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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Dugal Request for Comments: 6192 Juniper Networks Category: Informational C. Pignataro ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Dunn Cisco Systems March 2011 Protecting the Router Control Plane Abstract This memo provides a method for protecting a router's control plane from undesired or malicious traffic. In this approach, all legitimate router control plane traffic is identified. Once legitimate traffic has been identified, a filter is deployed in the router's forwarding plane. That filter prevents traffic not specifically identified as legitimate from reaching the router's control plane, or rate-limits such traffic to an acceptable level. Note that the filters described in this memo are applied only to traffic that is destined for the router, and not to all traffic that is passing through the router. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6192. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................2 2. Applicability Statement .........................................4 3. Method ..........................................................4 3.1. Legitimate Traffic .........................................5 3.2. Filter Design ..............................................6 3.3. Design Trade-Offs ..........................................7 3.4. Additional Protection Considerations ......................10 4. Security Considerations ........................................10 5. Acknowledgements ...............................................11 6. Informative References .........................................12 Appendix A. Configuration Examples ................................13 A.1. Cisco Configuration .......................................13 A.2. Juniper Configuration .....................................17 1. Introduction Modern router architecture design maintains a strict separation of forwarding and router control plane hardware and software. The router control plane supports routing and management functions. It is generally described as the router architecture hardware and software components for handling packets destined to the device itself as well as building and sending packets originated locally on the device. The forwarding plane is typically described as the router architecture hardware and software components responsible for receiving a packet on an incoming interface, performing a lookup to identify the packet's IP next hop and determine the best outgoing interface towards the destination, and forwarding the packet out through the appropriate outgoing interface. Visually, this architecture can be represented as the router's control plane hardware sitting on top of, and interfacing with, the forwarding plane hardware with interfaces connecting to other network devices. See Figure 1. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 +----------------+ | Router Control | | Plane | +------+ +-------+ | | Router Control Plane Protection | | +------+ +-------+ | Forwarding | Interface X ==[ Plane ]== Interface Y +----------------+ Figure 1: Router Control Plane Protection Typically, forwarding plane functionality is realized in high- performance Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) that are capable of handling very high packet rates. By contrast, the router control plane is generally realized in software on general-purpose processors. While software instructions run on both planes, the router control plane hardware is usually not optimized for high-speed packet handling. Given their differences in packet-handling capabilities, the router's control plane hardware is more susceptible to being overwhelmed by a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack than the forwarding plane's ASICs. It is imperative that the router control plane remain stable regardless of traffic load to and from the device because the router control plane is what drives the programming of the forwarding plane. The router control plane also processes traffic destined to the router, and because of the wider range of functionality is more susceptible to security vulnerabilities and a more likely target for a DoS attack than the forwarding plane. It is advisable to protect the router control plane by implementing mechanisms to filter completely or rate-limit traffic not required at the control plane level (i.e., unwanted traffic). "Router control plane protection" is the concept of filtering or rate-limiting unwanted traffic that would be diverted from the forwarding plane up to the router control plane. The closer the filters and rate limiters are to the forwarding plane and line-rate hardware, the more effective the protection is and the more resistant the system is to DoS attacks. This memo demonstrates one example of how to deploy a policy filter that satisfies a set of sample traffic-matching, filtering, and rate-limiting criteria. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 Note that the filters described in this memo are applied only to traffic that is destined for the router, and not to all traffic that is passing through the router. 2. Applicability Statement The method described in Section 3 and depicted in Figure 1 illustrates how to protect the router control plane from unwanted traffic. Recognizing that deployment scenarios will vary, the exact implementation is not generally applicable in all situations. The categorization of legitimate router control plane traffic is critically important in a successful implementation. The examples given in this memo are simplified and minimalistic, designed to illustrate the concept of protecting the router's control plane. From them, operators can extrapolate specifics based on their unique configuration and environment. This document is about semantics, and Appendix A exemplifies syntax. For additional router vendor implementations, or other converged devices, the syntax should be translated to the respective language in a manner that preserves the semantics. Additionally, the need to provide the router control plane with isolation, stability, and protection against rogue packets has been incorporated into router designs for some time. Consequently, there may be other vendor or implementation specific router control plane protection mechanisms that are active by default or always active. Those approaches may apply in conjunction with, or in addition to, the method described in Section 3 and illustrated in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Those implementations should be considered as part of an overall traffic management plan but are outside the scope of this document. This method is applicable for IPv4 as well as IPv6 address families, and the legitimate traffic example in Section 3.1 provides examples for both. 3. Method In this memo, the authors demonstrate how a filter protecting the router control plane can be deployed. In Section 3.1, a sample router is introduced, and all traffic that its control plane must process is identified. In Section 3.2, filter design concepts are discussed. Cisco (Cisco IOS software) and Juniper (JUNOS) implementations are provided in Appendices A.1 and A.2, respectively. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 3.1. Legitimate Traffic In this example, the router control plane must process traffic (i.e., traffic destined to the router and not through the router) per the following criteria: o Drop all IP packets that are fragments (see Section 3.3) o Permit ICMP and ICMPv6 traffic from any source, rate-limited to 500 kbps for each category o Permit OSPF traffic from routers within subnet 192.0.2.0/24 and OSPFv3 traffic from IPv6 Link-Local unicast addresses (fe80::/10) o Permit internal BGP (iBGP) traffic from routers within subnets 192.0.2.0/24 and 2001:db8:1::/48 o Permit external BGP (eBGP) traffic from eBGP peers 198.51.100.25, 198.51.100.27, 198.51.100.29, and 198.51.100.31; and IPv6 peers 2001:db8:100::25, 2001:db8:100::27, 2001:db8:100::29, and 2001:db8:100::31 o Permit DNS traffic from DNS servers within subnet 198.51.100.0/30 and 2001:db8:100:1::/64 o Permit NTP traffic from NTP servers within subnet 198.51.100.4/30 and 2001:db8:100:2::/64 o Permit Secure SHell (SSH) traffic from network management stations within subnet 198.51.100.128/25 and 2001:db8:100:3::/64 o Permit Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) traffic from network management stations within subnet 198.51.100.128/25 and 2001:db8:100:3::/64 o Permit RADIUS authentication and accounting replies from RADIUS servers 198.51.100.9, 198.51.100.10, 2001:db8:100::9, and 2001:db8:100::10 that are listening on UDP ports 1812 and 1813 (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) RADIUS ports). Note that this does not accommodate a server using the original UDP ports of 1645 and 1646 Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 o Permit all other IPv4 and IPv6 traffic that was not explicitly matched in a class above, rate-limited to 500 kbps, and drop above that rate for each category o Permit non-IP traffic (e.g., Connectionless Network Service (CLNS), Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX), PPP Link Control Protocol (LCP), etc.), rate-limited to 250 kbps, and drop all remaining traffic above that rate The characteristics of legitimate traffic will vary from network to network. To illustrate this, a router implementing the DHCP relay function can rate-limit inbound DHCP traffic from clients and restrict traffic from servers to a list of known DHCP servers. The list of criteria above is provided for example only. 3.2. Filter Design A filter is installed on the forwarding plane. This filter counts and applies the actions to the categories of traffic described in Section 3.1. Because the filter is enforced in the forwarding plane, it prevents traffic from consuming bandwidth on the interface that connects the forwarding plane to the router control plane. The counters serve as an important forensic tool for the analysis of potential attacks, and as an invaluable debugging and troubleshooting aid. By adjusting the granularity and order of the filters, more granular forensics can be performed (i.e., create a filter that matches only traffic allowed from a group of IP addresses for a given protocol followed by a filter that denies all traffic for that protocol). This would allow for counters to be monitored for the allowed protocol filter, as well as any traffic matching the specific protocol that didn't originate from the explicitly allowed hosts. In addition to the filters, rate limiters for certain classes of traffic are also installed in the forwarding plane as defined in Section 3.1. These rate limiters help further control the traffic that will reach the router control plane for each filtered class as well as all traffic not matching an explicit class. The actual rates selected for various classes are network deployment specific; analysis of the rates required for stability should be done periodically. It is important to note that the most significant factor to consider regarding the traffic profile going to the router control plane is the packets per second (pps) rate. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to determine the maximum pps rate that could be generated from a given set of packet size and bandwidth usage scenarios. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 Syntactically, these filters explicitly define "allowed" traffic (including IP addresses, protocols, and ports), define acceptable actions for these acceptable traffic profiles (e.g., rate-limit or simply permit the traffic), and then discard all traffic destined to the router control plane that is not within the specifications of the policy definition. In an actual production environment, predicting a complete and exhaustive list of traffic necessary to reach the router's control plane for day-to-day operation may not be as obvious as the example described herein. One recommended method to gauge this set of traffic is to allow all traffic initially, and audit the traffic that reaches the router control plane before applying any explicit filters or rate limits. See Section 3.3 below for more discussion of this topic. The filter design provided in this document is intentionally limited to attachment at the local router in question (e.g., a "service- policy" attached to the "control-plane" in Cisco IOS, or a firewall filter attached to the "lo0" interface in JUNOS). While virtually all production environments utilize and rely heavily upon edge protection or interface filtering, these methods of router protection are beyond the intended scope of this document. Additionally, the protocols themselves that are allowed to reach the router control plane (e.g., OSPF, RSVP, TCP, SNMP, DNS, NTP, and inherently, SSH, TLS, ESP, etc.) may have cryptographic security methods applied to them, and the method of router control plane protection provided herein is not a replacement for those cryptographic methods. 3.3. Design Trade-Offs In designing the protection method, there are two independent parts to consider: the classification of traffic (i.e., which traffic is matched by the filters), and the policy actions taken on the classified traffic (i.e., drop, permit, rate-limit, etc.). There are different levels of granularity utilized for traffic classification. For example, allowing all traffic from specific source IP addresses versus allowing only a specific set of protocols from those specific source IP addresses will each affect a different subset of traffic. Similarly, the policy actions taken on the classified traffic have degrees of impact that may not become immediately obvious. For example, discarding all ICMP traffic will have a negative impact on the operational use of ICMP tools such as ping or traceroute to debug network issues or to test deployment of a new circuit. Expanding on this, in a real production network, an astute operator could define Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 varying rate limits for ICMP such that internal traffic is granted uninhibited access to the router control plane, while traffic from external addresses is rate-limited. Operators should pay special attention to the new functionality and roles that ICMPv6 has in the overall operation of IPv6 when designing the rate-limit policies. Example functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND) and Multicast Listener Discovery version 2 (MLDv2). It is important to note that both classification and policy action decisions are accompanied by respective trade-offs. Two examples of these trade-off decisions are operational complexity at the expense of policy and statistics-gathering detail, and tighter protection at the expense of network supportability and troubleshooting ability. Two types of traffic that need special consideration are IP fragments and IP optioned packets: o For network deployments where IP fragmentation is necessary, a blanket policy of dropping all fragments destined to the router control plane may not be feasible. However, many deployments allow network configurations such that the router control plane should never see a fragmented datagram. Since many attacks rely on IP fragmentation, the example policy included herein drops all fragments destined to the router control plane. o Similarly, some deployments may choose to drop all IP optioned packets. Others may need to loosen the constraint to allow for protocols that require IP optioned packets such as the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP). The design trade-off is that dropping all IP optioned packets protects the router from attacks that leverage malformed options, as well as attacks that rely on the slow-path processing (i.e., software processing path) of IP optioned packets. For network deployments where the protocols do not use IP options, the filter is simpler to design in that it can drop all packets with any IP option set. However, for networks utilizing protocols relying on IP options, the filter to identify the legitimate packets is more complex. If the filter is not designed correctly, it could result in the inadvertent blackholing of traffic for those protocols. This document does not include filter configurations for IP optioned packets; additional explanations regarding the filtering of packets based on the IP options they contain can be found in [IP-OPTIONS-FILTER]. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 The goal of the method for protecting the router control plane is to minimize the possibility for disruptions by reducing the vulnerable surface, which is inversely proportional to the granularity of the filter design. The finer the granularity of the filter design (e.g., filtering a more targeted subset of traffic from the rest of the policed traffic, or isolating valid source addresses into a different class or classes), the smaller the probability of disruption. In addition to the traffic that matches explicit classes, care should be taken on the policy decision that governs the handling of traffic that would fall through the classification. Typically, that traffic is referred to as traffic that gets matched in a default class. It may also be traffic that matches a blanket protocol specific class where previous classes that have more granular classification did not match all packets for that specific protocol. The ideal policy would have explicit classes to match only the traffic specifically required at the router control plane and would drop all other traffic that does not match a predefined class. As most vendor implementations permit all traffic hitting the default class, an explicit drop action would need to be configured in the policy such that the traffic hitting that default class would be dropped, versus being permitted and delivered to the router control plane. This approach requires rigorous traffic pattern identification such that a default drop policy does not break existing device functionality. The approach defined in this document allows the default traffic and rate-limits it as opposed to dropping it. This approach was chosen as a way to give the operator time to evaluate and characterize traffic in a production scenario prior to dropping all traffic not explicitly matched and permitted. However, it is highly recommended that after monitoring the traffic matching the default class, explicit classes be defined to catch the legitimate traffic. After all legitimate traffic has been identified and explicitly allowed, the default class should be configured to drop any remaining traffic. Additionally, the baselining and monitoring of traffic flows to the router's control plane are critical in determining both the rates and granularity of the policies being applied. It is also important to validate the existing policies and rules or update them as the network evolves and its traffic dynamics change. Some possible ways to achieve this include individual policy counters that can be exported or retrieved, for example via SNMP, and logging of filtering actions. Finally, the use of flow-based behavioral analysis or command-line interface (CLI) functions to identify what client/server functions a given router's control plane handles would be very useful during initial policy development phases, and certainly for ongoing forensic analysis. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 3.4. Additional Protection Considerations In addition to the design described in this document of defining "allowed" traffic (i.e., identifying traffic that the control plane must process) and limiting (e.g., rate-limiting or blocking) the rest, the router control plane protection method can be applied to thwart specific attacks. In particular, it can be used to protect against TCP SYN flooding attacks and other Denial-of-Service attacks that starve router control plane resources. 4. Security Considerations The filters described in this document leave the router susceptible to discovery from any host in the Internet. If network operators find this risk objectionable, they can reduce the exposure to discovery with ICMP by restricting the sub-networks from which ICMP Echo requests and potential traceroute packets (i.e., packets that would trigger an ICMP Time Exceeded reply) are accepted, and therefore to which sub-networks ICMP responses (ICMP Echo Reply and Time Exceeded) are sent. A similar concern exists for ICMPv6 traffic but on a broader level due to the additional functionalities implemented in ICMPv6. Filtering recommendations for ICMPv6 can be found in [RFC4890]. Moreover, different rate-limiting policies may be defined for internally (e.g., from the Network Operations Center (NOC)) versus externally sourced traffic. Note that this document is not targeted at the specifics of ICMP filtering or traffic filtering designed to prevent device discovery. The filters described in this document do not block unwanted traffic having spoofed source addresses that match a defined traffic profile as discussed in Section 3.1. Network operators can mitigate this risk by preventing source address spoofing with filters applied at the network edge. Refer to Section 5.3.8 of [RFC1812] for more information regarding source address validation. Other methods also exist for limiting exposure to packet spoofing, such as the Generalized Time to Live (TTL) Security Mechanism (GTSM) [RFC5082] and Ingress Filtering [RFC2827] [RFC3704]. The ICMP rate limiter specified for the filters described in this document protects the router from floods of ICMP traffic; see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 for details. However, during an ICMP flood, some legitimate ICMP traffic may be dropped. Because of this, when operators discover a flood of ICMP traffic, they are highly motivated to stop it at the source where the traffic is being originated. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 Additional considerations pertaining to the usage and handling of traffic that utilizes the IP Router Alert Options can be found in [RTR-ALERT-CONS], and additional IP options filtering explanations can be found in [IP-OPTIONS-FILTER]. The treatment of exception traffic in the forwarding plane and the generation of specific messages by the router control plane also require protection from a DoS attack. Specifically, the generation of ICMP Unreachable messages by the router control plane needs to be rate-limited, either implicitly within the router's architecture or explicitly through configuration. When possible, different ICMP Destination Unreachable codes (e.g., "fragmentation needed and DF set") or "Packet Too Big" messages can receive a different rate- limiting treatment. Continuous benchmarking of router-generated ICMP traffic should be done before applying rate limits such that sufficient headroom is included to prevent inadvertent Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery (PMTUD) blackhole scenarios during normal operation. It is also recommended to deploy explicit rate limiters where possible to improve troubleshooting and monitoring capability. The explicit rate limiters in a class allow for monitoring tools to detect and report when these rate limiters become active (i.e., when traffic is policed). This in turn serves as an indicator that either the normal traffic rates have increased or "out of policy" traffic rates have been detected. More thorough analysis of the traffic flows and rate-limited traffic is needed to identify which of these two cases triggered the rate limiters. For additional information regarding specific ICMP rate-limiting, see Section 4.3.2.8 of [RFC1812]. Additionally, the handling of TTL / Hop Limit expired traffic needs protection. This traffic is not necessarily addressed to the device, but it can get sent to the router control plane to process the TTL / Hop Limit expiration. For example, rate-limiting the TTL / Hop Limit expired traffic before sending the packets to the router control plane component that will generate the ICMP error, and distributing the sending of ICMP errors to Line Card CPUs, are protection mechanisms that mitigate attacks before they can negatively affect a rate-limited router control plane component. 5. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Ron Bonica for providing initial and ongoing review, suggestions, and valuable input. Pekka Savola, Warren Kumari, and Xu Chen provided very thorough and useful feedback that improved the document. Many thanks to John Kristoff, Christopher Morrow, and Donald Smith for a fruitful discussion around the operational and manageability aspects of router control plane protection techniques. The authors would also like to thank Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 Joel Jaeggli, Richard Graveman, Danny McPherson, Gregg Schudel, Eddie Parra, Seo Boon Ng, Manav Bhatia, German Martinez, Wen Zhang, Roni Even, Acee Lindem, Glen Zorn, Joe Abley, Ralph Droms, and Stewart Bryant for providing thorough review, useful suggestions, and valuable input. Assistance from Jim Bailey and Raphan Han in providing technical direction and sample configuration guidance on the IPv6 sections was also very much appreciated. Finally, the authors extend kudos to Andrew Yourtchenko for his review, comments, and willingness to present this document at IETF 78 (July 2010, Maastricht, The Netherlands) on behalf of the authors. 6. Informative References [IP-OPTIONS-FILTER] Gont, F. and S. Fouant, "IP Options Filtering Recommendations", Work in Progress, February 2010. [RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC 1812, June 1995. [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004. [RFC4890] Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890, May 2007. [RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C. Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 5082, October 2007. [RTR-ALERT-CONS] Le Faucheur, F., Ed., "IP Router Alert Considerations and Usage", Work in Progress, March 2011. Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 Appendix A. Configuration Examples The configurations provided below are syntactical representations of the semantics described in the document and should be treated as non-normative. A.1. Cisco Configuration Refer to the Control Plane Policing (CoPP) document in the Cisco IOS Software Feature Guides (available at <http://www.cisco.com/>) for more information on the syntax and options available when configuring Control Plane Policing. !Start: Protecting The Router Control Plane ! !Control Plane Policing (CoPP) Configuration ! !Access Control List Definitions ! ip access-list extended ICMP permit icmp any any ipv6 access-list ICMPv6 permit icmp any any ip access-list extended OSPF permit ospf 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 any ipv6 access-list OSPFv3 permit 89 FE80::/10 any ip access-list extended IBGP permit tcp 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 eq bgp any permit tcp 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq bgp ipv6 access-list IBGPv6 permit tcp 2001:DB8:1::/48 eq bgp any permit tcp 2001:DB8:1::/48 any eq bgp ip access-list extended EBGP permit tcp host 198.51.100.25 eq bgp any permit tcp host 198.51.100.25 any eq bgp permit tcp host 198.51.100.27 eq bgp any permit tcp host 198.51.100.27 any eq bgp permit tcp host 198.51.100.29 eq bgp any permit tcp host 198.51.100.29 any eq bgp permit tcp host 198.51.100.31 eq bgp any permit tcp host 198.51.100.31 any eq bgp Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 ipv6 access-list EBGPv6 permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::25 eq bgp any permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::25 any eq bgp permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::27 eq bgp any permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::27 any eq bgp permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::29 eq bgp any permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::29 any eq bgp permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::31 eq bgp any permit tcp host 2001:DB8:100::31 any eq bgp ip access-list extended DNS permit udp 198.51.100.0 0.0.0.252 eq domain any ipv6 access-list DNSv6 permit udp 2001:DB8:100:1::/64 eq domain any permit tcp 2001:DB8:100:1::/64 eq domain any ip access-list extended NTP permit udp 198.51.100.4 255.255.255.252 any eq ntp ipv6 access-list NTPv6 permit udp 2001:DB8:100:2::/64 any eq ntp ip access-list extended SSH permit tcp 198.51.100.128 0.0.0.128 any eq 22 ipv6 access-list SSHv6 permit tcp 2001:DB8:100:3::/64 any eq 22 ip access-list extended SNMP permit udp 198.51.100.128 0.0.0.128 any eq snmp ipv6 access-list SNMPv6 permit udp 2001:DB8:100:3::/64 any eq snmp ip access-list extended RADIUS permit udp host 198.51.100.9 eq 1812 any permit udp host 198.51.100.9 eq 1813 any permit udp host 198.51.100.10 eq 1812 any permit udp host 198.51.100.10 eq 1813 any ipv6 access-list RADIUSv6 permit udp host 2001:DB8:100::9 eq 1812 any permit udp host 2001:DB8:100::9 eq 1813 any permit udp host 2001:DB8:100::10 eq 1812 any permit udp host 2001:DB8:100::10 eq 1813 any ip access-list extended FRAGMENTS permit ip any any fragments ipv6 access-list FRAGMENTSv6 permit ipv6 any any fragments ip access-list extended ALLOTHERIP permit ip any any ipv6 access-list ALLOTHERIPv6 permit ipv6 any any Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 ! !Class Definitions ! class-map match-any ICMP match access-group name ICMP class-map match-any ICMPv6 match access-group name ICMPv6 class-map match-any OSPF match access-group name OSPF match access-group name OSPFv3 class-map match-any IBGP match access-group name IBGP match access-group name IBGPv6 class-map match-any EBGP match access-group name EBGP match access-group name EBGPv6 class-map match-any DNS match access-group name DNS match access-group name DNSv6 class-map match-any NTP match access-group name NTP match access-group name NTPv6 class-map match-any SSH match access-group name SSH match access-group name SSHv6 class-map match-any SNMP match access-group name SNMP match access-group name SNMPv6 class-map match-any RADIUS match access-group name RADIUS match access-group name RADIUSv6 class-map match-any FRAGMENTS match access-group name FRAGMENTS match access-group name FRAGMENTSv6 class-map match-any ALLOTHERIP match access-group name ALLOTHERIP class-map match-any ALLOTHERIPv6 match access-group name ALLOTHERIPv6 Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 ! !Policy Definition ! policy-map COPP class FRAGMENTS drop class ICMP police 500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop violate-action drop class ICMPv6 police 500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop violate-action drop class OSPF class IBGP class EBGP class DNS class NTP class SSH class SNMP class RADIUS class ALLOTHERIP police cir 500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop violate-action drop class ALLOTHERIPv6 police cir 500000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop violate-action drop class class-default police cir 250000 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop violate-action drop ! !Control Plane Configuration ! control-plane service-policy input COPP ! !End: Protecting The Router Control Plane Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 A.2. Juniper Configuration Refer to the Firewall Filter Configuration section of the Junos Software Policy Framework Configuration Guide (available at <http://www.juniper.net/>) for more information on the syntax and options available when configuring Junos firewall filters. policy-options { prefix-list IBGP-NEIGHBORS { 192.0.2.0/24; } prefix-list EBGP-NEIGHBORS { 198.51.100.25/32; 198.51.100.27/32; 198.51.100.29/32; 198.51.100.31/32; } prefix-list RADIUS-SERVERS { 198.51.100.9/32; 198.51.100.10/32; } prefix-list IBGPv6-NEIGHBORS { 2001:DB8:1::/48; } prefix-list EBGPv6-NEIGHBORS { 2001:DB8:100::25/128; 2001:DB8:100::27/128; 2001:DB8:100::29/128; 2001:DB8:100::31/128; } prefix-list RADIUSv6-SERVERS { 2001:DB8:100::9/128; 2001:DB8:100::10/128; } } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 firewall { policer 500kbps { if-exceeding { bandwidth-limit 500k; burst-size-limit 1500; } then discard; } policer 250kbps { if-exceeding { bandwidth-limit 250k; burst-size-limit 1500; } then discard; } family inet { filter protect-router-control-plane { term first-frag { from { first-fragment; } then { count frag-discards; log; discard; } } term next-frag { from { is-fragment; } then { count frag-discards; log; discard; } } term icmp { from { protocol icmp; } then { policer 500kbps; accept; } } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 18]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term ospf { from { source-address { 192.0.2.0/24; } protocol ospf; } then accept; } term ibgp-connect { from { source-prefix-list { IBGP-NEIGHBORS; } protocol tcp; destination-port bgp; } then accept; } term ibgp-reply { from { source-prefix-list { IBGP-NEIGHBORS; } protocol tcp; port bgp; } then accept; } term ebgp-connect { from { source-prefix-list { EBGP-NEIGHBORS; } protocol tcp; destination-port bgp; } then accept; } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 19]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term ebgp-reply { from { source-prefix-list { EBGP-NEIGHBORS; } protocol tcp; port bgp; } then accept; } term dns { from { source-address { 198.51.100.0/30; } protocol udp; port domain; } then accept; } term ntp { from { source-address { 198.51.100.4/30; } protocol udp; destination-port ntp; } then accept; } term ssh { from { source-address { 198.51.100.128/25; } protocol tcp; destination-port ssh; } then accept; } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 20]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term snmp { from { source-address { 198.51.100.128/25; } protocol udp; destination-port snmp; } then accept; } term radius { from { source-prefix-list { RADIUS-SERVERS; } protocol udp; port [ 1812 1813 ]; } then accept; } term default-term { then { count copp-exceptions; log; policer 500kbps; accept; } } } } family inet6 { filter protect-router-control-plane-v6 { term fragv6 { from { next-header fragment; } then { count frag-v6-discards; log; discard; } } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 21]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term icmpv6 { from { next-header icmpv6; } then { policer 500kbps; accept; } } term ospfv3 { from { source-address { FE80::/10; } next-header ospf; } then accept; } term ibgpv6-connect { from { source-prefix-list { IBGPv6-NEIGHBORS; } next-header tcp; destination-port bgp; } then accept; } term ibgpv6-reply { from { source-prefix-list { IBGPv6-NEIGHBORS; } next-header tcp; port bgp; } then accept; } term ebgpv6-connect { from { source-prefix-list { EBGPv6-NEIGHBORS; } next-header tcp; destination-port bgp; } then accept; } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 22]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term ebgpv6-reply { from { source-prefix-list { EBGPv6-NEIGHBORS; } next-header tcp; port bgp; } then accept; } term dnsv6 { from { source-address { 2001:DB8:100:1::/64; } next-header [ udp tcp ]; port domain; } then accept; } term ntpv6 { from { source-address { 2001:DB8:100:2::/64; } next-header udp; destination-port ntp; } then accept; } term sshv6 { from { source-address { 2001:DB8:100:3::/64; } next-header tcp; destination-port ssh; } then accept; } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 23]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 term snmpv6 { from { source-address { 2001:DB8:100:3::/64; } next-header udp; destination-port snmp; } then accept; } term radiusv6 { from { source-prefix-list { RADIUSv6-SERVERS; } next-header udp; port [ 1812 1813 ]; } then accept; } term default-term-v6 { then { policer 500kbps; count copp-exceptions-v6; log; accept; } } } } family any { filter protect-router-control-plane-non-ip { term rate-limit-non-ip { then { policer 250kbps; accept; } } } } } Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 24]
RFC 6192 Protect Router Control Plane March 2011 interfaces { lo0 { unit 0 { family inet { filter input protect-router-control-plane; } family inet6 { filter input protect-router-control-plane-v6; } family any { filter input protect-router-control-plane-non-ip; } } } } Authors' Addresses Dave Dugal Juniper Networks 10 Technology Park Drive Westford, MA 01886 US EMail: dave@juniper.net Carlos Pignataro Cisco Systems 7200-12 Kit Creek Road Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 US EMail: cpignata@cisco.com Rodney Dunn Cisco Systems 7200-12 Kit Creek Road Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 US EMail: rodunn@cisco.com Dugal, et al. Informational [Page 25]