHA3oz+lfQ6VRvb2WGeDdUI3GAukQTmyL2yALHjspQ++nBD4wAsNc5meDdeX UMvMRTQjSUGFIiStKcMCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PH aJpYFncnMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAwGA1UdEwQF MAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAAZfnq6gmry1uVt+lzPM32OYmJTLDWap g+iqWCpZoZ5HMaavXD+iJYb43wWSt9tpoWlyh2bFqzWJATcZyXTrCdE/iHskE0LK LftF5sxL+CF48/WX7AmSJKLw5pSNl0oAlAC9JbgXLFJTXcxcSKShHS32UFUTpNOy ovTxuW1IXlzz3uD8WQmh2RRhZb/YP7m6LnztXCSba8qqX/HBHrCo2oIP+0xxO017 OMjjiioZNEQmC+rwRzhGKGUE4gFS3ew95fVTdHd0dW3G2cIKrDu4mFxVUzR0Uqgm sS8wItCLt/Og3WgHM9Wut4GylFhyTnzGci+9bGn7tReoKo3XLJEGyAw= -----END CERTIFICATE----- EOF # uncomment the following lines to generate your own key pair # openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -passin pass:password \ # -passout pass:password -set_serial 0x96a384174eef8a4c \ # -sha1 -x509 -keyout demoCA/private/cakey.pem \ # -out demoCA/cacert.pem -days 36500 -config ${CONF} <<EOF # US # California # San Jose # sipit # Sipit Test Certificate Authority # # # EOF # either randomly generate a serial number, or set it manually # hexdump -n 4 -e '4/1 "%04u"' /dev/random > demoCA/serial echo 96a384174eef8a4d > demoCA/serial Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 39]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem \ -outform DER -out demoCA/cacert.p7c cp demoCA/cacert.pem root_cert_fluffyCA.pem A.2. makeCert script #!/bin/sh set -x # Make a symbolic link to this file called "makeUserCert" # if you wish to use it to make certs for users. # ExecName=$(basename $0) # # if [ ${ExecName} == "makeUserCert" ]; then # ExtPrefix="sipuser" # elif [ ${ExecName} == "makeEkuUserCert" ]; then # ExtPrefix="sipuser_eku" # elif [ ${ExecName} == "makeEkuCert" ]; then # ExtPrefix="sipdomain_eku" # else # ExtPrefix="sipdomain" # fi if [ $# == 3 ]; then DAYS=36500 elif [ $# == 4 ]; then DAYS=$4 else echo "Usage: makeCert test.example.org user|domain eku|noeku [days]" echo " makeCert alice@example.org [days]" echo "days is how long the certificate is valid" echo "days set to 0 generates an invalid certificate" exit 0 fi ExtPrefix="sip"${2} if [ $3 == "noeku" ]; then ExtPrefix=${ExtPrefix}"_noeku" fi DOMAIN=`echo $1 | perl -ne '{print "$1\n" if (/(\w+\..*)$/)}' ` USER=`echo $1 | perl -ne '{print "$1\n" if (/(\w+)\@(\w+\..*)$/)}' ` ADDR=$1 echo "making cert for $DOMAIN ${ADDR}" Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 40]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 if [ $2 == "user" ]; then CNVALUE=$USER else CNVALUE=$DOMAIN fi rm -f ${ADDR}_*.pem rm -f ${ADDR}.p12 case ${ADDR} in *:*) ALTNAME="URI:${ADDR}" ;; *@*) ALTNAME="URI:sip:${ADDR},URI:im:${ADDR},URI:pres:${ADDR}" ;; *) ALTNAME="DNS:${DOMAIN},URI:sip:${ADDR}" ;; esac rm -f demoCA/index.txt touch demoCA/index.txt rm -f demoCA/newcerts/* export ALTNAME openssl genrsa -out ${ADDR}_key.pem 2048 openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -reqexts ${ExtPrefix}_req \ -sha1 -key ${ADDR}_key.pem \ -out ${ADDR}.csr -days ${DAYS} <<EOF US California San Jose sipit ${CNVALUE} EOF if [ $DAYS == 0 ]; then openssl ca -extensions ${ExtPrefix}_cert -config openssl.cnf \ -passin pass:password -policy policy_anything \ -md sha1 -batch -notext -out ${ADDR}_cert.pem \ -startdate 990101000000Z \ -enddate 000101000000Z \ -infiles ${ADDR}.csr else openssl ca -extensions ${ExtPrefix}_cert -config openssl.cnf \ -passin pass:password -policy policy_anything \ -md sha1 -days ${DAYS} -batch -notext -out ${ADDR}_cert.pem \ -infiles ${ADDR}.csr fi Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 41]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:password \ -passout pass:password -export \ -out ${ADDR}.p12 -in ${ADDR}_cert.pem \ -inkey ${ADDR}_key.pem -name ${ADDR} -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem openssl x509 -in ${ADDR}_cert.pem -noout -text case ${ADDR} in *@*) mv ${ADDR}_key.pem user_key_${ADDR}.pem; \ mv ${ADDR}_cert.pem user_cert_${ADDR}.pem ;; *) mv ${ADDR}_key.pem domain_key_${ADDR}.pem; \ mv ${ADDR}_cert.pem domain_cert_${ADDR}.pem ;; esac Appendix B. Certificates for Testing This section contains various certificates used for testing in PEM format. B.1. Certificates Using EKU These certificates make use of the EKU specification described in [RFC5924]. Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 42]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Fluffy's user certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEGTCCAwGgAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pNMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxN1oYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE3WjBWMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZmbHVmZnkwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCjLFkM6bzk7NOe+5kC7LE2OrfTHU3DOrauUL1f VQh3jH6k6fBoMSiPIzJWGcMil6dt/aciKgG1r2G9X37BFOWYKbQ0TjiKJu4N2tsn uXjWrKwEeDKYwnXnarctszzj65el74tZQlAXe/6nga83p+fjH7CN0HIvbBRCxgFo 4Y/9Vk19zxbcqgVhCwrKyuxR7FNuPSsAgP41GwYKYROIC0TzzP0rDrSiC6CXhBQu 7ivjL8EanoaaeGqiTFeT5wEm01YNvbAv+NrHPAHcyy0xjGzGXLRj6LKiQBG/rfht EgGXHUf4ahWL+yeWc0RGNNckHM9WjdS+1pRb8KZn493PtPLVAgMBAAGjgc0wgcow UQYDVR0RBEowSIYWc2lwOmZsdWZmeUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbYYVaW06Zmx1ZmZ5QGV4 YW1wbGUuY29thhdwcmVzOmZsdWZmeUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0G A1UdDgQWBBSFlwm401U3JIrc3uORcuQiz5iHUjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSVRX5fK+pl mBKRBPNjx2iaWBZ3JzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwQG CCsGAQUFBwMUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCoqY/YiguI7f9Pv+XNj557uOby LKrjI1uacV79IKPd2dPB8ujwvnfbM8yKe0+RK43W9xTDjeBg0zRQvL5nIs31dHv0 mmiiUiuBL0bTCZ8lwyDoENXvOHvRF9Tx11RnVvETzy/8i4P8FOcBglmDzLGN8Mfa TrHczFTPbDtHR1mH2Rbsr6/hEhMjHgrb9bX/XasVDuMlkQAOkNvYBxGQgQE6SKiq nrBi0zbwDLcvpxeSUjYpFArWZYZnc3RuqjzuRzgeyG4GgYUcLvC2BH1sONuBnLgH 4we+9S8JaGMEa4cONrmho/vIMAygY41tqwr4RLB4GRo4fvpqodRLS3V1v28J -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 43]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Fluffy's private key for user certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAoyxZDOm85OzTnvuZAuyxNjq30x1Nwzq2rlC9X1UId4x+pOnw aDEojyMyVhnDIpenbf2nIioBta9hvV9+wRTlmCm0NE44iibuDdrbJ7l41qysBHgy mMJ152q3LbM84+uXpe+LWUJQF3v+p4GvN6fn4x+wjdByL2wUQsYBaOGP/VZNfc8W 3KoFYQsKysrsUexTbj0rAID+NRsGCmETiAtE88z9Kw60ogugl4QULu4r4y/BGp6G mnhqokxXk+cBJtNWDb2wL/jaxzwB3MstMYxsxly0Y+iyokARv634bRIBlx1H+GoV i/snlnNERjTXJBzPVo3UvtaUW/CmZ+Pdz7Ty1QIDAQABAoIBAH+bSvjiQir1WnnW YM78s4mpWeDr5chrvjmMQsyu/zQe11u4551T9FgcOl1DQGtpFjLaTz5Ug4nGYjVq 3QG6ieL5mkfddDH2R+zl3sWuMmYQG2ZTaZ41VWdo+V/v8Ap+T9YhA2UGiwQSoA/3 R0PLN3lTaws8nE+hwiaGGsweujBvcaIJu4RQrGHRHaeEplU+tfjcHHElfzUAmKyM cMgF8IpdUcA1pyHe3Pyc0oGnLyEVnv291xGWQfWT7nqf7K0QDLA6+TvbG3fGEYIw WK4DMraUbZ66Jlnj1XfADoxWOTsygV+KYhZcbwjBWAUSOSduAtfwa6b72OnWd28J 8KYvrXECgYEA1eCJZZSavxhlfxqsWC/WdQ8S3SimI62KSLrN3bI0RO/60KiU2ap3 16ZhNLq8t3DjpkWiZrukixs2odsU7k3z6q+qm++P0TUwL7z3Bri0FimqUeVSYgAf ZmFgGz7wLAM29zhv0hTZjGrrwMlNSyJ2tjyqpiO1XqkbdBpPBxKPrdcCgYEAw09f 4M2QKQBFzjecPeQpwJqnh8cuoHS+2CNLYGjlmjd/zAUgVF2+WPA1R1DmjAqJ9iwh 15Yx3CbknpKbfhfilmHkcGyA+fjQaisq/NzN3Ya0FP9Waht0FoBsAHt9X5xFwXH6 YBKUrqoPF5DAy427EL1nsIRa+LtoPaTdqpphFzMCgYEAlgSOO0s2FA43uyTpeF3t rmQpVilaB7KFSaiGGBgUY7p0koF9DwRsVT4l9sd48a7kb09ur2K08sHe2z8BenoB Oj+HiyNJHHSTXRjNqNBLuTP2fMU+uPDfFX/92n6WFjkXB+d1P8VSJxUkUjCg36/H 1uHMzQZFBKXXVOPTROG3GDcCgYEAoPFmq8QZOIA+BbnzqVi8QzfuN8geFyE9JrSm 55JpKdT0HbZXts3tDjMbZGI5KUuB9nbViGb/PVBbcoSTV6vtD0kpyq7O9a5gaCyc ZvS5PARFn0vt9NAcsHIxDZC1drU7EjaPQN3u4aPHff7NsK9haGD78gyPPoqIUsvp 0i0XNtsCgYEAxIUikI+5wXIrnC1FUt0gt6+4T0zc7qEO0EpQRtktZ/1saNXEhA6N EUqWLJMOnClhp72V5IvXsKgjxU8VpgIZeHIIt5jZb8XMmBiSQxiVTf6rp3s8PqlM EtXfh7TdJzKuRP7d0g2uG4boJMFf590nqNjrxj9VeSxEWUrSK3YG/h8= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 44]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Kumiko's user certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEGTCCAwGgAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxN1oYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE3WjBWMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZrdW1pa28wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDL5odVdA3gFf/MuGIqbMY8Kl7g7kUfexWkpXbT ptxlxf2D8hzUX8/PUn2XXcTbP019DqA+MkMiX4NNGpDZyeoIrcquKUXK7UQlRoKy Q6Va11DijHTqdPTWFIrRhbRUhPjj0WvG1AFPYRRG/IZfRQcH8Aw1w8XSp614m1mY 9XwL5LuHNimAgjADHMrSk1obmHws0thU9nV0t1UG1SA1lA32JZX81bqKDg3Tq1Ho fsKU3GwoBZG507lVG5bcV2ByA5HnCFpFeDTDYE23197USLhqRtIqrxxr64SFo9Dn P0mYH6e3lRveAZhdKIbCHgGaKqIr7+SZDnLdCyKDrFSPC/lbAgMBAAGjgc0wgcow UQYDVR0RBEowSIYWc2lwOmt1bWlrb0BleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYVaW06a3VtaWtvQGV4 YW1wbGUubmV0hhdwcmVzOmt1bWlrb0BleGFtcGxlLm5ldDAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0G A1UdDgQWBBQ02bNX/rnbbYoEy6wU7oyst63WbDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSVRX5fK+pl mBKRBPNjx2iaWBZ3JzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwQG CCsGAQUFBwMUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCTN2SNTLUcvgtVnBi3RBRtD0+p aiFPtWQ+YWbyCG/+NetesegCwi7xBOgSK+GxUWpTVuDW5smyTTZyvrMQhpkckcyO KvuUVz0/yK67oSume1vo75KY8BvgfeZXZG4PjqqelJ3czB0XLfeb6KFmtoiHQ/R7 4i/O9+MhB3Zoeg5bm5f2g9ljYwRbD1Uav/aH9WeGEX992d9XJ/bpGGPrAdgmV3jo KDFKh8ys1yfmM3xVdU0qPtos2nlzGNaqoceeFZoYaMf8uTzoaan6KZkQDTiMDRpt YKxyS721re/840FwDvt67w+GIfFf7ISrAlkHwroYt0NMnLv610rka8qnVvaQ -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 45]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Kumiko's private key for user certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAy+aHVXQN4BX/zLhiKmzGPCpe4O5FH3sVpKV206bcZcX9g/Ic 1F/Pz1J9l13E2z9NfQ6gPjJDIl+DTRqQ2cnqCK3KrilFyu1EJUaCskOlWtdQ4ox0 6nT01hSK0YW0VIT449FrxtQBT2EURvyGX0UHB/AMNcPF0qeteJtZmPV8C+S7hzYp gIIwAxzK0pNaG5h8LNLYVPZ1dLdVBtUgNZQN9iWV/NW6ig4N06tR6H7ClNxsKAWR udO5VRuW3FdgcgOR5whaRXg0w2BNt9fe1Ei4akbSKq8ca+uEhaPQ5z9JmB+nt5Ub 3gGYXSiGwh4BmiqiK+/kmQ5y3Qsig6xUjwv5WwIDAQABAoIBAHCXmrGgRS0xWLBW PLbKm+iLSRsR14+bqwbg663SHTAB1Yzvu+W2Bo2oMnvMJrEe0o407l2J6bJoZZvF CKmKqrYiKaJkXgrBW/jtZ6xCWGPCNAL1pnX1IWG5tDIgj8SALOO4N7hyR0rrA4Rz W0vuVQSYFFX4BhvdxZesyRwCqn3x0pPSff95Ad+vuJd5CYuFZCuyGkszQ3fi+Nia Gqs01EuyolEv72rsw2E5+wtx3qXB8Z4HXr+Yq9NbE8lp2CWd1Uh1qIHl8kwWmnIG V3oLKiIowV+M6Zx/uzwAMF0Rdn5kET+b5DOlIksUAAa8LZsf95rOvkLgw7aZaj5e sXhAdGECgYEA8930YqU2+AcEkjC5hygw1M/X5k/IcvZp0a8/in2hJW7iZgGh0AFE jjxuoIVXbxSf9cZ+M6g76Svww9ecmovLArqbhFaLfbZCsrLeEAhQtGcu3wv7o6px N0EbbF5FmOK7qaQ1Sgqj0NF5zP2JsrxGNoRmgFFwVdcpP/3Jp/IlZEsCgYEA1guI /7I8h9og1dmTPzMpvpnANdRF/iuMX9AE4LNRp09Hjx0B7Vuat1ABtx09/ZN1hLhZ BTZ5R2R2RjbzSHXZ3FdoMgSx9Q3qa+xuPel4RcppHNjdYkPDhPLnOUwQBqFL6kyU nTEF+k6VIZvNsmGbB6wpHU1cjDAZUx71p6W49TECgYAMHpa7pExUDT076rH9tpCe sume544lsHtX0WbOAipVCuqzeRdKmBWJIBW7YoUS3yqH82JoPM8lamqfwQJmZ9Yh /5YlAIwUJk+wQ9VnZJJmNM6OhTDvVFQmE9VCEHlS/Mmox6FiWZ8EjLSJ7HvAZzzy Dqhtbh6wFW5WYM15zD3xewKBgQCRmIkY/QGFm0+Ih5ZMgB3eI7GGLB1sNe0nY1Ve Dzv0pc3UQHQGI7CLDuYLy91V9o8St17+V76JXIHDYy97U4bdBau/kkgGm++gd9PJ U11Xg8aaM73rUJLXhW7ZH68rA16jQnI4tpcNW5S/pr51n0UYI/hXkT7psPIZA08w OV8lkQKBgQDaGzCYC/6WumGJUerVCzZd/H6+E3ntZmtz273c8+wV89oRtZzUoJY4 bVNrYFs9iKFxLtNGRECEU2VzDXHUAguqe05rbzPudAZ4wSsrNchUyw8LkIXHDckt pVLs0vhRK2gW/W2I+p2exSPQPt3Uy8tT6IsB9ZbNg/H4D160heHkuQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 46]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Domain certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID9DCCAtygAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxN1oYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE3WjBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAN10BgIQwucEH7yMtiTnm5SjSDeFnm2D EoRQGo5IsfqGjKeAub5S7KbKY0eErfZ0hYIWfk42QAp0LCCpag5qfzXPcHFjfelD Z4FM6rUet0yjNQh7IQ0qcwdjnY11vx/UjuZnYHX36gp6bJCvkkXgYgWaihCY3HxU i+RhlTsE/BBQ74BFul6El3bBICXBkh2JCvdVYmT66GmiYkxn0wjZYbU9FlS2t0SN WSuQ1On7x32HWMMSrDN4AFC6BwWzuQEaY1Vs4XrsoweuOwKDoWngw9wtYemy47Nx yKbP2vs+mcflcbnJF9TtvKBHVAmMbm1TmizJaMZv8T2RGiRDd32RaUsCAwEAAaOB ozCBoDAnBgNVHREEIDAeggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbYYPc2lwOmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMAkG A1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMwGWVuLXtYN8gVNG2hUHvz5QxkXMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIF4DAdBgNVHSUEFjAU BggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAxQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAGqa0dsAS5CG sFPqbzAxiR6bCRS9b7kCqm9Y7jADuKH9s0Fy/7MNy3anF8ZXOAYT5fPkMBdN95e1 83Tpgfj0VaMN9YI4w5hDUh+EzRq0o0WfPeIx/cuire1gffrSqkkvQamAAbvttnXJ l2l/DJFg8cRaNuhcrOGo55pV5eDNAfTek/Q4bMFx0v3NG10l65B7MUHnNw7lwAFI kfc03cYfdOY0NObNkw8/zpStkdnicrGfHdOlfV7ipFbFsXFNEApdplbmVx9IpVx1 Z+qrNT72tvrB84rBgHEyGGwztfoWWhbhoWwZZ/VFaGRvsjHc41oastSHiZb9h7o4 TgoZBwNLm7E= -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 47]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Private key for domain certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEA3XQGAhDC5wQfvIy2JOeblKNIN4WebYMShFAajkix+oaMp4C5 vlLspspjR4St9nSFghZ+TjZACnQsIKlqDmp/Nc9wcWN96UNngUzqtR63TKM1CHsh DSpzB2OdjXW/H9SO5mdgdffqCnpskK+SReBiBZqKEJjcfFSL5GGVOwT8EFDvgEW6 XoSXdsEgJcGSHYkK91ViZProaaJiTGfTCNlhtT0WVLa3RI1ZK5DU6fvHfYdYwxKs M3gAULoHBbO5ARpjVWzheuyjB647AoOhaeDD3C1h6bLjs3HIps/a+z6Zx+VxuckX 1O28oEdUCYxubVOaLMloxm/xPZEaJEN3fZFpSwIDAQABAoIBAB9s231ni4Dk4OwM u7w48acCFLlsSLMZqoMEKwCN6FO4zDTo23LaqaJxje0UMuuKVXfEYWAP6r6RBcIM yHQLQMoOCdLNX4y+d+2tUJErLq+9aUUu093ebDxcMntkfh6yNyUS/mk/KQMbpFRT 1dn8oWxSJc19I6yxArkB7/9UEcDut6vzdbz+agXpHZH4Tje5OWZQXkHzsYobM8Y8 c2XwudP1zdQtvOrrOeirexxpOQf4CBQnBxoGmbae9Wf27Kw2bBm5+blZFgdqNxoh 6Q3rJ9EDyWkrVMAq9a67a59wST1ymyC0c6FmfToCMGlgoMPHcEdvuNYPWd2322oK ZdfsawECgYEA+AewMiTdhAE+9TId2qilLQV+y8bdTHQ9rSqW9SF+q5ShOpZa79ER asuDuqxU+TiewS0ircrkIyzQmCc1fnfBJh5y6GukpUk8HdLLkA29fV3ZJe+Y4ZbL b4TEy/RxEECQREgtnQiaw08yOlT1dobNwxzVsi3mrhtOpfbPBERZUSsCgYEA5JG2 aGRCkyzASGAnZmqqXCP/pImU+tJb2OCgQ6/3gsxi/l91LwtRhFgx/ptYCgZWlpbz +mpnDqexKtowldbjorrUADw84zG4u9d+uWOCXEpCVIEu4DZsRURdy3OzpK1vJaUm NLgBiDj8JkUFrXTi4Rzx1Xysf6ndWAxDPDdI+GECgYEAoyFrYY+dohSvs9UijY4e FV5n5t8E7iQF7L72SoOdLHy1DjOV2+VF71erbDusJ751q9hj1qp7Iid3ips/M87P 2qJsMTGbOJrST0s1V6mx16LCD5Fmm/jyFIbeaMZ9FpNgT4ipd38RSyPrhTIbv7kp 3Ao7AtXtwtVzBPUvcz8A/8ECgYEAw2ps2F13qdql3nsO1Ho3gqVoaGUUUUlOK2MI wjYM1/AkZrR4PKthm1PIEpT/tTpsBz2yBBO6XoYya5+10DWz0yoGHNljeR7GgRqh hqC0EHGQuizkRd9hu+rSgiI+oXmCQF4tBv+Wl7+YnKOAUidP3gTgIZUA6fjxe9io FzBxG6ECgYEAyAHvSeqqwmdotdpWgR3Fk1CmtH7ZPnF2rsuRBaBoYnWtU619ote+ +Bmd4fBUB9tQOzUC9desRtoK3+wlJKHEPjm/0FxtQQi9ogHEn4e6P9jOwXJNkSsa GjGUfzQ3Vm2baeNMg7sH8C5mQ9nskDuCzdlVAB2bMp23oPl6cvPIb0E= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 48]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Domain certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID9DCCAtygAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxOFoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE4WjBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLm5ldDCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOwsdgPVSPMweLWsBDHUSXJS6Vk6pu6K sVg8IWMf1g0TWTPc5jUAQlWlLNtmN4gcSzq5z1ecvf3rLMomJPZaWbektTTg1KZl 2wQgyP+vx/Hf1BByj3s2DE/KZoLnQjFQawHHMc+kCtSa6dCFTmD9nA5cYDVxNmKG Kz/+5HYxe6ByI6NZGNlSB8ADPULcFg6UchO06JvrGFt1n9tAtMf5C31+YYGpqXBl qZOV8Wo0Gp6Vlnd4LrvDZkwjpQ/o7EuFbiK34Gvh3cuh9EkMbk+IPgVv7ohjWPDl 6WygTkE2VXHDhhdN4MXPKyenXX35sB52fNytN+2qM8bo4QPfTZlGrx0CAwEAAaOB ozCBoDAnBgNVHREEIDAeggtleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYPc2lwOmV4YW1wbGUubmV0MAkG A1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFNiNYjKOu6f046JHy28GDRVMeR7sMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIF4DAdBgNVHSUEFjAU BggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAxQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAHUzR2H2IWrQ ls3iqNlG7815mOjm9mgQX6WP2ILwBOTOqtPJ9uE2XZU9qw6d9vdcbAgLpp4Em4T7 Whcs0zVTrgKpWjDlho/boRS1gP2Qu9I86zJzf2R3mhTHUsbpxIwMCcHQg/fdIIeP 5Ar8R5DZXx/Q9zdQLE+cjMSjxo7q7uOV8DRkgMpYtp7BURg5ZXhnkAhEHxa3/SbU YGfy3PzRoAMQmRZieAXArsIxEfkaC4Dtox/D4XLvY7njBFv8H6wqlvQyDsKXWlUH 8dS9i/3wFEpQtymUUeXwk8gzf2ytT6hgrX70s6BLy/IeRU+wLJ3k5YZpopQZjDm1 fNQG/O8TJlQ= -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 49]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Private key for domain certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEogIBAAKCAQEA7Cx2A9VI8zB4tawEMdRJclLpWTqm7oqxWDwhYx/WDRNZM9zm NQBCVaUs22Y3iBxLOrnPV5y9/essyiYk9lpZt6S1NODUpmXbBCDI/6/H8d/UEHKP ezYMT8pmgudCMVBrAccxz6QK1Jrp0IVOYP2cDlxgNXE2YoYrP/7kdjF7oHIjo1kY 2VIHwAM9QtwWDpRyE7Tom+sYW3Wf20C0x/kLfX5hgampcGWpk5XxajQanpWWd3gu u8NmTCOlD+jsS4VuIrfga+Hdy6H0SQxuT4g+BW/uiGNY8OXpbKBOQTZVccOGF03g xc8rJ6ddffmwHnZ83K037aozxujhA99NmUavHQIDAQABAoIBABfBYR2BlpTfi0S6 yLE6aSjWriILhD76NFxrr/AIg79M8uwEjCNIo2N5+ckXvv4x2l9N0U0+tt2Tii3L KGyfKecO6isncjxKgn0nzw/o3nO1z97Xpxb9mL9t3GHOYRoUvK6xGpGILo60BlCz F+8pk0jegc7eVFoUpMULHm/FCmpY30N5cvCHcAE/ncW49bZmH3gQ+cmr5UcKKDUY baJyLd8Q1f+uSmtrfYZzRT5c+4wmrBUjv3w9poMJuEo4slRaDnyeKJPSNR/6/LJk tqnqgNif9cj9wqF6hWA23dDmmU/kSRtn1KOz5XmV9Jbo4Fu64Fvn/m/hj5Og4CP9 hZUWIQECgYEA+nV2pzspCfS7jSebVnvjChvqJ0nJAilSqCmrSQIT5PRmO+GQs6UT PVN4GE0Ms8TTJyvxVkpoagQ36VLw/Wr0jUm+Z+dv1TIlFWTas8RNmdZHMv0LvfEe Qu2fTI68l2d/L9GBMUCYa/sucX5E9q+3LC+Qo9jw8ehWjQZsWYER4dsCgYEA8WYX AqDdKjHRqu2h248gZsuogiZq05iuzXhk2VTQoiM92mu8m1Htak+eov3/3wojqxuw TAQbf/t8EfQ7LIGjaKqAua7mgG/aNB6MGGwdpBAPUZDL+DuKfbDbzTOL/IuaW0Fp 40RC0Up5nTU9wzIKB7a6n5S5R0KXxiGUIphfcGcCgYA6IYdPmziUOfxJ79ZrBUgV 8ZKwWbzQxpyLsVgzEsthSaRs45a9S2QiyLvIECIRm25S2i0ilRSU/rOncPvEJc3q +SG7Zgkb146p34WvUbGdMhHGcNsH0+3tJM/jagG1tmzbwWmV7+MwtNT7vI3vH6uJ EuUkUlbiHsXv53zAbWekHwKBgBy5HwfLCEXbA62o9NdhImPY28YQuClRQ4tjReyu MNz6AIQayahZiTxbGO8f9fAeDrxvYPzKiFMkI1EnlFrpWf48O3DcpMSninklIVpO kwBQgOIdrods3j+yaZTzCzcTjVxKXkUSfDjW+b2A9kZhj9v3HCGc2qbl/5Utraio JMMFAoGAHb+k+C4e8WrW+jXbbG/DgAkSokK5vZwZLHeWBig9bEi626xN/oFEQVXp zqwyNo6zQaofmS6anT6P2M7NClSGJxh27eBTiTLp1NCXlGTWAQEtXmYtvnAZNzXC 5Ur0wvS5bLx0nbhJwN8ZBwzJhYup0kU3pn99GcF+vkj5Eg7Zftg= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 50]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 B.2. Certificates NOT Using EKU These certificates do not make use of the EKU specification described in [RFC5924]. Most existing certificates fall in this category. Fluffy's user certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID+jCCAuKgAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxOFoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE4WjBWMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZmbHVmZnkwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC6VyOIP6UANXy766KHiYDxyOpYEFboLJv6SEtw UWQoZS3hQurFidOu4gkCspblzaMoty7lnUexbFxUKdbJOWGMcB2hrezJ+6rwJPK/ bF5YDijVtVqMRd5lv/Ni5yzteHfrMszWnz3t+ojgak4XTjBJmP2RO0T67GUpEbFV sDeYtWi+G1ebDAR6bf6Jdba2K6DnmkxT5Rr6oYJHIApYbubk28asBQN6EGBBgPEO RReJYrjoJR/rBDDe1bxK+ONdFXPlwjI/TRPMpvUYraWgTjJ18tXISgF1htaa/Y1K YP79Yun2Nl/3UQcPIc/C6CXBs3yAUK3qQO1G6C5pXH9KMMlNAgMBAAGjga4wgasw UQYDVR0RBEowSIYWc2lwOmZsdWZmeUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbYYVaW06Zmx1ZmZ5QGV4 YW1wbGUuY29thhdwcmVzOmZsdWZmeUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0G A1UdDgQWBBT7CTXlQ5GKWvxGZNY24mmmVuEnRDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSVRX5fK+pl mBKRBPNjx2iaWBZ3JzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBeAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAKL9 wUWGRhCQdhjzY4bx0R5Kwz+NHvsb8rjlPqfdcbNujBCw+rD+/uux0G3HwW+Mraj5 U2tUehwz87k6SgdqADzL/CP2mjzCJo5uDhi+tzjeg6ZklTSZYQrL3FSv/AgcUfFI 9HuCGkix/htaoEMy2zNZnZOjdtFME9w7wb3GxxqWTUzl9TToloCXYmLeQo/jwuad 40ybun1P5CWkO5Md2Y5zuNfCsRRz5lLYtAVfANtLBfeFV+S87AwrrdeITT+iyB7H Jj+t24U4IMC8MttcHBlPPBuRVc2kmhNEQuTzelCsldXgY2+kn8ItnLdv1mvLpXA2 2Y41CPLCSj9AlqqZL9I= -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 51]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Fluffy's private key for user certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEogIBAAKCAQEAulcjiD+lADV8u+uih4mA8cjqWBBW6Cyb+khLcFFkKGUt4ULq xYnTruIJArKW5c2jKLcu5Z1HsWxcVCnWyTlhjHAdoa3syfuq8CTyv2xeWA4o1bVa jEXeZb/zYucs7Xh36zLM1p897fqI4GpOF04wSZj9kTtE+uxlKRGxVbA3mLVovhtX mwwEem3+iXW2tiug55pMU+Ua+qGCRyAKWG7m5NvGrAUDehBgQYDxDkUXiWK46CUf 6wQw3tW8SvjjXRVz5cIyP00TzKb1GK2loE4ydfLVyEoBdYbWmv2NSmD+/WLp9jZf 91EHDyHPwuglwbN8gFCt6kDtRuguaVx/SjDJTQIDAQABAoIBABtIBLi+8K5eJlvw /MOxOwKrMrwf8ElftppnGTxhfjN31MbFIFA5hJd3GnCdqwAMIlYks6YEZ+mu/rmH wp2FXCXOiFgSebd8tCMilbO27v0fXZUkTxR4aj4lY0HYrLg7yfrSXjER8WQ1KPMK PVKmLOWpk34+2jOOhqUDpR3xhcJClQ81fC1hKe2JoixNDoPdfM3azTq8QUPLQD2I mjww1IH1677G5o/6qMloOM0Feqv/3cUWiRmvPv4eyGHdNtuFXKFpB4DQQMQL7TD8 FoOHBymHIOzSSF+gYgBFOb0YNgu2CqZrfED9cf0rRotrbXf6tM+akclxfHhkfKaa JPZosbUCgYEA4MaetKsa7azhEYMc4TK0xhhV5Hi6lj1xR/6h++uYF0OIOBjM9yU3 5n6vLpyghNbW2bK08OIWPO0F4syvyKYR2elmUDraH29DKAtRLEkU9K82RG4AmXmk G6ZsWOfx6Jf35OnAKVj/7aN9jc4K1v6EFyQGYEXbp4I0fhFfbJBAe28CgYEA1Dmx iKJD+jWW9ypHk51YJ3r+a5qPPNVmjGKQQje3Y6+rSlxmW0hMwXoCBOYRwhHBRA// SxH93PZ8rECjNkhxp6Ao87X2Gcol5U6kH+rwfd/3+SsHqPrugaDIwNlgkcu8VRrP 8uP2CgJoDBi5UY2UR97GVK98x8k2Sf6kDT32mQMCgYB/KH3R8VY7jOiKcqTc1UWl J1E3/gB4S+wQ8YELth0FVCP0sDsLuZdlItfRw7OfUraa01k/SHeSIfiJdIghN6mz oDFMQ+7vh47zUWurZPCg95n4nk5ihIkNR1nV9elJTudjLcWS3pFyC2JU3XIObE+n k66zufFoUuWFSCi2juibqwKBgCT6RHe1JjkDe2FniX8r7D88y/W9wXVtDWgqiE4x XQ/OfP8A6IjBKTaQ5qcp2zBAXbdZPjc7VEta21A8FvQPXVZCrsAAFXha4413zVsO WYblLlTI7ZXA2yvU8wW/Gnds00zU1iTRGX6W+sAY0rll/M8k/tOknA5HfeEYsEbq Y/w3AoGASjoC9Fjy2aBvH8SQaimn/Rx3hOFR4myOGWtHxrXmezoO2YdcMO1d8rlz A/sQRvVofHRwyoaIkZkALprEGyxEqCdMmEs1h9xYAcxfW23RfqC39DYb9RTrRkwa ArJmcEdRESOsIYhhXGfE1QMGiwj1UXMWeYcLtqQKWiLLDTYYfQE= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 52]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Kumiko's user certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID+jCCAuKgAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxOFoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE4WjBWMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZrdW1pa28wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDE/QVN7nxDDu5ov6b0cmHIFH93KhNbTEyCisir i4OeUBiCv9dgRgPBXffrIIVQdIlCoDeLDusHdsC9EfFWvg+pRlKVEDgwccO0F5AV bq3MK2Njma5I0lwpIa0RXYQ0K//oX/+jZeakhFty/R9yer0KaXWdLRd6KtncISui z9rFhlTB9lHg6vNJUN9+Xonbcs7siXbj3qZdhb7oipI4PoQlXVetyu+SzAVe6MsU 5lwLmpQpIzQdSsJyxaAsW+AsyxunhWWiPZ888UM4vXjacZuj8GvJ8w2XjgJilQvV s8ojWMKnAGLaR7grTBmGQ90e6+cg7hWuoGBlQA0R0h8zWQz5AgMBAAGjga4wgasw UQYDVR0RBEowSIYWc2lwOmt1bWlrb0BleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYVaW06a3VtaWtvQGV4 YW1wbGUubmV0hhdwcmVzOmt1bWlrb0BleGFtcGxlLm5ldDAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0G A1UdDgQWBBR6WwH61Ul7BIWeiKM35fMAiE9xazAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSVRX5fK+pl mBKRBPNjx2iaWBZ3JzALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBeAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAKE8 y9YyoZlkFw4WxPalK087sSEveKBfzh4TuYQf5YcSIPw0coZGj/gNxn1juiYhE93G F+Si/hJM0M6cc7SLB5Spq06Tt3PyPBIOZOWk9koh92kDI3axSr6II9Plsvp+Xsrl bz5Zy8njy/YZrk/qOaHqQ5J6nPNp5qwF+ns2t+5Zl88Lli5nkBgOXFOuE0RIkcdF CUFRUj026GxAILR6wUThOzfq55Azwl5Y9Y9QmEjFhkbYLls00HxcJdnt+6Sdm/vN MeMJZdTzp1x+8pfPhJgHoyz7nkAxhgzC9RT33ra33BNkMQ6esRlQONJ+ZRsRLhHP O7+kvXvmj9AAsA291wY= -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 53]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Kumiko's private key for user certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAxP0FTe58Qw7uaL+m9HJhyBR/dyoTW0xMgorIq4uDnlAYgr/X YEYDwV336yCFUHSJQqA3iw7rB3bAvRHxVr4PqUZSlRA4MHHDtBeQFW6tzCtjY5mu SNJcKSGtEV2ENCv/6F//o2XmpIRbcv0fcnq9Cml1nS0XeirZ3CEros/axYZUwfZR 4OrzSVDffl6J23LO7Il2496mXYW+6IqSOD6EJV1XrcrvkswFXujLFOZcC5qUKSM0 HUrCcsWgLFvgLMsbp4Vloj2fPPFDOL142nGbo/BryfMNl44CYpUL1bPKI1jCpwBi 2ke4K0wZhkPdHuvnIO4VrqBgZUANEdIfM1kM+QIDAQABAoIBADuLR+kwp3sVrlcX Z34IfSofmBALNeKpA4+KJ/JCr7xQ9bfACXhecZAnuWLnZ6TUNRFgoKl2DvEookYE gHD57n36dcf9KR7rpH5xiOoRlJNcoiRfNeFpRNZiCZBwNiAXFLnHGtznVnpwT7xI axMNqsrU6epi0O/quAPkOu5x6e0+j+j3ZauI4EfD1w2R6moBMUtATauZEEyLuC9A 6bFz2AFDchPVLwSjNMu0tAJc8Fss8xKls9HUXGS22eUfHxWfkCGwChuW60obGmas E7GS7h4g9QvvQ4hGSVy9/MmQ88GmT0LynOyzFBCpuwjOQTHwsD674ldMSL4kXYVK jcnTAkkCgYEA4bjN2ILis3uWTjvTNnrmWn1QoZBZDhg1LuNs5o1XtOJ7CdkckUvs nqqQYOzNk/9N8vUs12ds3csXHypuuGrJwAVf648RSPDUUQ2XOoPSL9NeuZt5V1fT 1VyVWanKCBZ5sztISNVPt7Pu8DtGLHch4S/7M+gEUQB1Ogz7fyJHvFsCgYEA32mE 6lN67aHkqMLa06ZI9JIk/3SsFIPpjwZ4tk+sQCqEzawPvkT7qF2+U8lVt0XXKJZL aexsopsULCGS86TEAPoYtjjk91p6ZZj8mgRZLU55g+gRdTpAFhXMgIctU7U6cDIw SPa6UxJp9XCa/Gf6YLfas9VBhc/8OC7I4ygjLDsCgYEAgAG7yuM/CSY3MRrARw8f f4W9qkIgHtwfnP2gjobtjEk8GXOkvcle4QQ9aJoiY6HPZM8hpO6kUIuSCzyXGcKF s33Yzc+Or9zTqzuX3blQA4tNFtlS0POf0En28KhXSIrmbXxbG+LMmJNUF6yluSW+ cuQxA1i6ye0Gjes63Phl0i0CgYEAuEcILGQpTGMyAYWgC93n5Vu6ir+IxO89sgyL ew1irhakLiWTYsTxsyGHwQKb4i0IWOEHWVp7DPDPhcs3tCIezhN8WKm7KtAFj1HO YZfemsFU99lutPwUKmNWqFlXqOkeR7cOHtDsRWM15Q45uKJnYmmkSptHjYFNsGXe q4fK40sCgYBoAYtsLfMlqt7s3htx4hZSMFbLP/iMGW2DMMAzDW+Xxsvw86ibrcWY 8c3hbohuJBpyAzba4QoR2G+gtRmodLca+tQFMrObETHFglNCY+WoHRSNRImbCS8w dsszPgHWf1nrxBLBiDFlHZwSqbZtLyBjPlHJ+fTiPNo6UTx8aDQ4Pw== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 54]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Domain certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID1TCCAr2gAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pTMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxOVoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE5WjBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKEVuYyZlaqfqks9u9yWQRp9WfI+VsQg GpJH3vAfastElCdxlBV7+R2CaQ/GnXDnE0lAC5SiKRcvPHq5OLx1VnDADMWmcXBv wK5n1zN+7MUCy/MISMr7E2Nd+py8Ft3XhjWDIuUljAh4HDO4fxS/BFy8zozADxvP OfpE40EABF5aj7e+xjtkErdkMybAcSYyo53IHP3wDPxmMzCsOw/fi8bfy9j1GiUD uz01F9qT/Opz9K1snxgT1IK6GRlktG4JawSiohW1QbARfj9//hR7ZgeB0gO6LLGX cGXdl87JdA4ZHMZNinN4Cv8ctZYSQZ3dbt1pRRbGtq7elPskiinDuUkCAwEAAaOB hDCBgTAnBgNVHREEIDAeggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbYYPc2lwOmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMAkG A1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFNu6jHPsItA+vy/Jqv81MW7wLJpMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIF4DANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQUFAAOCAQEANH+wX56VJd0vVB9+Mef1xItWrSQUyNYZZCBq+y/5vIoOp6Chaupn xjTjWf50zg6CK8yKBWq8pGlG45GTUx+uCx+nVIbHpyTT5+YDDUzlIhhAUzIOOB33 Fd/XI/1PK5p5ftuJIYXU0rGuaoH8ud/p2nhIf9mwicUHxViTX3PUwlFC7eMbevBo 8/dMYnHb2i40ug6hsiYggsmQDbhHLVLo/yqkpvgzPLSSlkXS4sv2oIoJ/ISuSjhP QkQ7mh7h01ct/LOa53qWfbCVogQDhMEqPTVdPm+JzTrMlWeZdrk4KbnXGp64Jtpu xTVI4GcVAGWUT0cmpspDmHbPOKm5kcltkg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 55]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Private key for domain certificate for example.com: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAoRW5jJmVqp+qSz273JZBGn1Z8j5WxCAakkfe8B9qy0SUJ3GU FXv5HYJpD8adcOcTSUALlKIpFy88erk4vHVWcMAMxaZxcG/ArmfXM37sxQLL8whI yvsTY136nLwW3deGNYMi5SWMCHgcM7h/FL8EXLzOjMAPG885+kTjQQAEXlqPt77G O2QSt2QzJsBxJjKjncgc/fAM/GYzMKw7D9+Lxt/L2PUaJQO7PTUX2pP86nP0rWyf GBPUgroZGWS0bglrBKKiFbVBsBF+P3/+FHtmB4HSA7ossZdwZd2Xzsl0Dhkcxk2K c3gK/xy1lhJBnd1u3WlFFsa2rt6U+ySKKcO5SQIDAQABAoIBABI9gIZAOedZLxJY Cja/ON4EBbRdhLuumvOnecIc/J3JxTD2Nnt8T0gdJUJpDhjjwZZQzz7kYdzDN4j6 Akeszb30sT2MTFob/WiCT6cAH1VrrKZ3cK6zYY2l7aPj1H8IUaUrlT73UnT/DMp6 gMFbo+XQZ18evFc8zubc+BK7KsN4Nb6/zMhw+PXEiyg2EGDN1Fo4TMhxPD4wBIMU 8oLlE8A6GKimxAk3gMuIiS6Ruau2HpGkjkkHkAx/yzU1s8BCMoLDJjyyH19PRISr n0VFfe0gM0aZpdZ/94ynFPdMnBXTq8BabT09eiycuLKlL0g/ERmj6jIImGSYRWED GzlzX0UCgYEA0FDUek2uLhyltXwlzhDTldyuItiYZq/MeXaq2eA96zhJlD6aX+55 PQIxEEfhgTNf4e4cKjXQSD7aixy7jp/kFGowFRlB4pwbLDuhlniYSxa8Kv0OpJM4 DTAGue4QFZId5Z43KH755Ub7tjrCEIdQnij44DA3gPnjqXk973pdyVcCgYEAxfUx /zMXgTp7HxW+QHZD7xXEs4Fp1xjzL5BaHoJnM7WbmkWvUvcMaEE/i9RqpyGlXRiN jX6KBZ9UVgh/B0/AcYMa3DImTa0+Uie9kN7jTi5pzvIUAdFh+RyQ4tULWr5cgrzv PjGG9tXMthuIbILSumVEwvC+P6Ksi1r4xp1ezl8CgYEArF51sk2clqM1qpnzXjMm IJbdsA+w6ycD9m1uqaGXGo8UswmqCz70KrspheM0gQfVisjPnU2x7lWz1/AKcdVz kEDdUFf54FxzT4J4Dl3zBg7l3FxQRXVbp+3ZYvfNb0vcWSc1VNjcRg8aMIsmES8m UfhtFnRPOPWMn6qmyQVjnTkCgYB/3zlinkBKq9ooZEU3Iq4TXL5pLemOloFQcjCk kJvVnTRcXTM5pngPSEaiLp6OQ3+sOVYG1nyV0SwLPwW/VVb8fDH3lzWC66vcKeuc Dz5JnFWg5mLiIbzly/wTaochIOJlWWI5jIigHc9Uu0hOv9sbqJrYSea6+Hv4sNUO h01chQKBgQCKLEH7vWQX8fkw+yKnmvAFoZ5H3IHUQw/WYsoCOVnWoY+vowcuuTTt cbW1VkrtEjJPuYeEPa5NI2kmsNUZGrKCpx/3uq2JfMVopJzJN9biFM4ulcKqf9ie hiVIFVVmxq+dVmXBgXCknhYK1Mnt9b3BK6mDqerQjK1TKryqAJ2QpQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 56]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Domain certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID1TCCAr2gAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzE5MzIxOVoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE5WjBbMQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLm5ldDCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKoWx8g1KbnGX2YEOXrbod2pbR0fpkYW V7O/tIWHddl+ACLlqqNPKSmIqwAFbZ2uf7S95OkXhkgRJGw3BugftUJS7zDhqVqi dgPLMUPrdzpFazeh/AwBjc0wNBz/6tkUXrm7y/FwwzaCoKw+8Qm4Ibn2E3bNqWlm iyKOXnYt4LGmy6J5e64hfQ3Vqe0ze5cfLKcpBbjF/TF75utbnH25zE0C/o1b+x1f dwyDjsH0NN+A1ZFrI2NdleVAuH6F2vx4ctwZUzUJXyXezFmw5SRzhtWkb0iHO0ER Ne7hCHLCv2Z6/GfIuHirCsGtNKSQIC6k74MyD7D75nltnLVgJ7Oxt28CAwEAAaOB hDCBgTAnBgNVHREEIDAeggtleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYPc2lwOmV4YW1wbGUubmV0MAkG A1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFC1TKpLjuKa/dPumVbeFXEW4UR6EMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFJVFfl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIF4DANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQUFAAOCAQEAJry8LukecUv4DUs5u/s6IymyqDLpeNvm94yrIIk/eRW72Jtr9rf5 6zF0Pd/+NzDXRYPe99HQgF3EKYndKIfnRUStJzIqiba2UszypDVRTQ6W9cH9e/1q FdCjjeoVkRvnGo91S8DkgWM4boNRUgZtYwP+1I8hR+0717tp0f4fKjYX+NxPe30r WzbLYXFDEiPndEgcxHc84Eeupit7VBQm7jxtF+XbaVGiLPGKCiYqdVS08h2ZakRK 8T3xL8Ecs4/rQn7PNPyEfS52R8hC70r66aAxZqLbKNpth/SZ3/hdeAyJ/NnFMW1J uq3kB5YAJSwMYAUXaQhB1BvxKzXqstzJHQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 57]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Private key for domain certificate for example.net: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAqhbHyDUpucZfZgQ5etuh3altHR+mRhZXs7+0hYd12X4AIuWq o08pKYirAAVtna5/tL3k6ReGSBEkbDcG6B+1QlLvMOGpWqJ2A8sxQ+t3OkVrN6H8 DAGNzTA0HP/q2RReubvL8XDDNoKgrD7xCbghufYTds2paWaLIo5edi3gsabLonl7 riF9DdWp7TN7lx8spykFuMX9MXvm61ucfbnMTQL+jVv7HV93DIOOwfQ034DVkWsj Y12V5UC4foXa/Hhy3BlTNQlfJd7MWbDlJHOG1aRvSIc7QRE17uEIcsK/Znr8Z8i4 eKsKwa00pJAgLqTvgzIPsPvmeW2ctWAns7G3bwIDAQABAoIBAHIjpV+B5YVITL59 +UCr4JyKVLGlioQf/CygafjtZTVVa6v/aRn8Rkgb8XyrJ9sXvZVBlTqiUbdM4Z9I 8faVSKLAWsj3thkfSojTMzU77x+IdCG6LxSzekAGqAIJ7sRL+iEzl/Fm1WlgEYhl GIWILgHH01n3O0eCy72dwmAV+2Hazn8eBggkWxMp0fblRC9pVh0FCo+jy1lHasjL oOBkH51lbmZ4PUuUY072j2665gPm7i0nr25igef842JkbqAV8rAoNlQ26Y7tYLEw 6QyLv0odeb0rHZ8IEzahWAdmIPGCIUcFM7RmyInOatGA0dVEU3uYnkUQQVOi/JTx 46CCMbECgYEA4c1Dv/IVz9pdW1o/0MaJ94zfeg7Pgn5DRXnNMjCsSxVHSMINwlUl BcYozs77vWbIuXiXO2xQe9mGA2ss3+vNxB0eu6EBQ/fK16cQQQH52nXdrV1sqnkN 5B5elFKcZKPfNVWrg0BC6csDndTcHp9STIKsxWkesLzC3Vz5UXZMsocCgYEAwNYV +SsCIQGLT8ZZfKyE2nHqRUFknKc/tWQJop5gnE4ws3Lql3SNyCUQr/sDYelxQDE3 6COm197JcZ7jggDq7grigIxMznRxLMeG7bb7FfwPE/SKV0H5uagEB7ktFl8xIJKt yOCK1ulillQjToSs4uetHLRXKCDSEpRiSw7wRdkCgYEAkDKBXYa/nykYDUqpDi57 1PbFkDD9G5x+YVPTUoX6wUgpabFjEANHzVQqo0dTRDTrYmY8Tdpx22WiS3SaB7WS hfcCtVewczM++lDZ9GnKoVQ76IaM6qC72j36sEXBUhPEa072ZK8ZDCx1dsmEeJnN +MZKhxcGXl9tIehJ31foyukCgYB9AUs1PwAeTVX13OrduyhUQ0xOoNmMA491Euh8 FpciPD2t1mzkyZWvjPeIXPwQWLglmMJZJeNeRPnpQcrR165zqXKzSj/wBePn12BM cTXLRp6vnPKhJg+wno4eQ5hKzGKYbv1hHs5iCuDx+pD4sWExpmW+Gdn2FXCYwsAF UCXJ4QKBgAKSrm8Y5xQhd8RAMg9JZLGUpPnmTKNU98f3fUFnX7jZEZETasnn18vd 65x04h58cohJJkNxqeL6k3lc3Mw0pzZrvsIha3ZMEoJPCgwBa8zLzrR13YQin6yf +bAmfTDmhigpORB36ODY4B1kcwxKzQ0n3XAtlrL7NRV5wHr2ejkY -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- B.3. Certificate Chaining with a Non-Root CA Following is a certificate for a non-root CA in example.net. The certificate was signed by the root CA shown in Section 2.1. As indicated in Sections 4.2.1.9 and 4.2.1.3 [RFC5280], "cA" is set in Basic Constraints, and "keyCertSign" is set in Key Usage. This identifies the certificate holder as a signing authority. Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:52 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority Validity Not Before: Feb 7 20:21:13 2011 GMT Not After : Jan 14 20:21:13 2111 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 58]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 OU=Test CA for example.net, CN=example.net Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:d4:46:65:51:f8:84:1c:b5:93:47:a5:15:14:06: ec:dc:2a:77:93:11:5e:75:14:d2:88:54:bd:16:50: dd:41:3f:7e:2a:e4:26:d5:a3:33:b0:5e:37:1d:e5: 96:37:1c:1c:69:80:a4:ef:fd:22:78:d7:ce:d3:c3: de:96:fb:87:30:88:bc:06:14:80:5d:f3:ab:d7:64: 3e:07:31:dc:97:c5:d6:19:26:bc:7d:0b:f8:de:5e: f9:0f:dc:9a:45:0f:28:8d:dd:fa:15:56:d5:35:17: 28:80:d2:fc:1f:d6:95:95:42:0e:2c:47:38:53:ad: fd:0e:24:fd:a3:43:33:83:52:65:54:da:48:d8:dc: 86:42:d5:26:ac:1d:52:54:08:52:e5:3f:4a:76:95: 77:8d:c6:f2:33:f0:18:87:c8:fc:5b:54:5d:dd:65: f1:5c:f5:c8:f4:36:54:8a:b6:7b:6f:f8:55:f8:d8: d8:df:a9:7b:40:45:4c:92:0f:aa:b2:2c:a1:a8:64: d5:99:22:1e:28:78:a0:d8:e5:51:64:3f:03:14:a9: 12:47:61:84:d6:b0:69:1a:6b:a3:6e:d8:ca:ce:43: 50:ad:57:96:2b:87:15:d9:c2:11:03:b0:82:d4:f0: 80:bf:dd:44:f4:f6:39:0a:2b:e3:4d:d3:f5:e7:aa: 34:e5 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:TRUE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 72:70:CF:66:1E:23:A5:38:FC:6F:40:8F:86:8A:AF:E0:B9:6F:E9:C3 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27 X509v3 Key Usage: Certificate Sign Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 70:73:c0:65:9c:2f:09:39:39:d6:a4:5b:95:e7:7b:43:34:b5: b9:b2:5d:76:eb:ef:87:e0:25:b6:68:ab:ee:f8:f7:85:c4:21: 47:bb:6c:68:62:ff:f8:84:1e:44:5a:30:4e:ce:97:91:cc:3d: 43:4a:8b:b7:25:26:08:63:c6:71:4a:c1:94:35:81:66:de:23: 9d:e3:37:de:31:80:ed:58:b7:07:a7:ea:87:d3:cc:da:1b:62: c9:82:c2:17:e6:2d:20:e4:b2:69:14:cb:05:43:34:6f:b5:2c: 60:d8:44:43:f9:e6:e9:3d:7c:54:a2:b9:d9:1e:7d:67:bb:3f: 32:31:0d:c1:88:78:a8:67:39:f5:d2:3e:08:f7:38:84:a6:8f: c2:3e:00:ce:5f:b4:c8:da:a1:b5:2f:c2:89:60:a4:3a:2b:be: 98:e0:44:34:af:ec:7f:73:26:f1:94:5b:39:09:b9:9f:93:c2: 9d:7a:96:2f:82:66:c8:4d:f6:db:87:00:8e:bc:2a:b9:51:73: 6c:cc:ff:e5:31:25:b1:4a:d0:9a:a9:c3:65:35:21:89:76:3d: 39:f8:84:42:a6:03:0e:b5:c9:2f:5d:18:bc:9d:b9:82:f6:83: Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 59]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 dd:2b:29:6c:8d:2c:8c:47:d4:7d:be:de:32:13:85:92:32:bc: 61:62:6b:e5 Robert's certificate was signed by the non-root CA in example.net: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:53 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, OU=Test CA for example.net, CN=example.net Validity Not Before: Feb 7 20:21:13 2011 GMT Not After : Jan 14 20:21:13 2111 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, CN=robert Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:d3:dc:14:69:6b:71:09:2c:0b:0f:9d:95:08:c1: 64:20:66:ef:9f:9c:30:06:30:39:eb:14:16:da:19: cc:41:4d:b1:cf:f8:53:5b:a5:0d:76:ec:97:ba:16: 10:9f:ed:57:b5:fb:6d:4b:9f:8f:d0:9f:0e:15:a7: 3e:88:c4:e4:ef:35:d1:63:91:20:68:18:f4:8e:3b: b4:0f:03:3e:a0:00:d6:c3:26:e7:57:8e:21:92:a3: 7a:2d:21:44:48:db:01:b9:54:e8:dc:d6:e3:d1:b3: f2:4b:26:0f:3f:d4:99:63:e4:7e:14:0a:b2:73:1c: 5f:3b:41:36:e9:9a:70:be:f7:4f:08:6b:4a:db:44: 02:e8:bb:50:66:2c:98:94:45:9e:7e:01:0e:9d:c3: a9:03:b7:28:15:28:c3:cd:a2:ad:ab:07:f6:ff:69: f4:ec:ba:7f:4b:bd:9b:28:8c:0d:87:e2:66:d1:24: 34:e5:77:be:89:f1:c9:76:4c:37:34:3a:bc:d9:9c: 36:f5:28:60:01:29:5c:f4:1e:7a:15:19:34:81:1c: cf:1a:06:5c:0f:f9:81:67:dc:50:09:e2:a8:d7:9d: 9f:35:6e:ff:a6:a8:80:74:6c:f8:a1:0a:f3:bb:2b: b6:51:8c:21:bc:06:72:59:d0:95:42:d3:02:2c:ce: f9:23 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: URI:sip:robert@example.net, URI:im:robert@example.net, URI:pres:robert@example.net X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: A6:42:BD:62:0D:6B:BF:EE:67:D4:C7:BC:09:3F:0B:3A:12:AB:19:CE X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 60]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 72:70:CF:66:1E:23:A5:38:FC:6F:40:8F:86:8A:AF:E0:B9:6F:E9:C3 X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: E-mail Protection, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 25:99:ea:1a:1e:96:6d:4e:b1:9c:5a:43:77:ea:3a:a7:a1:b7: 22:db:b9:d4:9a:1e:17:f7:13:2e:b2:ca:80:dd:c9:a5:db:61: 41:c6:8b:65:ae:0e:fc:9a:46:77:16:e0:e2:3d:1d:20:3c:e5: d5:e0:b8:03:41:4f:e7:69:bf:e0:4c:dd:cc:c4:51:b1:da:2f: ad:58:e1:ed:c6:5b:04:ea:1e:af:9a:89:cd:be:60:3c:9a:30: 51:7f:99:5a:6b:5c:8f:5a:d4:b8:ce:b5:8b:31:74:70:b3:cc: 5c:04:90:d8:8d:b6:75:55:fb:c1:d8:e8:db:cf:3d:80:e4:8d: 2f:7e:b9:2b:a2:9e:9f:1e:6f:d0:4e:6e:f7:f0:a6:61:3b:9e: 9b:4b:78:6b:84:37:ad:93:19:0d:7f:46:5a:18:74:89:8b:a8: 1a:75:bf:db:df:25:43:4b:57:ab:a1:19:2e:7c:7b:b9:b5:50: ef:2c:1f:5c:18:8f:6c:66:83:61:eb:25:a3:21:81:2c:61:3b: ee:8c:18:1a:89:9a:29:0d:5c:5b:38:f3:71:3d:61:f0:3f:80: 33:90:f2:60:53:48:fb:7a:65:c9:5f:1f:a3:e8:75:42:42:f5: ad:db:60:29:c6:0f:3c:68:00:7a:2b:38:db:c7:17:b9:4e:d8: 90:d8:52:bc Certificate for CA for example.net in PEM format: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDzzCCAregAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUg QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTExMDIwNzIwMjExM1oYDzIxMTEwMTE0MjAyMTEzWjB9MQsw CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MSAwHgYDVQQLExdUZXN0IENBIGZvciBleGFtcGxl Lm5ldDEUMBIGA1UEAxMLZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IB DwAwggEKAoIBAQDURmVR+IQctZNHpRUUBuzcKneTEV51FNKIVL0WUN1BP34q5CbV ozOwXjcd5ZY3HBxpgKTv/SJ4187Tw96W+4cwiLwGFIBd86vXZD4HMdyXxdYZJrx9 C/jeXvkP3JpFDyiN3foVVtU1FyiA0vwf1pWVQg4sRzhTrf0OJP2jQzODUmVU2kjY 3IZC1SasHVJUCFLlP0p2lXeNxvIz8BiHyPxbVF3dZfFc9cj0NlSKtntv+FX42Njf qXtARUySD6qyLKGoZNWZIh4oeKDY5VFkPwMUqRJHYYTWsGkaa6Nu2MrOQ1CtV5Yr hxXZwhEDsILU8IC/3UT09jkKK+NN0/XnqjTlAgMBAAGjXTBbMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMB Af8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFHJwz2YeI6U4/G9Aj4aKr+C5b+nDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJVF fl8r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwICBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOC AQEAcHPAZZwvCTk51qRbled7QzS1ubJdduvvh+Altmir7vj3hcQhR7tsaGL/+IQe RFowTs6Xkcw9Q0qLtyUmCGPGcUrBlDWBZt4jneM33jGA7Vi3B6fqh9PM2htiyYLC F+YtIOSyaRTLBUM0b7UsYNhEQ/nm6T18VKK52R59Z7s/MjENwYh4qGc59dI+CPc4 hKaPwj4Azl+0yNqhtS/CiWCkOiu+mOBENK/sf3Mm8ZRbOQm5n5PCnXqWL4JmyE32 24cAjrwquVFzbMz/5TElsUrQmqnDZTUhiXY9OfiEQqYDDrXJL10YvJ25gvaD3Ssp bI0sjEfUfb7eMhOFkjK8YWJr5Q== -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 61]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Private key for CA for example.net: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA1EZlUfiEHLWTR6UVFAbs3Cp3kxFedRTSiFS9FlDdQT9+KuQm 1aMzsF43HeWWNxwcaYCk7/0ieNfO08PelvuHMIi8BhSAXfOr12Q+BzHcl8XWGSa8 fQv43l75D9yaRQ8ojd36FVbVNRcogNL8H9aVlUIOLEc4U639DiT9o0Mzg1JlVNpI 2NyGQtUmrB1SVAhS5T9KdpV3jcbyM/AYh8j8W1Rd3WXxXPXI9DZUirZ7b/hV+NjY 36l7QEVMkg+qsiyhqGTVmSIeKHig2OVRZD8DFKkSR2GE1rBpGmujbtjKzkNQrVeW K4cV2cIRA7CC1PCAv91E9PY5CivjTdP156o05QIDAQABAoIBADp/7/pIH7h9vcn3 z7hGNE50kaGBHuPrSh3yJG4a+O67XbzaRW2I3XzUaiIeHGixoY7duha9Txu4dbJc f2JijR4uAIs4aSv7NDdW09VNw3o8NkWWLEnV288Eo2Tgqc8wXz/BleL9nCJWcH4Y Jw1rKKwKmTdQpVBCWcPlI9UzduXQdZfBbrsL6+OZ+F3kbvUwYAVhhUuBS9sf4Xib 5GA2CDLPm433giOS3yr9KigpcLvbhAhMiPTXJ6i65m9xGGCcjhxP/drOH0cNczRD yW0FCbaNRJUg9kEVu+n3uG1aVfOnU7RqcblFXgO7ea7G+mfp3Cfm744kvFEXz04k 8WLW6gECgYEA9lK9mKhMUeB1+xPJB4Za5QvrFc7nLt8ee7/aTNcyMI0l3uXyPDPj TNEfgaRobptmwd2HVtXjlQ54fE+pE+qS8dOORh2VFoWi91zI4C8WnM/6j5P+QiXY tcZDPF22bmsSW7uaQyaOhUfIMhzox1BbUH5q5YrcA5DmmQtaxcIZ+IECgYEA3J07 6DamIgy0eJO2GKHU/Hy8RvQZgauzCtmqmLQrWZeOmx9hORe1a71QU5F6Y3HQRcTD RDDdJua9Y8BJ0WTkasbRgxjmHQlf4pUdT6ycfWgISbcCNFTosgPH+/OZPEh4DKlO rbldUzHPuZdo2Q72KtSPMk+ikny2lCZ9cm2mKmUCgYEAsGoX4fJ/HpDMzrKf4qTG Co8bojXZ+wbPVT/Vf/0LtBwTCG3VrGpZG5YWo4n1RWpFEQmwuW9cnE+N2TJQXLQ+ 47Vpiyv6r/OsAM9SCsWOw2ZtBFGw4v0qFR3W37AaTUCgGFTnKbq+jhQX/FQaH02c 6KxxsM5fvqoTjX7FVycp5IECgYA4Tq1WpHQcpq99Qv4sJUnuM4v+dBj6fq9Q6qNf HEUgNc2BDC5NWx7D4+rXmX7qWMc2t3S7N9mKL0RRbGeq2RxvoFUjJ7y71oOxmiuE BWNfoqjS37HhV3aY0Nw/EzqeJ0T0vlXFg1Utgb4p+VoaZHYyElSGG8s7pjcXcwd7 qD7L/QKBgQCeDLKx5T1d/EqwW8KNK5qD/5lG/T0zu3MCDlzCjfs2BHMasv5RALd+ unMMANDElPHOFs7fSmCfspN8Y7+W15/k9WugpwQfST2Y8dSRVdPFp1FRt8u25yX2 mdRbU3vJSiAqPEEpKpBolXPxLOeLGvoTHFWSazgmCPIKKxq0wL+0+w== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 62]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Robert's certificate: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEJjCCAw6gAwIBAgIJAJajhBdO74pTMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMH0xCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHEwhTYW4gSm9zZTEO MAwGA1UEChMFc2lwaXQxIDAeBgNVBAsTF1Rlc3QgQ0EgZm9yIGV4YW1wbGUubmV0 MRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLm5ldDAgFw0xMTAyMDcyMDIxMTNaGA8yMTExMDEx NDIwMjExM1owVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExETAP BgNVBAcTCFNhbiBKb3NlMQ4wDAYDVQQKEwVzaXBpdDEPMA0GA1UEAxMGcm9iZXJ0 MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA09wUaWtxCSwLD52VCMFk IGbvn5wwBjA56xQW2hnMQU2xz/hTW6UNduyXuhYQn+1XtfttS5+P0J8OFac+iMTk 7zXRY5EgaBj0jju0DwM+oADWwybnV44hkqN6LSFESNsBuVTo3Nbj0bPySyYPP9SZ Y+R+FAqycxxfO0E26ZpwvvdPCGtK20QC6LtQZiyYlEWefgEOncOpA7coFSjDzaKt qwf2/2n07Lp/S72bKIwNh+Jm0SQ05Xe+ifHJdkw3NDq82Zw29ShgASlc9B56FRk0 gRzPGgZcD/mBZ9xQCeKo152fNW7/pqiAdGz4oQrzuyu2UYwhvAZyWdCVQtMCLM75 IwIDAQABo4HNMIHKMFEGA1UdEQRKMEiGFnNpcDpyb2JlcnRAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXSG FWltOnJvYmVydEBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYXcHJlczpyb2JlcnRAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQw CQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpkK9Yg1rv+5n1Me8CT8LOhKrGc4wHwYDVR0j BBgwFoAUcnDPZh4jpTj8b0CPhoqv4Llv6cMwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgXgMB0GA1UdJQQW MBQGCCsGAQUFBwMEBggrBgEFBQcDFDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAJZnqGh6W bU6xnFpDd+o6p6G3Itu51JoeF/cTLrLKgN3JpdthQcaLZa4O/JpGdxbg4j0dIDzl 1eC4A0FP52m/4EzdzMRRsdovrVjh7cZbBOoer5qJzb5gPJowUX+ZWmtcj1rUuM61 izF0cLPMXASQ2I22dVX7wdjo2889gOSNL365K6Kenx5v0E5u9/CmYTuem0t4a4Q3 rZMZDX9GWhh0iYuoGnW/298lQ0tXq6EZLnx7ubVQ7ywfXBiPbGaDYesloyGBLGE7 7owYGomaKQ1cWzjzcT1h8D+AM5DyYFNI+3plyV8fo+h1QkL1rdtgKcYPPGgAeis4 28cXuU7YkNhSvA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 63]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 Robert's private key: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA09wUaWtxCSwLD52VCMFkIGbvn5wwBjA56xQW2hnMQU2xz/hT W6UNduyXuhYQn+1XtfttS5+P0J8OFac+iMTk7zXRY5EgaBj0jju0DwM+oADWwybn V44hkqN6LSFESNsBuVTo3Nbj0bPySyYPP9SZY+R+FAqycxxfO0E26ZpwvvdPCGtK 20QC6LtQZiyYlEWefgEOncOpA7coFSjDzaKtqwf2/2n07Lp/S72bKIwNh+Jm0SQ0 5Xe+ifHJdkw3NDq82Zw29ShgASlc9B56FRk0gRzPGgZcD/mBZ9xQCeKo152fNW7/ pqiAdGz4oQrzuyu2UYwhvAZyWdCVQtMCLM75IwIDAQABAoIBAAv+Q3GMUYPRaHbj 1tH+EKr86MfCUb2n8T9rjbefCj8QJOa/CgkAGPkIf7ZbFWnYR8TXjOJhEAUhW+zB 4PphGwynoUjfqFP8RavfmVvYNS1dnsrBYwtD0oa4lmwDnBf7vec99Ui7KX5vj2HN r8NPR7et8a00xdFaY9G46WDkC0nkH8AqMMymY/Vu2KpH0f01hTpFLmxS7We+d3Uq mva15GUc8+EL079uphokchr4E0036Ce4luCnqQfOUAKcXCMYK27lG5uue620IXLE CqeevZPEn8eqWhSNGl981CF15AEb0tApMcMwrfcbpnQMHQuyQHm2XVewgF0gQGLn UA0i6NECgYEA9TrFg3Kuw1Vfi+kztX6IMjW07YgN443NtB/9+sXKoc0Iz6LoPbOT VHSVqHHpjicicBUyUa77Kr61HAv7AV0s2FRHAb3M7wOVYGkT52+12o4FH6EMU42G ISAcsS4vCfHhYq1T0hC91bIY1XXxuBrpo0yb1RkEaSALHN6arAEgWccCgYEA3Sod gEcahQEnu5P8UY5j9yFaBRqVxdQKWnO2trkfLkyVgtvn7ES31EGojVHg23nr5IsK IpwFgBiQvEGUgV3dR0Jc5sZTETOweWBLebC/CtZfnhBcCNx8jwX5m/CtTzMHuxVs VJ1WpUDn+K7+G8KIK0+Kp5QdOCxXptHRLkGPBcUCgYAVgCulFL8B3VBdQfsIpKlo TZEpak5dbydj7ZIlFIZpnUJyggP+tOnr87TTafliP0gjr5gT1VWsL8BNTzeYrQSr iugW3P9EzXmhVFUsa3z0RpNobIRaJwRljx0046m4I37xWeUJe/JI9C59OLQSwjlN 2f+ntWPPm8GdrF6/SfH+LQKBgQCyDaf2kEf/cHCmiXuHxVUhrs4kccTGofE75RDi hqNdyPZNhfFvu9srnTivnY2j5MJPGsksF+Qtvpk3lqySghkVt43HlT9nB/A5p5bb /7muZexQ+ua9k5UMKElOjDNbIcBFk/fFH26UWG7pPSkC/FhYVg9Q3uOvR7PBcAYy cUFN6QKBgBw2k5SDvun41wNV4wxGEli9ia+i4lzg8pwJ1DUxnOcDvlDGzAzCNtW9 wPoR+jvhK6V6X1mI0tqqcYZ07pC3CJBEtAckHj2Ik+ZAEjQMf+eH62Rcv6Sbozq0 5dFCBZwzIe2IQomg3J8+OyILSs/uzFkjGjloJIrP+OtPKSrfR+/Y -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Appendix C. Message Dumps This section contains a base64-encoded, gzipped, compressed tar file of various Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) messages used in this document. Saving the data in a file foo.tgz.b64 then running a command like "openssl base64 -d -in foo.tgz.b64 | tar xfz -" would recover the CMS messages and allow them to be used as test vectors. -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- H4sIAIpaUE0CA+ybeUATxx7HCSCIHIpoqSIQvFECu5tsDhAEDATQhCsQExTZ JBtIyGUSIEREREU8i1ZRqVYERVHUCqKiUBWP1vusXCJeeIv3LfpCaRUpSF8f tJXH/JPdmd3fTjYz8/n+fr8JT6LEKSVCCYqTKCMd+YhKp/0LAABEAgHb8Eki wp98NhSIQACxIAhDBACGIRDCAiCBQCTqYAGdv6HEKFWIQtsVrkKISD9zXVvt jd8F++HzCyl0r+BgD5oXVimUO0fHSITRMndUjUjkYtRRiqqwwb4BTpAjYNoj VIg4/37mxBwTgAUp2iNHyBFyBmEAAF24CkTKi3LVUKJoBO5YHJ9MggkaHAUi CxASgSvAc3kwgQDgQBzu9zYXhVymULnCAImgfQAdUeO8ZYo4RMFXOmNJ2hqm zBk7quV+uZn28FbIJL+1C8QxAkH8h3aeTOLmokIiXXkIWSAgEHimPcYgYjHO l+qMZYui49gsdpw/ky9mM33V2mOAwWTDdCpPQ6eFSugsuppOjYbZIraj9rZg Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 64]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 dLIzlkwg4bG/vSfTHh48HipXOWMlMWKVUI4oVE5KYaQU5TtgVaha5SQXI0Kp AxaRy8VCHqISyqRO8miekoRrmGOf1iv5cocmZhCxClVItU2xqPbJMqkKlapw zHg5+sdnuXBlMVI+ooh3JQkAIoULAhRAwKMIINBForUujnRVRiGgi1whU8l4 MrHrwD92p8EQoopRoAM/PmwcKo1URWlffsPbN+2BwzW33rxfH79xkxbtOFAK UAXOS8qT8YXSSGcsVyjV9rXBpA8qFsvs/ozpz/TYRYpIUNdfFy1HOUn58U6q UCmXKYUN92gNqFQIL0qirXeJQqR8sbYnrgp0coxQoX1/AqEYbc3KZ78AkIw5 b2A0IsUn5YUpxlA3MxlzSFu1XxeDAY0AQ4NuI830dPsDxh8vwYDJmCztJd9r LwGmAnLQGDAy0AvRN7DQDQkGLQDzhpPuJr8OUaFAppAKEdAc6NlQa2jSPRiR Yv1kShQ0A0waqkx7mHTTjnihCrQHhjVUGJtggxvOsUxUqcKOQRUqoaDhtaFY jxhVlEwhVMXrGumkZ8+0ZDyYS//YQ9MPPcRguunoJ2N0VHQ7yoWrVx0AzsZi RsQC4fra+ID+26b6nduvt7rf1KzYZQUngRPcselYuGo/vwK/OP3EcL3lUgeT 5wu+dX+cWmm/2bjU7NU50VKHeGmpK/cGM9cqT1D11U6qWM9q8sq6I/fo3247 9cwy/tDPu53Wi8dePMXNftLfavB1d8Eo/9kpe41EmjERI9+Wu45kWR6brjci VDg9+bX60llnp9fZh+7Mu2VCtCq+WG8137EnZmvFFX0zRsCSmISSCuPqja+J 1+5dXwd7/5i1zHrzbirT+f6Syli/wN1rp2q4e0c4PZ7AeXf0RtHFiXeGPoYt +2FPLktnKFYq6m2j9osmpHg+vv9Yjo77iXoooaVBicOZ9tDp3EWCKpVIJIpT iZU4BaqUd4QEaIP/AIEENOM/DAH4Lv7/HeU3pGMhbZ/9xzbn/LjgP8l5HokM IwCJhFAQMgEGuS1zHk/+SHVlC1h3hgEi2MhugA+QYBgEmoJe2QLpG3vVeA+I UPAEPMBtwnt/JkdCp3pB/iyGlvehIgY1WsPWeEbRWUFiOjWEwKB6qTmSEAKH GfiB91oT5I+8bw7HX9HYeZaFJvO/g9R/2/Of9Ef9D+Hhrvn/N+v/Vmdka15A B6wOrXsBra8X//gS8U+4BC1J79+XKGJTqd3G7y+VodExOF6HRgH+e/8fJgJd 878z+P8CroDHhfFkMiSABDwC2Ir/T+gQ/59PQUEKD0aaTHYG1VviT/OF2CJe PFvjAdJpgXEMUWA8ncUmMCSh0QzIW0RniiUMmu8X4f8L8ESUC8E8MsCDiBCR 0L7+f3Pr7ej/t2W6y/9vf/8/8HP+v9NPV5eaR6TYVRfWLfhu+1lh9PEH1Yl7 3jz7fs3BmbkOBuG3w2pqtwGq9cbhC6OdH96zemPjG4apsSHkbVgcoUcehTFK OWy7cOCpAU/puqGxdgMgZPODtBLNnvfvJ/vNw+utn/rowmayYapSsrV8Dykr oeeNqsQnR8adKxop2bOKs3FLYdEZeeaIqUusqmMYP5nVzdYPybwytua2/eLE H1KtuBdqepaMG+w9Fn8y8krfg0ZDhjr1PcK2W385634htWhFRL3aEne7xP2b u4b1ewyC5s1GzZ/Pt/LaHLkhZNaNd2YF9k604RuOKkWaQTtOVP5UOGTKnAvB MxPUO5e9HvBypdFIe7tcIT/uSkuD8v/A/2/kfyP7USlPES9Xofx2VgBt8R/C k5rxn6it6uJ/J+A/SsaDFDJERPB8PpEIEFvhP9wh/Af5EB8gkD7hv8gXr5X7 AIMZDdI1gQCbFaLVAtEgg+YXxWCFxPmz6ABd5B3F0PA+8B8PEYF/iv//A9L+ FNHagm6DLZfG1UGlvcQVlcaiYpkc5eO0SwTyKYklf1QSMBFupKYu+BGJepnJ ugO1VTa6GB0tHVdo6bhUe/hP0zGoBSjuo1ZeP9XrMm7+knrDUIfaOajutiR+ 1V3a4n2njLBOoePccHmXneaWvBeZ59noD3vlpzFMfBpaqZd229hH1D1sCMOD o7vxgaEUfRl33svcUzD95IYZc0PDjqzPej56ZblXwcnKhcJdgUOTVdhizi77 bUfNr48KjZ0gsN+jCs1aBizgpe9Q7xy1et+m11+dHXyROEVgrS80Of1457vt tW/N3Q5gfpyvd9ku0U6j/7Vmh5GqICyaIApP8JwVysod4jd9p/skL/eTD49W SZ2KU4vU5iWxo75POZTx3bDM5IlOg3fnw7OKlDdWzJb1DU3LNfd5GRYb/dB6 q+y8dkzcwoTffGNyxsvum+OjgIQmUgawNjCKSPHBoHr6GF39XrzBx9SKM6eD a4oSrqXTD71KCoistLQITlMeYfRj+XKQKK/oVeHiy2nwiITFQZutH/DpQeqc vbIj9dH1R+Zd35uQs2ZJfI11vQnV+q7sweLwNN7g0irbvoHyN18Pm7tpV/GI rJudnr7/Lv531A6Atv1/uLn/D+DBLv53Av5rf08eAIJ8PAUPCAQAoRX+4zuE /xREO6i4hE/9fzaBzvJV+7NC8P5MD5AhiobpLHocR8KOY0C+eAbkpWEwfWF/ Ju+L8P/xRATSyis+Hw8QBGSY3E7+P6HR/29uvR39/7ZM/3v9//JP/f8j2qpD Df5/g3Rp9K676TSPAKzVXpT5r4gANOljVwygpRhA84HZyWMATfnfMMN+DwK0 pxBog/94EoRv7v8TiV3x/87AfxKfCwoIJBIIk0ABv9X4P7Fj+E+GIJBEIjXh Px3yBTlMLzydGtWw/w/mMDlCjihKxKD6SdgSLzWHqm1j8sX+tI/7/2ACgfJv Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 65]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 5T+fCBJhlEQgg1wuiof57cJ/kADDjQKgufkOCxh0dJzjC4lBMFqAcvKdjFmr L0ziPSuQYdfIDmX9vIJ7ro5zN3koOb1nZXDiqzQj2PxgRPfvt3692MPesDw3 H0mRFak32LoZXSW5mZVmmHEWzc6t9900ZeP9gYbHTscbvXB5Yuk6d7DnTupR zS97Jtkejg3IeTE3/yvh5Ko6cXzQpnFhIJ9SYbN5dIplpR4F7337BfKy5v0I zDy7YUxd/zmPbLdcnxc0VVBa+1w1Y0BGVC/r8WGZ5CdzcoQFugTSlKP97Yfd t2TaztDc2oZRG848pK4SbVjCjb1sEjbbgDNGrCPKC/ZZ914Usqo/bXj/+OUX PHUP6r6ca1RTeHPQnKiHZy3STN8T7+wvs31XNpGZbuJJ+1wIYgGsMP1lVUJ3 sWn+UVD3lmNSwPnbj/Z7mvZ4ek1i49fPd4PGduPzY/cLy0eNLY9VYZLKAiTB K7aM74m3GMg/XX3D/RnboCgzWqWesPS0xb7C07Dt2bQhY0r5C48vzDPpttsi gMka8temQZdYbY/tqp8Vq0rvxIKvIg7nF71/PmnMyyzd0mn6eVzNU+dvH2w4 c8XBuLdN0YSMHBfhvHnjYjg78aylKLrrTOlyN1qF+PRFl1SrGZNnmU+Wjk05 G+saWZdicn8BeVBe0g/IrbKKiVnCUFr2IltxryU+mccj+kgCvMfeHSVh95o2 ab7u01UQ5f4O5wr9Q1XXhsfVDPUoM4ms3lTHcGaUbinanG12t/ervoYlR5Kr h0tLLdPDfYcrZxUnxkwetmuDXt7+3WXblV6S9L2mPfpaTl2+Zxt31HGR5UNe 6rSg8xWj7tNcsne/vbDVlTToHJmT3+v2pl599bIm6Cfu3mzn8F4Ve2XiNp9J uum46AWJRNo1C3J9SyPzv1arHZv5+bP5H2Lz+A8IduV/OoP+40EkIoSHuDAB 5PNhiNSK/gM7RP+REAjFAxDcVP9R2fFa7RflT/XAM1heEEfk1bAPJM6fyRHT RV5qBssX4rAC4zg0elf+5/8r/9OS9irq/Q20ye8qef/lYGHqhSE33fW2XYq3 y741iGN17M34p8t81v/80LXGI5uTBsmTX/9wqXxJgtgR8w5fwj1m6D/+kuzO 6Afb33grxmekZs4qHlT2s5Fx2gK/SaPTE/LOX+13S3eH2RPTx4v8InPrAkXL ylIk99TSw5dnJFzRseW4syNMyu5mv9EvOLLubvz9gtCXzwPzw8dfLbccjs/Z Bc836zMt7fQUPR2x63T7Z2W1eTHhlx9WX3PLN1h2wTf3GLn7o5ndnu0rDsk5 f6S8fm2e++pVgWEvnA8cOOF8U2LX7XRAjH+f8rjYwxY5Pr2nDDk+cKKyxP16 X90sit+xipDua+sYc8N3H/TzXvk57XUUPlpio55RgRXTilZfXJSaFGC1pfdB s5D0TSuOD5hWuHzt3rPl05bsKSR3Yz8mrzlhH2NpzbMy/gGXajBNnfSE43YR 3jvQRg9iL6+snz6pwoPn/HV94cw+GG9j97uh9im0eWfqutI/HV8+ZH5wcVGI ChcpU+Ea17N2VAJt7f8Ggeb5HyIJALr4/3eUdgnod02jL3/+d9i/P/5K/hdP AqGu+d8J9D8eoUAQl8jnAQJAIMC3ov/xlA7R/6iAyEX4MNo0/wsxhByRL8AQ BYkY1ECAzmSDDKr2mMWQ0GkhIJ3qAdGpQVFsyZex/xvPhUEYBSGQS9C+ahBs 5/xvM+vtmf9tw3RXSO0fCKl1/Qf8jwOzk+d/Ozbz+2fzv1Dz+B9M6Mr/dgb+ U0gIRERhCpcEESEuvrX9X1CH8B9PoghgLvRJ/lfEjqNr+CI2k41ns4Ki2ZpI DV0UAtBpvgS6hgcxRNEgW+MnZmi8voj8L0rmC4goyENhPoiS2+n/Xx/zv83N d+V///4YpK+5sXlQ7qprG9+kHLvb+/jC9FWz3JLOJhz8buf0sYWvLZJEonyC onxfckRlwZiXgfOhedWnYyUrvZX7qZm93n+1doZqlp1q6uV6z33LdJKzkqYP XJmVbNpj1sOoBxllEuvBI3PDCzIy3dZXWA8o8zwmWzddMGi4TsIK0Q690YnP fe4s8oUf1bszJ+a9mHln9LAx9Zeu9qrmHYT9LHjGEtOMXzYpKML56DjqwWww Ir5oQ/YavXqPIb1rn7yknZzvWTE0bh1ra/+le7utu017fGbLRYtEqxkT5h+0 BYvZN+qlGT8sujc5Z9pwt0FW7lf3RZwKD0vpbpC8fWeVTnWeM2XY1YT0zXNv H9hlEP65IGTqdxYx6wV9Dpw6cfj92UUTM5MCkoyzd7LmbH8q32LdJxeufmUt sPcOcre44uI3qPbepldwzo61P+7TDoV+BykDp/YaZ/o0XV9tPouReO1AcX5N iGX8pMeM2iGeJC/KxOeVrAyG8V+bBl1itcPFqjQwb7Dj7oQ1dUkbQorP8yfW 2htNyt+6Ubbo7LJ4KGzr0XdrlG9rWYzDLpHwxutqG/a3dZG8OBtNcrHN0J6U GJOcoYsxop0TH+5zCPR+s55IvcY/bH7MOLr+iSSh3m2L46I96u+fWq3BRhVd OnfN5O2LPhkO/E3DgkqC7g1L7VNSdYD50x2fKsPb3zn+/CM3K3ZGMOmW7tgz KbdrHEu+pdxzwgRnTutflAO+vbloQNVAv8gZS/IZw3NPXPLTF11OSZsyflKV Jj09cwhSOj5reG1B/iNJoMFKNWJa7rx+dXbhbOMk89Lc/7RvxzQMAgEARRkw Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 66]
RFC 6216 SIP Secure Call Flows April 2011 wNSEMOLlFDBVBGMnFhJsYAABZ4LuJUwkJZCgoQQDdcB7Gv768/VRHG01vNNt emZ7DOdvjHOoX11ffrLl2/wL8wbDIgAAAAAAAAAAAJBchjiJbgB4AAA= -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- Authors' Addresses Cullen Jennings Cisco Systems 170 West Tasman Drive Mailstop SJC-21/2 San Jose, CA 95134 USA Phone: +1 408 421 9990 EMail: fluffy@cisco.com Kumiko Ono Columbia University 1214 Amsterdam Avenue MC 0401 New York, NY 10027 USA EMail: kumiko@cs.columbia.edu Robert Sparks Tekelec 17210 Campbell Road Suite 250 Dallas, TX 75252 USA EMail: Robert.Sparks@tekelec.com Brian Hibbard (editor) Tekelec 17210 Campbell Road Suite 250 Dallas, TX 75252 USA EMail: Brian.Hibbard@tekelec.com Jennings, et al. Informational [Page 67]